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Abstract 
This study is inspired by the current debate between the traditional anarchist views, the 
post-left and post-anarchist understandings of anarchy. It claims that the depictions of 
anarchy by both sides are primarily negative and develops an original and positive 
definition of anarchy. In particular, it argues that anarchy is the concept that refers to a way 
of being with the cosmos and thus instead of being posterior to the political it is in fact 
prior to it. This is to say, it is neither political nor ontological but can only be seen as 
metaphysical in the sense of what cannot be spoken of in terms of a primary cause or a 
founding principle.   
Methodologically, it follows Martin Heidegger’s understanding of anarchy as an-arché and 
his idea to look into pre-Socratic, as in non-teleological thought, to define anarchy. But it 
then adopts Emmanuel Levinas’ approach that anarchy refers to what escapes the thesis-
antithesis dialectic. It draws mainly upon Ancient Greek philosophy and literature as this is 
where anarchy appears as a term for the first time. In particular, it criticizes the Aristotelian 
ontological and political thought, while it is mainly assisted by the thought of Democritus 
as the only pre-Socratic whose work escapes ontological thinking. Moreover, the 
development of a positive definition of anarchy ultimately leads this study to defend the 
communal nature of traditional anarchism while rejecting its association with the political.   
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Introduction  
Main Argument and Aims  
There have been significant developments to establish the study of anarchy and anarchism 
as an independent field within political studies since about 1993.
1
 Within the field of 
anarchist studies the notion of anarchy is traditionally employed by anarchists to refer 
primarily to a political association without an established ruling mechanism.
2
 However, 
due to the fairly recent emergence of two anarchistic tendencies, which have become 
known as post-left anarchism and post-anarchism, the interest in the meaning of the 
concept of anarchy has been revived.   
They can both be described as attempts to infuse or replace the traditional political 
anarchist thought with post-foundationalist notions and understandings. A more accurate 
description of them is that they provide a critique of anarchism’s ontological and 
epistemological foundations on post-foundationalist grounds. In particular, they attack the 
prominent position of anarchism, within the field of anarchist studies, as a political 
ideology but their main aim appears to be the critique and rejection of the communal 
nature of anarchism.  
Now, a clear definition of what post-foundationalism stands for is difficult because it does 
not pose a coherent political theory or political thesis in itself. It rather can be seen as a 
thought fusion or an interpretation of the political that mainly draws upon the ontological 
anarchy of one of the most prominent figures of continental philosophy, Martin 
Heidegger.
3
 It would be fair to say that the post-foundationalist critique of anarchism, 
expressed mainly through post-left anarchism and post-anarchism, is the result of the 
different views on what constitutes anarchy. Thus, traditional anarchism sees anarchy as a 
political end, while the post-foundationalist tendencies argue for anarchy as an ontological 
concept.  
                                                          
1
 Here I refer mainly to the publication of the first issue of Anarchist Studies in 1993. But the developments I 
refer to also include the Anarchist Developments in Cultural Studies journal, the Institute of Anarchist 
studies, the North American Anarchist Studies Network and the introduction of the UK’s Anarchist Studies 
Network as an official specialist group of the Political Studies Association (UK). 
2
 The ruling mechanism I refer to here is usually defined as government or the state. As the anarchist 
academic Ruth Kinna observes there is a tendency among anarchist writers to employ the terms state, 
government, authority and power interchangeably and this is because they usually call for the abolition of all 
these and not because they consider them as being synonymous. For example, see Kinna R. (2005), 
Anarchism: Beginners Guide (Oxford: Oneworld Publications), pp. 56-80.   
3
 Marchart O. (2007) Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and 
Laclau, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), p. 155.       
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Nevertheless, the traditional anarchist view and the post-foundationalist ones arguably 
describe anarchy as being primarily against and in opposition to an established thesis.
4
 
Inspired from the current debate in the field and the opposing understandings of the 
concept of anarchy, this study makes the case for a positive definition of anarchy. In other 
words, I argue here for a definition of anarchy that does not arise as or describe an 
antithesis in the sense of a position that deviates from what is considered as normal but at 
the same time requiring this in order to be defined against.     
I argue that anarchy is the concept that refers to the way of being with the cosmos and thus 
instead of being posterior to the political it is in fact prior to it. It is neither political nor 
ontological but can only be seen as metaphysical in the sense of what cannot be spoken of 
in terms of a primary cause or a founding principle. In practical terms, this means that 
anarchy signifies a union of beings that cannot be completely defined by an absolute 
signifier, or a communion of othernesses, which is the term introduced in this study to 
capture the togetherness of anarchy. This means that instead of an association that arises 
with reference to an ultimate signifier, the union I argue for has need as the medium that 
brings the othernesses together.   
Thus, this study is not about anarchism per se. Instead it is inspired by the current debate in 
the field of anarchist studies to develop its own definition of anarchy based mostly on 
Ancient Greek philosophy which is the origin of the notion. As a result it is mainly a 
critique of the Aristotelian and to a much lesser extent Heideggerian philosophies than 
anything else. This is to say it mainly contests the Aristotelian ontology and political 
philosophy, and through it most of Ancient Greek philosophy, as well as the Heideggerian 
ontological anarchy. This is precisely because it is upon Heidegger’s ontological project 
that the contemporary or latest understandings of anarchy are based and Heidegger’s 
thought draws upon the Aristotelian ontology. 
Nevertheless, the main aim of this project is to contribute to the said debate about the 
concept of anarchy. Hence, it ultimately aims to demonstrate the inadequacy and the 
inconsistencies in the way anarchy is depicted when anarchism is seen as a political 
ideology as well as critiquing the way anarchy conceptually functions in post-left 
                                                          
4
 This is to say anarchy is primarily defined as the absence of government or of the established political 
order. For example, as Kinna observes, the arguably most prominent figures of anarchism, Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin and Piotr Kropotkin, define anarchy primarily as the order that arises from the 
abolition of the established political order. See Kinna R. (2005), pp. 8-10. This means that anarchy is not 
referring only to the abolition of the established order. However, anything else that anarchy signifies in the 
works of these thinkers stems from the abolition of the established order, for example communal co-
existence, non-violence and so on.     
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anarchism and post-anarchism. Thus, even though the main aim of this study is to provide 
a new definition of the concept of anarchy, this ultimately leads it to defend the communal 
nature of what is described as traditional anarchism while rejecting its association with the 
political.  
Reasoning and Approach  
So, this study approaches the concept of anarchy in a way similar to Heidegger. This is to 
say it sees anarchy as a concept that is related to the Aristotelian concept of arché and thus 
it considers anarchy to be an-arché.
5
 As will be discussed thoroughly in this study the 
Aristotelian arché is a concept that refers to the founding principle or primary cause of the 
cosmos or the natural world. It is based on that from which his first philosophy or his 
ontology stems. Thus, Heidegger’s anarchy can be described as ontological because it is 
developed against the Aristotelian arché and thus in opposition to his ontology.  
As the Heideggerian philosopher Renier Schürmann says, ‘anarchy expresses a destiny of 
decline, the decay of the standards to which Westerners since Plato related their acts and 
deeds.’6 This means firstly that the analysis that takes place in this study is about the 
Western World and secondly that it approaches the concept of anarchy through a critique 
of the Ancient Greek thought as the foundation of Western philosophy. This in its turn 
means that its critique does not stop with Aristotle but entails others; from pre-Socratic 
philosophers upon whom Aristotle draws and Plato who as his teacher has a major impact 
upon his thought. 
Nevertheless, it is Aristotle’s work that is mainly criticized, mainly because he is the one 
that provides a complete account of the concept of arché. A further reason is because it is 
his thought that is commonly seen as the one with which Ancient Greek philosophy 
reaches its peak. For example, in Heidegger’s timeline of the Ancient Greek philosophy he 
is considered as the last of the great philosophers. In fact according to Heidegger, with him 
Ancient Greek philosophy reaches its peak and after him it declines.
7
 In a similar way, the 
                                                          
5
 The Introduction to Metaphysics is the work throughout which he presents and develops his account of 
anarchy as what precedes the arché. He identifies the arché with the Socratic philosophical thought and for 
this reason he looks in pre-Socratic literature, as what is prior to the arché, to find anarchy. See Heidegger M. 
(2000) Introduction to Metaphysics, (New Haven & London: Yale university Press).   
6
 Schürmann R. (1987) Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press), pp. 6-7. 
7
 See Heidegger M. (2008), Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press), pp. 17-18. 
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Modern Greek philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis, who is a critic of Aristotle, says that 
Aristotle enhances Plato’s thought and takes it to its limits.8  
Thus, through criticizing mainly Aristotle this study contests the works of those that 
preceded him and upon which he draws. However, Heidegger’s thought is characterized by 
a peculiarity that has been dubbed by his readers as “the turn.” So, after his so-called turn 
Heidegger renounces the Aristotelian and Socratic philosophy. It is through this that his 
ontological anarchy arises. But, as the continental philosopher and critic of Heidegger, 
Emmanuel Levinas says, he remains faithful to the concept of being.
9
 This means that he 
turns to the ontological exegeses of the pre-Socratic philosophers Heraclitus and 
Parmenides. 
Now, these are the first two thinkers concerned with the concept of being and those that 
employ it systematically. As a result, they are considered to be the main influences behind 
Plato’s teleological thought, upon which Aristotle builds his ontology. In other words, even 
if the turn to his approach can be seen as logical, in order to develop an account that 
escapes the Aristotelian domination, he ends up drawing upon the thought of those that 
gave birth to ontology and teleology in the first place. 
Thus, this is the point where this study parts ways with Heidegger. To make this clearer, I 
follow here Heidegger’s approach to anarchy as an-arché and his idea that anarchy must 
appear as a philosophical notion prior to the dominance of the Aristotelian arché or his 
first philosophy. For example, Castoriadis, in order to demonstrate the incompleteness or 
anarchy that describes pre-Socratic accounts in contrast with the overwhelming 
completeness of the Aristotelian ontology, says that chaos reigns supreme in the pre-
Socratic literature.
10
 But, instead of drawing upon those that are responsible for the 
emergence of ontological thought I choose probably the only pre-Socratic thinker that 
escapes this kind of thinking altogether; namely Democritus.             
Democritus is the pre-Socratic thinker that is principally arguing for spontaneous 
generation or a way of coming to be that is void from a founding principle. The term pre-
Socratic is a way to distinguish the teleology of the Socratic school, which is primarily 
expressed through Plato and Aristotle, from the thinkers prior to them. This is to say, it is 
not necessarily a chronological distinction, at least not in the case of Democritus, who was 
                                                          
8
 Castoriadis argues that ‘Aristotle does no more than make Plato’s thought more precise, pushing it to its 
limit.’ See Castoriadis C. (1987), The Imaginary institution of Society, (Cambridge: Polity Press), p. 197. 
9
 Levinas E. (1961), Totality and Infinity, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), p. 46.
   
10
 Castoriadis C. (1991), Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 103.  
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a contemporary of Socrates.
11
 However, I will be referring to Democritus as a pre-Socratic 
thinker in the sense that his thought comes before the Socratic teleology. 
The opposition between Aristotle and Democritus is clear through the plethora of 
references he cites to Democritus’ thought, as examples of what is wrong with not having a 
first philosophy or a founding principle as the beginning of the cosmos. Meanwhile, there 
is also the claim of the Ancient Greek biographer Diogenis Laertius that adds to the 
opposition between the teleologists and Democritus. So, according to Diogenis Laertius, 
Plato, the teacher of Aristotle, demonstrated his repulsion and antipathy towards the 
Democritean thought by asking for Democritus’ works to be thrown to fire.12 
It is unknown whether Plato and his followers actually complied with his request. It is a 
fact that only fragments of Democritus’ thought remain. It is arguably through Epicurus, as 
the philosopher considered the heir of Democritus that his thought lives through. 
Nevertheless, this study chooses to draw upon the fragments of Democritean thought as 
well as the work modern scholars have presented on them rather than on Epicurus, who 
employs Democritus’ thought to come up with his own philosophy.13  
Moreover, the thought of Democritus is usually examined alongside that of the philosopher 
Leucippus. They are usually referred to as associates and their thought, known as atomist, 
is examined or presented together. However, because nothing from the writings of 
Leucippus has been found, Epicurus argues that Leucippus never existed.
14
 Without 
implying that Epicurus is right, for the purposes of this study I will be referring to the 
sayings, which sometimes are attributed to both of them, as Democritean.   
This is to say, my approach to anarchy is partly Heideggerian and partly Levinasian. To 
clarify, I follow Heidegger’s understanding of anarchy as an-arché and his idea to look 
into pre-Socratic, as in non-teleological thought, to define anarchy. I then adopt Levinas’ 
approach that anarchy refers to what escapes the thesis-antithesis dialectic. Hence, this 
                                                          
11
 Democritus was born in the Thracian city of Abdera in 460BC and Socrates in 469BC in Athens. See 
Diogenis Laertius (1925), Lives of Eminent Philosophers, (London: William Heinemann Publications), p. 
443. 
12
 Diogenis Laertius (1925), pp. 449-451. 
13
 For example, as the classicist Monte Ransome Johnson observes, Epicurus introduces the notion of chance 
in order to change the Democritean spontaneous generation in a way that is more in line with his own views. 
As a result the criticism against Democritus as a proponent of by-chance causation is mainly a result of the 
Epicurean portrayal of his thought. See
  
Johnson R.M. (2009), ‘Spontaneity, Democritean Causality and 
Freedom,’ Elenchos, 30, pp. 5-52, pp. 19-21.
 
14
 Diogenis Laertius (1925), p. 541.    
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study’s account of anarchy is not developed as an antithesis to an established thesis.15 It is 
not anarchy because it rejects or contests the very foundations of Aristotelian ontology, as 
Heidegger’s ontological anarchy arguably does.  
Instead, as stated above I argue here for a positive definition of anarchy. The critique of the 
Aristotelian ontology and of ontological thought in general for that matter that takes place 
in this study does so in parallel with the development of my definition of anarchy. The 
reading and critique of Aristotle’s first philosophy as well as Heidegger’s ontological 
project serve as ways of establishing the plausibility of this study’s claims and arguments. 
The former is employed as an example of what is wrong with having an arché or with 
ontological thinking in general. Meanwhile, the latter as an example of what is wrong in 
providing a negative definition of anarchy or associating anarchy with what deviates from 
the arché.  
It could be said then that my approach is also partly Aristotelian because I employ his 
thought in a way similar to his employment of Democritus to support the plausibility of his 
arguments. As a result and because of the arguably prominent and somewhat privileged 
position of Aristotle in Western philosophy in comparison with that of Democritus, large 
parts of this study are dedicated to my own reading of the Aristotelian philosophy. This is 
mainly in order to provide a ground for my critique and thus additional support to my 
arguments.     
Field of Study and Sources  
As stated previously, this study aims to contribute to the recently emerged field of 
anarchist studies. Thus, it positions itself in the fields of political theory and political 
philosophy. In particular, it would be fair to say that it is more closely related to the 
Ancient Greek and continental philosophical traditions. It is quite clear that the Ancient 
Greek tradition refers mainly to the thought of Plato and Aristotle who can are commonly 
considered as the founders of Western political thought.
16
  
On the other hand though, the continental tradition arises from an obscure distinction from 
analytic philosophical thought. This distinction is arguably the result of the emergence of 
                                                          
15
 As Levinas says, thesis and antithesis, in repelling one another, call for one another. They appear in 
opposition to a synoptic gaze that encompasses them; they already form a totality. See Levinas E. (1961), 
p.53.
 
16
 Honderich T. (Ed.), (1995), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, (New York: Oxford University Press), 
pp. 693-700. 
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the Anglo-American approach to philosophy also known as logical positivism or analytic 
tradition.
17
 This tradition can be seen as approaching philosophical problems from a 
natural sciences or mathematical point of view. On the other hand the continental tradition 
is arguably more historically and socially contextual and phenomenological.  
Now, the post-foundationalist thought, upon which post-anarchism as a challenge to 
anarchism arises, is mainly based on Heidegger’s existentialism or his ontological thought. 
However, it is also influenced by post-structuralist thinkers, such as Michel Foucault, 
Gilles Deleuze, Jean-Francois Lyotard and Jacques Derrida, among others. Post-
structuralism is also a term widely used but without a clear definition. It usually refers to 
French thinkers or to a mainly French school of thought which focuses on how meanings 
and knowledge arise in language through the corresponding subject positions. It argues that 
language can only provide meanings that correspond to the culture within which it arises 
and thus against universal meanings or truths.
18
   
Post-structuralism or post-modernism can be mostly seen as the epistemology that derives 
from Heidegger’s ontology.19 For this study, then, only Saul Newman’s version of post-
anarchism will be examined and contested. This is because his version stands out as the 
one that makes a clear attempt to redefine anarchy on ontological grounds. Newman argues 
that anarchy is not an end or more accurately not a political end. He, much like post-left 
anarchists, draws upon the thought of the individualist philosopher Max Stirner, but he also 
adopts elements from the Heideggerian an-arché to refer to his account of post-anarchist 
anarchy.
20
 
Hence, I will not look into the version that has been dubbed post-structuralist anarchism. 
This is not only because of the fact that Newman’s version is arguably the most prominent 
one, but also because post-structuralist anarchism is more concerned with an 
understanding of anarchy as epistemological rather than metaphysical or existential. In 
fact, as the post-structuralist anarchist Todd May argues, post-structuralist thought is a 
                                                          
17
 Critchley S. (2001), Continental Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press), p. 32. 
18
 Honderich T. (Ed.), (1995), p. 708.  
19
 Post-modernism can be generally described as a critique of totalizing theories of knowledge or grand 
narratives. The main criticism of post-modernism is that grand narratives impose oversimplified explanations 
that end up reducing reality. For example, see Lyotard J-F. (1979) The Postmodern Condition: A Report on 
Knowledge, (Manchester: Manchester University Press). 
20
 See Newman S. (2016), Post-Anarchism, (Cambridge: Polity Press), p. 12. 
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fundamentally different approach to the Heideggerian phenomenology as it shifts the focus 
from being to the practices that constitute the being or more accurately the subject.
21
  
Furthermore, in practical terms this means that a plethora of Ancient Greek terms will be 
introduced and employed as a part of the endeavours of this study. A number of 
neologisms that appear mainly in continental philosophy will also be employed and 
explained. This is also due to the fact that the conventional terms of ontological thought, 
being rooted upon the Aristotelian concept of arché, cannot capture the notions this study 
associates with anarchy. This becomes clearer in the main body, although there is an 
indication of what terms are introduced in the chapters’ breakdown that follows. In relation 
to that and considering the convenience of the reader, there is a glossary of terms included 
after the concluding chapter.         
Moreover, in terms of the sources upon which this study draws, these include more or less 
the Ancient Greek philosophers named above and the post-foundationalist thinkers that 
engage in a Heideggerian or an-archic approach. This means that thinkers such as 
Castoriadis and the political theorist Hannah Arendt, whose political thought expresses in 
political terms the Heideggerian ontology, are included. Meanwhile, post-structuralist 
thinkers, as in the French thinkers named above, are for the most part excluded.  
It has to be said at this point, since part of my approach has been identified with him, that 
in Levinas’s thought this study finds an ally. However, his writings are mainly employed to 
support the arguments of this study rather than to drive them. This is because he grounds 
his criticism of Heidegger on Judaistic thought and rejects all Ancient Greek philosophy as 
ontological. This means that he ignores the Democritean thought as one that refers to 
anarchy. Consequently, his views will be of assistance but on a secondary level or used 
mainly as a methodological tool rather than as a basis for the actual development of this 
study’s arguments.  Moreover, since this study is about anarchy rather than anarchism, the 
examination of the writings of traditional anarchist thinkers is beyond its scope. Instead, 
anarchism will be approached through the way it is depicted in the works of contemporary 
anarchist thinkers.  
                                                          
21
 See May T. (1994) The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism, (Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press), pp. 75-79.  
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Breakdown of Chapters and Corollary Arguments 
Thus, based on the foregoing, I present here a breakdown of the chapters that comprise this 
study. In particular, I provide a short summary of the corollary arguments as well as the 
most important secondary arguments that are developed in parallel to support what this 
study stands for. It seems more efficient to not detail at this point the minor arguments and 
claims that arise as part of the discussion that take place in each chapter. However, it is 
appropriate to include here the key terms that are introduced in every chapter, as they play 
a fundamental role in the analysis and argumentation that takes place in them.   
Chapter One: 
Following the Heideggerian approach, as stated above, the first chapter employs a 
philological or etymological approach to the concept of anarchy. Philology and philosophy 
are arguably the two disciplines that share an interest in logos. According to Heidegger, 
logos is the Greek term that refers to the word or language/speech, as well as to, in a 
different sense, the essence or the reason that a being comes to be.
22
  
In relation with that, this chapter aims to provide a preliminary definition of anarchy 
through analysing the various ways in which the term is employed in Ancient Greek 
literature, as the context in which it makes its first appearance. This is mainly for the 
purposes of demonstrating that there is something wrong with the common association of 
anarchy with disorder. The main argument of this chapter is that anarchy signifies what is 
other than the arché or the hierarchical ordering found in the political and military 
contexts. The main secondary argument that appears in this chapter is that there is a 
fundamental difference between what is in anarchy and what is anarchic, a distinction that 
enables the contestation of understanding anarchy as a political concept. 
The preliminary definition paves the way for proposing a different understanding of 
anarchy or a positive one that is not associated with disorder. Meanwhile, the distinction 
between what is in anarchy and what is anarchic serves the same purpose, as it makes it 
possible to identify those definitions of anarchy that portray it as an antithesis rather than a 
thesis in itself. The key term introduced is the Aristotelian arché, which plays a 
fundamental role in the argumentation and the development of this study’s account of 
anarchy. Other terms are the Aristotelian telos, the notion of hierarchy, and the notions of 
being in anarchy in contrast with that of being anarchic.      
                                                          
22
 Heidegger M. (2000), Introduction to Metaphysics, (New Haven & London: Yale university Press), p. 131. 
16 
 
Chapter Two: 
This chapter draws upon the preliminary definition of the previous one, to complete the 
dissociation of anarchy from disorder. The examination and conclusions drawn here are of 
the utmost importance for what takes place in the rest of the study. This is because it is in 
this chapter that the plausibility of arguing for anarchy as the way of being is established. 
This occurs mainly through demonstrating that spontaneous generation or anarchy, as a 
way of coming to be without a founding principle, is in fact more logical than the 
Aristotelian concept of physis or nature as the primary cause of everything. 
In order to do that, I firstly distinguish between the notions of spontaneity and chance, 
drawing upon Democritus. Meanwhile, inspired by Levinas’ claim that metaphysics is 
prior to ontology, I then put forward the case for an understanding of the metaphysical as 
what is other or prior to ontology as the first philosophy.
23
 According to Aristotle, ontology 
is the first philosophy because it is the study of being qua being or of the essence of 
being.
24
 As a result, the main argument of this chapter is that on a metaphysical level, as 
what is prior to the emergence of ontology, there is no founding principle but anarchy or 
spontaneous generation.  
It follows, as one of the two main secondary arguments, that ontological thinking, and 
Aristotle’s physiology in particular, impose the way of the human téchne or craftsmanship 
upon the cosmos. Based upon the said distinction between the metaphysical and the 
ontological, I then demonstrate the difference between Heidegger’s ontological anarchy 
and what I argue for here. The other secondary arguments are: that Heidegger’s ontological 
anarchy is anarchic; that it arises as an antithesis to the Aristotelian ontology; and, that it is 
more accurately described as panarchy rather than anarchy. This is to say, instead of being 
without a starting point it turns every being into the principle of itself.   
The main terms introduced here are spontaneity and chance, the Aristotelian physis and 
téchne, the notion of teleocracy, the metaphysical, the Ancient Greek notion of chaos, the 
notion of being, and the idea of panarchy.
25
 Meanwhile, the thought of numerous pre-
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Socratic philosophers such as Anaximander, Parmenides and Heraclitus is presented and 
contested. The first two are challenged alongside the contestation of Aristotle’s ontology 
and Heraclitus individually, as a part of arguing against Heidegger’s ontological anarchy.      
Chapter Three: 
Having established the plausibility of arguing for anarchy as the way of being with the 
cosmos, while having demonstrated the implausibility of imposing an arché and a first 
philosophy, this chapter looks at what it means for the cosmos and the being to be in 
anarchy. To that end, I argue that the cosmos is a communion of othernesses or that the 
cosmos is an endless metaphysical interplay, in the sense of always incomplete or in 
ataxia, between beings and things. It follows that being is something that is always 
incomplete or an idiosyncrasy, as in an active constituent of the cosmos that appears as a 
unique amalgam of synergies that can never be completely captured by a hierarchical 
taxonomy.  
Meanwhile, this chapter provides additional support to its main claim that anarchy is a way 
of being by arguing against the Platonic and Aristotelian natural completeness, which 
requires the division of the being and the cosmos. As Aristotle says, the fact that the 
cosmos and the being consists of a mover and a moveable or a ruler and a subject, is 
apparent everywhere in nature.
26
 In relation with that the two secondary arguments I put 
forward here, is that being in anarchy is always being with or indivisible from the world 
and that the Aristotelian division of being brings forth the death of being or its renders it 
inactive. 
In order to do that, I draw mostly on Democritus and to a much lesser extent upon 
Castoriadis and Levinas. Meanwhile, Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle is also 
employed as a useful tool for the purposes of this chapter. So, I start by introducing the 
terms communion, otherness, ataxia, the private and the common, and the Democritean 
idea of the ‘like to like.’ These are followed by idiosyncrasy, the notion of non-being, the 
Aristotelian notions of entelechy, potentiality and actuality. Meanwhile, the discussion that 
takes place here paves the way for the contestation of the Aristotelian political philosophy 
and the portrayal of anarchy as a perversion of the political.   
                                                                                                                                                                                
TAZ: The Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism, (New York: Autonomedia), 
p. 9. 
26
 Aristotle (2001), Politics, in McKeon R. (ed.), The Basic Works of Aristotle, (New York: The Modern 
Library), 1254a, 30-40, p. 1132.  
18 
 
Chapter Four: 
This chapter as well as the next one look into the implications of the definition of anarchy, 
as a way of being, with regards to the political. This chapter does so through arguing 
against the founding fathers of Western political philosophy, Plato and Aristotle. This is 
because it would be fair to say that their political philosophy mainly looks for the best 
possible association humans can form based on a specific/specified understanding of the 
human being as a political animal. This is to say, the chapter demonstrates how the 
political and the ontological are linked in the founding works of political philosophy. It 
initiates the argumentation against identifying anarchy with the political or the depiction of 
it as a political concept.  
It does so, by drawing upon the preliminary discussion of chapter one, but mostly based 
upon the definition of the cosmos and of the being developed in chapter three. 
Subsequently, the main argument it puts forward is that the human being in anarchy is but 
a being in need or a being among beings. In relation to that, I argue for an understanding of 
need as the metaphysical medium through which beings and things come together to form 
the cosmos.  
Additionally, I make the case for an understanding of the political animal as the ontologist 
or the being that, driven by its neediness to have a reason to be, ends up enslaving other 
beings to serve its purpose. Consequently, the other secondary argument is that the 
political arises as a perversion of anarchy or through the war the political animal wages 
against the incompleteness of nature. In this sense, the political and slavery are products of 
chance rather than nature.        
In order to support the definition of need as the metaphysical or the missing link I draw 
upon Democritus. Meanwhile, to support my approach to the notion of the political animal 
I draw upon various Ancient Greek texts that claim for a specific understanding of the 
human being, which is very specific and non-inclusive. In addition, I introduce the 
following terms: the notion of need, the Aristotelian political animal, the concept of the 
polis, neediness and irrationality, the Ancient Greek notions of phronesis and homonoia, 
and the concepts of the ontologist and the slave.   
 
Chapter Five: 
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In relation with the discussion of chapter four, this chapter completes the examination of 
the implications for the political that this study’s definition of anarchy has. It also 
completes the argumentation of chapter two against the Heideggerian depiction of anarchy 
as an ontological concept. It does so in relation with the notion of freedom, as a concept 
that is inextricably bound to the arguments related to the political and the ontological.  
In particular, I argue that in anarchy there is no freedom, in the sense of the freedom to be 
attained through the political, or rather there is no need for it. In other words, the notion of 
freedom when in anarchy becomes redundant. This is because being in anarchy, as in being 
according with need, is a responsible way of being in itself that does not look to overcome 
or escape the world. Subsequently, the main secondary claims put forward here is that the 
political way of being is a futile attempt to attain a form of immortality through 
overcoming need. Meanwhile, the Heideggerian authentic way of being, which is realised 
in spite of the political, is an attempt to escape need that turns being into an indifferent and 
self-absorbed entity. 
To do so, apart from Aristotle and Heidegger, I also draw upon the writings of Arendt as 
well as other Ancient Greek writers, from Homer to Thucydides, as they provide useful 
information about the way of being in the polis. Moreover, I introduce the notions of 
authority and responsibility, the Heideggerian authenticity and oneness, and the Ancient 
Greek concept of authentes. The conclusions of this chapter, in particular, play a 
fundamental role in contesting the depictions of anarchy as a political end as well as the 
post-foundationalist versions expressed by post-left anarchism and Newman’s post-
anarchism.  
Chapter Six: 
In this final chapter of the main body, I employ the definition of anarchy I have developed 
in the previous chapters in all of its aspects to examine the implication it has in the said 
debate within the field of anarchist studies. In particular, I argue here for an understanding 
of anarchism as the manifestation of being in anarchy within a political context. I say that 
anarchism should be seen as the communal struggle that arises from the need to be in a 
way that is not contextualized by the political. 
I reject the depiction of anarchism as a political ideology, mainly because it reduces 
anarchy to a political end akin to Aristotle’s democracy or renders it a part of the political 
context that is tamed. Meanwhile, I also reject the non-ideological individualism of post-
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left anarchists, because it ends up depicting anarchy as an alternative ontology or first 
philosophy. And I argue against Newman’s post-anarchist anarchy because its rejection of 
the communal nature of anarchism eliminates every possibility of being in a non-political 
way by turning it into an irrelevant and isolated entity. 
To do so, I draw mainly upon the discussion of the previous chapters, as well as upon 
various contemporary works on anarchism. These include the main positions of post-left 
anarchism, Bob Black’s version, and Newman’s main claims, but also a discussion of Max 
Stirner’s individualism. Meanwhile, the terms introduced here are the idea of the 
Aristotelian democracy, Stirner’s concept of ownness, Michael Freeden’s notion of 
ideology, Newman’s concept of being, and the ideas of domination and revolution.      
Conclusion: 
This study concludes that anarchy is not a political or an ontological concept. As a result, 
the way of being is not something that can be completely defined by a first philosophy or 
rather it is not a téchne or a science but always something incomplete or in ataxia. Hence, 
it is probably now more than ever, necessary for the human being to part ways with the 
anthropocentrism of ontological reasoning and to use its ability to reason to be in a 
responsible way. In other words, arguing for anarchism as a communal struggle that can 
uproot being from the slavery, ruling and domination of the political is more relevant than 
probably it ever was.     
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Chapter 1: Arché and Anarchy  
Introduction 
Anarchy is a concept that is employed within a political context, to mainly signify the 
absence of government or the absence of the state.
27
 This is usually associated to a 
condition that deviates from the norm, which wants the political, from the Ancient Greek 
polis, to refer to an association of rulers and subjects. Because of this divergence, anarchy 
is commonly employed to refer to disorder, which is the result of departing from the 
fundamental principles and rules that make up the order that the polis signifies.   
I argue here, instead for a preliminary understanding of anarchy as a term that refers to 
what is void of an arché. This means that it signifies the absence of contextualization or 
indefiniteness, in the sense of what cannot be defined with reference to a primary cause or 
an absolute definer. To develop this preliminary definition of anarchy, I start by discussing 
the meaning of the concept of arché, which plays a fundamental role in the contemporary 
understandings of anarchy. To do so I draw upon Aristotle’s philosophy, as he is the 
thinker that develops the most comprehensive account of the concept. 
Following this discussion, which paves the way for the analysis that follows, I look into the 
way anarchy appears in Ancient Greek texts and argue for the detachment of anarchy from 
the notion of disorder. In particular, I argue that anarchy escapes the order that the arché 
signifies and thus cannot be spoken of in terms of this ordering. Consequently, anarchy 
cannot be the non-order of the order or disorder.  In order to illustrate and support my point 
further, I then draw upon the Greek language and propose a distinction between anarchy 
and what is anarchic. More specifically, I suggest that disorder or what is antithetical to the 
established order is akin to the anarchic rather than anarchy. To do so, I discuss relevant 
examples, while introducing Martin Heidegger’s thought and contesting it in a preliminary 
discussion of his understanding of anarchy.    
Thus, the discussion that follows is mainly etymological or philological in nature as it 
looks into the ways anarchy is employed in Ancient Greek texts. It is placed within a 
political context, since this is the context within which anarchy arises as a concept in the 
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first place. The main aim of this chapter is to provide a stable basis for the argumentation 
and analysis that follows. Hence, the mainly philological approach that follows is of the 
utmost importance for this study because it paves the way for the development of its 
account of anarchy. For example, the distinction of anarchy with the anarchic enables the 
next chapter to contest Heidegger’s ontological anarchy. In the same way, it informs the 
rest of the study, since the contemporary debate regarding the notion of anarchy starts with 
Heidegger and Heidegger begins with Aristotle’s arché.  
1.1. Arché and Hierarchical Ordering   
To start with, I look into the concept of arché. This is because the contemporary 
definitions, which sparked the debate regarding the meaning of anarchy, are based on a 
specific understanding of arché. In particular, the contemporary understanding of anarchy, 
as presented in post-anarchism, is based on Heidegger’s work on the ontology of being and 
is employed to refer to the opposite of arché. This becomes clearer later in this chapter. 
Now, the main ways in which the concept of arché is employed are to signify a primary 
cause, an established origin or a fundamental reason. However, it can also be understood as 
referring to a specific type of starting point, a beginning/initiative, and a source as well as a 
founding or ordering principle.
28
  
The fact that the concept of arché is polysemic or that it can be employed in many ways to 
signify similar things makes the analysis that follows even more important. This is to say, 
since arché and anarchy are two tightly related concepts that share the same root, 
understanding arché is the first step, or more accurately the fundamental step, in 
identifying and defining anarchy. It would be fair to say that if anarchy signifies the 
absence of an arché, then understanding what is an arché would provide a useful insight on 
what anarchy means. For example, as will be clearer later, one of the fundamental 
misconceptions with regards to the meaning of anarchy is that it requires or that it derives 
from an arché. It seems that this misunderstanding is the most common and refers to the 
conception of anarchy as disorder or deviation from an established order.   
Hence, the main aim of this section is to identify the meaning of arché. In fact, it aims to 
show that what defines the concept is the aspect of domination that comes through 
contextualization. This becomes clearer as the analysis unfolds. So, the terms arché and 
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anarchy can be traced back etymologically, to the Ancient Greek verb árcho. The verb is 
mainly used within military or political contexts by the Ancient Greek epic poet Homer, as 
well as by the Ancient Greek historians Herodotus and Thucydides.
29
 It is used to signify 
leading or commanding in a situation of war. The word árchon, which refers to military or 
political ruler, derives from the same verb.
30
 
Similarly, the anarchist historian Peter Marshall, who employs an etymological approach 
to trace the meaning of anarchy, argues that ‘the word anarchy comes from the ancient 
Greek word αναρχία in which αν meant without and αρχία meant first military leader then 
ruler.’31 Indeed, Herodotus and Thucydides used the word anarchy to describe situations 
where there was absence of leaders, a leaderless position, or a condition of lawlessness
32
. 
Now, leaders and laws are concepts that historically emerge within a political or a military 
context. Subsequently, it would not be inaccurate to say that if arché is to be understood as 
referring to a political or military leader; the political and the military are the only two 
contexts that appear to have an arché. Or that it is in the politics or in war that the Ancient 
Greek writers identify dictating and commanding as fundamental constituents.   
Indeed, politics and war-making, in Ancient Greece and in Ancient Greek literature, are 
two functions closely related to each other. For example, full citizenship in Ancient Greek 
city-states is often, if not always, a privilege of those that have the right to bear arms or to 
those that are soldiers.
33
 Meanwhile, being a citizen in Ancient Greece usually meant being 
able to participate in ruling or in government.
34
 This shows, albeit in a simple way, that 
there is a close relationship between politics, war-making and the concept of arché. 
However, this relationship will become clearer in the following chapters and it will help 
with the development of this study’s definition of anarchy.   
More specifically, this relationship captured by the notion of the political animal plays a 
fundamental role in Aristotle’s philosophy, who is also the thinker that employs the term 
arché in the most consistent way than any of his peers and among the Ancient Greek 
writers. It is his understanding that Heidegger draws upon or opposes and thus it is his 
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understanding that informs, in the first place, the contemporary anarchist debate about the 
meaning of anarchy. So, according to Aristotle, arché names that: 
1) Part of a thing from which one would start first, 
2) From which each thing would best be originated, 
3) From which, as an immanent part, a thing first comes to be, 
4) From which, not as an immanent part, a thing first comes to be, and from which the 
movement or the change first comes to be, 
5) At whose will that which is moved is moved and that which changes changes, and 
6) From which a thing can first be known.35   
Thus, for Aristotle arché is a starting point that directs a thing as in a line or a road as he 
says. Then arché becomes the point from which it would be better to start, to set things in 
motion, such as the best point to start learning something in order to advance. The third 
way in which Aristotle conceives arché is as a foundation or a fundamental part of a thing 
on which the whole thing and its existence is based, such as the vital organs of an animal 
or the foundations of a house.  
He also defines arché as the reason that brings a thing into existence, such as the coming 
together of the father and mother that brings the child to life. In his fifth definition he 
makes an analogy with the political world and talks about the will of those that steer or 
govern movement and change, such as the will of the magistrates in politics or the architect 
in arts. Finally, Aristotle conceives arché as the point or the idea that discovers, unveils 
and characterizes a thing, as a hypothesis relates to a demonstration. 
It appears then that for Aristotle the concept is multidimensional or that it escapes the 
limits of politics and warfare. Meanwhile, it would also be accurate to say that arché is a 
reference point, which defines or causes what follows in a complete way. A political 
action, for example, is political in relation to the reference point that defines what is 
political in the first place. In the same sense, if anarchy is to be employed as a term that 
signifies the absence of this reference point then anarchy is, itself, a part of the same 
context or something that only makes sense in relation with the same reference point. I will 
get back to that later in this chapter. 
For now it is important to attain the best possible understanding of what arché refers to in 
Aristotle as this enables, to a large extent, the analysis that follows in this and the rest of 
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the chapters. Aristotle distinguishes arché from other causes. In particular, he says that 
every arché is a cause but, it is not a mere cause (aition – αίτιον) that causes something 
and disappears.
36
 It is rather something that remains or persists and defines what follows or 
what comes to be completely. Arché, according to Heidegger’s interpretation of the 
Aristotelian concept, should be understood as ‘originating ordering and as ordering 
origin.’37 In other words, the origin, is the logos or the fundamental reason out of which 
order comes to be.  
To elaborate, Aristotle says that the cause of what comes to be names that out of which a 
thing comes to be and which persists; the form or the archetype; the primary source of the 
change or coming to rest; and that for the sake of which a thing is done.
38
 As he says, the 
last three often coincide.
39
 All three of them refer to the final end (telos) of what comes to 
be in different ways.
40
 This understanding plays a fundamental role in Heidegger’s 
ontological anarchy.  
So, the primary cause is primary precisely because it defines or contextualizes towards the 
end or the final form. To put it differently, the final form is entailed in the beginning. The 
outcome or what comes to be is intended and the beginning is the cause of what comes to 
be rather than simply a starting point. The difference between a primary cause and a mere 
cause is identified in the fact that the primary cause entails the telos or the final end of 
what is caused. As Schürmann, in his interpretation of the Aristotelian thought, points out, 
arché cannot simply be inception without domination because arché anticipates the telos.
41
 
Now, the domination that Schürmann talks about refers to the completeness that 
characterizes the arché. It refers to the fact that it contextualizes what comes to be in a way 
that leaves no room for either dispute or an alternative result than the one intended. It 
signifies a direct relationship of the primary cause with the effect or, in other words, it 
refers to the rule that governs towards a specific/specified outcome. This needs to be 
clarified further because it is the assumption of completeness that this study contests later 
on in order to develop its account of anarchy as a way of being. This becomes clearer in 
chapter 3, which looks into the concepts of being and the cosmos.  
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Thus, the completeness of the arché, as a primary cause or the origin of ordering, refers to 
the fact that the telos or what results from the primary cause is something that is intended 
and something that is not distinguishable from what causes it. The way the primary cause 
dominates is through the complete contextualization of the outcome. Hence, the final end 
or what comes to be is the projection of the primary cause or the actualization of what it 
intended. Or the effect of a primary cause is intended and predefined. 
For example, an arché is not a mere moving force that pushes a rock and causes its falling. 
It is rather a moving force that pushes the rock in such a way that makes it fall and land 
exactly where was intended. Thus, the primary cause contextualizes the whole process 
from the moment the rock is pushed to its falling and its landing.
42
 Most importantly, it 
provides the rock with a meaning or a goal. The context that governs the way the rock falls 
is governed by the primary cause, which is the fundamental reason that underlies it. As a 
result, the context is at the same time what governs and what is being governed.    
It needs to be emphasized though that the primary cause is distinguishable from the parts 
that it assembles and shapes to produce the order or the context, but indistinguishable from 
the product. For instance, the political ruler or the ruling principle, for example, is not 
distinguishable from the political order; it is the sole cause of it and the order is the 
materialization of its will. On the other hand, the parts that make up the political order, for 
instance the citizens and the slaves, are the subjects or the material through which the ruler 
produces the order.       
This means that the primary cause is the source that provides the context with significance. 
Here, significance, in accordance also with Heidegger, refers to what constitutes the 
context or what provides the context with meaning or substance.
43
 The primary cause, as a 
cause of the order or as a cause that entails and is projected in the order that it produces, is 
the ultimate definer or as Aristotle says the kyrion (το κύριων).44 It is what essentially the 
order is and what defines, by providing with a meaning or a role, the whole.  
Thus, the arché is the alpha and the omega or the beginning and the end; it is the origin of 
the order but also the order itself is a projection or the actualization of what it intended and 
caused. It is the essence of what comes to be or what the Ancient Greek term ousia (ουσία) 
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signifies; that out of which everything that comes to be acquires its meaning and substance 
from. As Heidegger states, by translating Aristotle; it refers to something on which other 
modes of being are dependent and through which these other modes are said to be.
45
 
What does this mean in practical terms or in terms of the ordering? Probably the best 
analogy that can be made for the type of ordering that arises from the arché is captured by 
the notion of hierarchy. Now, the term hierarchy is commonly used to refer to a type of 
ordering or organization in which the classification or ranking takes place in accordance 
with a starting point.
46
 Meanwhile, it is usually employed to refer to military or political 
ordering, where the taxonomy or classification takes place in accordance with the 
commander or the political leader. Indeed, Aristotle says, the things that follow the primary 
cause are placed at intervals in reference to that definite thing.
47
  
To make this more specific, the term hierarchy is coined by Dionysius the Areopagite, to 
describe an order that starts and ends with the same thing. For Dionysius the arché or the 
archon of the order is God and thus the order that the term hierarchy describes is a sacred 
order.
48
 The word is a synthesis of the Greek words hieros (ιερός), which means sacred or 
holy and arché. Hierarchy is usually translated as the governance of things sacred or 
holy.
49
  
However, based on what has been discussed thus far, the literal meaning of hierarchy is 
closer to holy origin or sacred primary source. To clarify, the term hierarchy is mainly 
referring to the nature of the origin out of which the order acquires its nature. This means 
that the order is what the origin makes of it; the order is sacred because the origin is. At the 
same time, this means that the fact that an order arises is secondary or something that 
necessarily follows the existence of an arché. As the philosopher Jacque Rancière says, 
arché always ‘presupposes a determinate superiority upon an equally determinate 
inferiority’.50   
Ruling, then, appears to be the result of having a primary cause or an origin of ordering 
rather than what defines it. To clarify, according to the foregoing interpretation, it is 
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because there is a primary cause that the order comes to be and it is because the order 
arises that ruling appears. The primary cause does not merely rule over something; it is not 
to be confused with a mere law or a command. Instead, the primary cause as the origin of 
ordering dominates by defining the nature of something. This, as will be discussed later, 
means that it defines what something or someone can do or be.   
Thus, to summarize the discussion about the meaning of arché, it has to be emphasized 
that a primary cause, as Aristotle defines it, refers to an absolute definer. This means that it 
causes something to happen in a predetermined and intentional way through 
contextualizing or ordering in a hierarchical way every possibility. The final end of what it 
causes is what dictates and defines the whole process of causation and provides every part 
of it with significance. This preliminary, mostly philological, understanding will become 
more comprehensive and practical in the course of this study. For now it will act as the 
basis for the argumentation regarding the false association of anarchy with disorder that 
follows.     
1.2. Anarchy and Disorder 
So, a primary cause or a founding principle, according to the foregoing, is something that 
orders in a specific way towards a final end and provides everything that is entailed in this 
ordering with significance. In other words, it causes through contextualization. As a result, 
it would be fair to say that without a primary cause there is no context. For example, if the 
military is arguably a context that comes to be in the way described above, then the 
disappearance of the primary cause that brought it forth would mean the disappearance of 
the context. I argue then that if this is correct, anarchy cannot be synonymous with 
disorder. This is because, based on the above analysis of what is an arché, anarchy can 
only signify something whose ordering cannot be described in terms of an arché. 
If an arché or a founding principle is what contextualizes and thus brings forth a context, 
anarchy, as what is without arché, can only refer to the absence of the whole context and 
not to a condition within the context. To elaborate on this, I will examine the case of the 
political context through the Ancient Greek polis. So, to start with, the most common uses 
of polis are those that refer to a citadel, to a settlement with a citadel, to a kind of a state, to 
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a human group, to a community, and those that refer to a country; the territory of a political 
community or state.
51
  
However, as Aristotle argues throughout his Politics, polis is the predetermined and 
predefined association of citizens in ruling under a constitution.
52
 It would not be wrong 
then, to say that in Ancient Greece there is no clear line between the polis and the political. 
The Ancient Greek polis/city-state appears to be referring to the materialized version of 
what is referred to as the political or the political is the literal way of referring to the polis. 
As Arendt, through her examination of the pre-Socratic or pre-philosophical polis, says; 
men secure a definite space and, through law, they built a structure where all subsequent 
political actions can take place.
53
   
Her description is slightly different to the Aristotelian view, as it emphasizes mostly on the 
law as the founding principle of the polis rather than its citizens or rulers.  However, what 
is of importance to the examination of this study is that the political or the polis refers to a 
structure or an organization according to a reference point. This may be either the law or a 
designated ruler. This reference point appears to be the founding principle of the polis or of 
the political context.  
In addition, there appears to be a hierarchical structuring that arises in accordance with the 
founding principle. For example, the inhabitants of ancient Athens are divided, roughly, 
into three main groups; the citizens, the privileged group that has the right to property and 
to participate in government; the metics, the non-citizen freemen, mostly foreigners with 
no property and voting rights; and the slaves, the group of people that is owned by others 
and has no actual rights.
54
  
It would be fair to say then that the Ancient Greek notion of the political refers to a context 
or to an ordering that is complete, in the sense that leaves nothing up to chance. This 
means that the ordering comes to be in relation to an established origin, which defines in a 
hierarchical way the parts that make up the polis. As will be discussed later, in chapters 4 
and 5, their positioning in the hierarchy defines their possibilities of being; since their 
being takes place in the polis. What is important here is that the polis or the political refers 
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to the product or what comes to be through the contextualization by, or in accordance with, 
a founding principle. 
On a different note, based on what was stated above regarding the relationship between the 
political and the military in Ancient Greece, it is not a surprise that the polis is a 
hierarchical order. Or it is not a coincidence that it is an arrangement of the parts that 
constitute it under an arché, in the same way the military order is defined by the 
commander. It is important to bear this in mind as this relationship, which is examined in 
depth in chapters 4 and 5, plays a fundamental role in this study’s argumentation.  
Nevertheless, with regards to the present argumentation it is important to note that the 
political context appears to be something that can be traced, in its totality, back to a 
primary cause, such as the constitution. If this is the case, then, it would be accurate to say, 
as stated above, that in the absence of this primary cause the disappearance of the whole 
context follows. If it is arguably correct to say that in the absence of the commander the 
military order collapses and disappears, then it would not be implausible to argue the same 
for the polis or the political. This is to say if anarchy literally means without arché, then 
anarchy refers to the absence of the type of contextualization described above or the 
nonexistence of the polis as a whole.      
In other words, I argue that it is ironical and wrong to employ the concept of anarchy to 
refer to disorder. To clarify, anarchy as stated above is commonly associated with disorder. 
I am saying that in order to talk about disorder there has to be some type of established 
order present. This is only logical because it is impossible to talk about disorder when one 
does not have a paradigm of ordering in mind. It is only in comparison with an order that 
something can be described as disordered or disorder. It would be correct to say that 
disorder refers to the collapse of an established understanding of what is an ordered whole 
or to what is other than an established order.  
Therefore, if, for example, the political is a context that refers to the specific hierarchical 
order that arises from a primary cause, anarchy signifies the absence of the whole context 
and not the disordering of the political order. In the same way the order arises and can be 
traced back to a sole origin, it withers away alongside the origin. It follows that the 
condition that describes the absence of the sole origin, anarchy, does not refer to disorder 
but to the total and complete absence of this specific order. To elaborate I will refer to a 
specific case in Ancient Greek literature in which anarchy appears as the result of 
disobedience or the collapse of the order.  
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So, the primacy or even sanctity of the laws, as the foundation of the polis, is stressed by 
Ancient Greek tragedian Sophocles in his Antigone. In the following passage, anarchy is 
presented through the words of the character Creon – Antigone’s uncle and the King of 
Thebes, as the greatest curse: 
The curse of anarchy will bring destruction. Bring ruin to our city. Destroy our 
homes. Breed panic and defeat. There is no greater curse than anarchy and anarchy 
is bred of disobedience. I must defend the law. No man, no woman is above the 
law.
55
 
In this case, anarchy appears as the result of disobedience to the law and as something that 
will have catastrophic consequences. The law appears as the foundation of the order that 
Creon’s city is built upon. Most importantly, in this case, the law is the foundation of his 
ruling or of all ruling, since he is the king.   
In other words, he sees in Antigone’s disobedience the beginning of a larger issue that may 
eventually lead to the elimination of the reason, from which his authority originates. Along 
with it, he sees the total collapse of the whole system of ruling that is maintained by and 
reproduces the order that Creon represents. However, there is no clear explanation on why 
anarchy would mean all the things he is afraid of. Meanwhile, it is portrayed as the result 
of disobedience. Hence, based on the way the term anarchy appears in this text, one could 
not be accused for understanding it as referring merely to political disorder. 
However, it is precisely this arguably superficial approach that creates the irony or the 
paradox I referred to above. The paradox is that anarchy as what is without arché, appears 
as a concept that can only make sense within a context or in relation with an arché. 
Consequently, based on this understanding, anarchy is a concept that requires an arché or 
is itself a part of its contextualization. In other words, anarchy appears as paradoxically 
acquiring its significance from the same primary cause whose abolition it signifies. 
If anarchy refers to political disorder in the above case then anarchy requires the political 
context to define itself while at the same time it is the concept that signifies the absence of 
that out of which the political context arises. This is like saying that anarchy has in fact the 
same founding principle as the order whose abolition it signifies while at the same time it 
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is the concept that signifies the absence of this founding principle. Or this is like saying 
that anarchy as what is without arché requires an arché or it has an arché.  
I will elaborate on this further, but firstly it has to be acknowledged that linguistically it 
may seem plausible to refer to anarchy as something that necessarily requires an arché. 
This is because indeed the term arises from the verb árcho, which appears, 
chronologically, prior to anarchy. However, conceptually or in terms of what the concept 
of anarchy signifies, this is not or this cannot be the case. It may be true that the root of the 
term anarchy is prior to it in literature or in the Ancient Greek language but this is not true 
in actuality. 
The phrase ‘in actuality’ will be used in many occasions throughout this study, especially 
when discussing Aristotle’s work. Aristotle, as will be clear in the following chapters, 
employs the term in opposition to potentiality.
56
 However, potentiality and actuality form a 
continuum for Aristotle whose importance will become clear in time. Here, I employ the 
phrase ‘in actuality’ to refer to what occurs in reality or practically. 
So, I am saying that practically or in reality prior to the establishment of a founding 
principle, such as the constitution of the polis, there is no such principle and thus no 
political context. This means that prior to the establishment of the founding principle that 
gives birth to the context there is anarchy or there is no arché. Does this mean then that the 
paradox I have identified here is simply the result of a linguistic failure? Or is it that the 
Ancient Greek language does not have a term to describe what is prior to the establishment 
of a founding principle?    
This question is not meant to be answered in this chapter. Answering it requires the 
introduction of the Ancient Greek notion of chaos and a further analysis of the Aristotelian 
teleological philosophy, which takes place in the following chapter. However, it is 
important to highlight this here in order to pave the way for the philosophical analysis of 
the issue that follows. Or it is necessary in order to suggest that the issue is deeper than a 
mere linguistic inaccuracy. 
To return now to the current analysis, I have claimed above that understanding anarchy as 
synonymous with disorder is paradoxical. This is firstly, because if this were the case then 
anarchy would in fact be signifying the abolition of what provides it with meaning. Or it 
would end up referring to the elimination of itself. To put it differently, if anarchy is 
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disorder or a description of the state of things within a context, the political for example, 
then it is the political that provides anarchy with significance. This means that anarchy 
requires the political in order to have a meaning. Thus, if anarchy is the result of the 
collapse of the primary cause of the context then anarchy signifies the abolition of what 
provides it with meaning. 
If this is right, then it is certainly a paradox, but it also means that anarchy, in a sense, 
eliminates itself. Because, if the primary cause is what provides the context and everything 
that is in the context with significance then its abolition signals the elimination of 
significance for everything that is defined in relation with it. For example, in a hierarchy, 
as discussed, all significance or in the case of the military all authority stems from the 
sovereign origin. Once this is abolished then all the layers of the hierarchy lose their 
significance or authority. Consequently, to say that anarchy is synonymous with disorder 
or to place it within this context is like saying that anarchy is what eliminates that which 
provides it with substance. If anarchy means the absence of the same founding principle 
that provides it with significance then it is no different than any other layer of a hierarchy. 
This means anarchy acquires its meaning from the same founding principle and withers 
away when there is no ultimate signifier.   
The understanding of anarchy as disorder cannot be right, because it defeats the very 
purpose of the term; anarchy appears as having an arché instead of being without one. 
Furthermore, if anarchy is to be taken as referring merely to the condition that results from 
the absence of a definer then this study considers this as another way of referring to the 
definer rather than abolishing it. Anarchy understood as a synonymous with disorder 
appears as an empty-of-meaning concept, which requires a definer to provide it with 
meaning or significance.  
Thus, in the light of this analysis, one can look back at Sophocles’ text and say with a fair 
amount of certainty that Creon’s fear is that the city of Thebes will disappear alongside the 
founding principle that brought it to life. What will replace it is not something that can be 
defined in terms of the existing order as it does not share its origin. In other words, his fear 
of anarchy, based on the above discussion, does not refer to him being afraid of leaving 
Thebes without a ruler or without his ruling. It does not refer to a transitional period, in 
which his ruling will be questioned because of Antigones’ disobedience and thus the order 
that Thebes is will change. It rather refers to the fear of being without the political context 
or with no polis at all.  
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Hence, to summarize the argumentation of this section, this means that anarchy does not 
signify what is not, in the sense of what is no longer what it used to be. It is not the 
disorder of the order, but what is not defined by the established order. For instance, 
anarchy is not the non-polis of the polis, but it is something that has no reference to the 
polis. Anarchy refers to what is not contextualized; in the same way it is impossible to 
refer to the polis prior to its appearance. What is prior to the appearance of the polis cannot 
be put in terms of it. Instead the political is nowhere to be found.  
The only way one can refer to what is there before the polis in political terms is in 
hindsight and once the polis has been established. In actuality what was there before it 
cannot be spoken of in political terms or in relation to it. To speak of it in terms of a 
context that was not there is to commit the fallacy of presupposing that what comes to be 
was always, somehow, meant to be. I will look into this fallacy later in this study. For now, 
it has to be emphasized that anarchy refers to what is prior to or beyond the establishment 
of an origin that produces a context or an order. Consequently, it cannot be seen as 
disorder, because order, in the way it appears through a founding principle is not there.   
1.3. Anarchy and the Anarchic 
Drawing upon the analysis of the previous two sections, this section aims to provide a 
solution to the above paradox through the introduction of a linguistic distinction. In 
particular, I argue here that there should be a distinction between anarchy and what is 
anarchic. With this I intend mainly to provide further support to the main argument of this 
chapter that anarchy refers to what cannot be spoken of or defined in terms of a primary 
cause. Furthermore, much like the rest of this chapter’s discussion, I intend to establish a 
basis for what follows. In particular, the distinction that is introduced here will serve as the 
basis for the argumentation of the following chapter against Heidegger’s notion of 
ontological anarchy.  
I propose that the term anarchic, unlike anarchy, requires a founding principle or a 
hierarchical context. In particular, I claim that it refers to what is against the established 
principle or ordering that arises from it. As a result, even though it acquires its significance 
from it, it refers to an ordering that is antithetical or to disorder; this is in comparison with 
the established order. I argue then that any antithetical ordering that maintains the initial 
context, produced by a founding principle, should be identified as anarchic rather than 
anarchy. This is because the opposite or the identification of anarchy with a reference 
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point, such as the political, implies that anarchy preserves the context and by preserving 
the context it maintains a reference to what it is meant to be abolishing.   
So, the distinction I am arguing for here can be demonstrated more accurately through the 
use of an example from the Greek language. In Greek, from which the concept of anarchy 
originates, the term anarchic (αναρχικό) refers to what arises as an antithesis or out of 
resistance to the arché or to what defines the order.
57
 For example, it is common in Greek 
to refer to a political action as anarchic. This type of action remains within the political 
context but defies or resists the ruling principle. The anarchic, then, requires an established 
origin or a context in order to acquire its meaning. An action is anarchic precisely because 
it is opposing the founding principle of the context. This is to say, it is itself a part of the 
context and never escapes it, which means that the anarchic is never without arché.  
On the other hand, the term for what is without arché or that cannot be spoken of in terms 
of an arché is anarcho (άναρχο). Arguably, the most accurate way the Greek term anarcho 
can be translated in English is: ‘being in anarchy.’ ‘Being in anarchy’, as opposed to being 
part of a context that has a primary cause or a hierarchical order, means being without a 
definer or being indefinite.
58
 This is to say, an action that is in anarchy is impossible to be 
defined as political, because it cannot be identified or defined through the political context. 
It is an action that is beyond the contextualization that occurs by a founding principle. As a 
result, it is indefinite or something that cannot be put in terms of a context or in relation to 
a reference point.  
So, it would be accurate to say that anarchy refers to what cannot actually be spoken of in 
terms of a context. It signifies that which has no context and cannot be defined by a 
founding principle. Does this mean though that anarchy, the way I have defined it here, 
signifies a context itself; the context that is the non-context? In the same sense, is it not 
more accurate to say that the anarchic is what stems from anarchy, as the non-context and 
not what requires a founding principle? With regards to that, I say that it is not plausible to 
say that the anarchic derives from anarchy, since anarchy, as being without arché, cannot 
act as a signifier or as an arché. 
                                                          
57
 It is not a coincidence that what is anarchic is identified in Greek language with what is anarchist or with 
the political ideology of anarchism; as an ideology that is antithetical to or subversive of the established 
political order. See Portal for the Greek Language: http://www.greek-
language.gr/greekLang/modern_greek/tools/lexica/search.html?lq=%E1%BC%84%CE%BD%CE%B1%CF
%81%CF%87%CE%BF%CF%82&dq= 
58
 See Portal for the Greek Language: http://www.greek-
language.gr/greekLang/modern_greek/tools/lexica/search.html?lq=%E1%BC%84%CE%BD%CE%B1%CF
%81%CF%87%CE%BF%CF%82&dq= 
36 
 
It is very important for the argumentation and contestation of the notion of ontological 
anarchy that takes place in the following chapter, to clarify that anarchy is not a signifier. 
Thus, I claim here that the relation the anarchic has with anarchy is that it resembles 
anarchy in the sense of unveiling the possibility of anarchy. For example, Antigones’ 
disobedience is an anarchic behaviour or a behaviour that goes against the established 
order. Antigones’ disobedience is not behaviour that is in anarchy; it can be identified with 
reference to the established order. However, such behaviour brings forth the possibility of 
anarchy or it demonstrates that the established order can be disputed and overthrown. 
Nevertheless, it remains within the limits of the context within which it arises and can be 
defined by it; it is an action that arises as an antithesis to the established order. 
As Levinas says, thesis and antithesis, as being in opposition to each other, already form a 
totality.
59
 For instance, an action that is antithetical is antithetical precisely because it is 
defined in reference with an established or a pre-existing thesis. In the same sense, the 
anarchic political action is antithetical in relation to the political. It would be fair to say 
then that the anarchic stems or acquires its significance from a founding principle rather 
than stemming from anarchy.    
Furthermore, understanding anarchy as a context or a signifier diminishes the whole 
meaning of the concept. If anarchy is to be seen as an alternative principle, to the 
established one, then anarchy again does not escape contextualization. Hence, the further 
argument that I put here is that the definition of anarchy is not a subjective issue. To make 
this clearer, there is an example in Ancient Greek history in which anarchy appears as 
being used to describe a period in which the established political order was replaced.  
This refers to the condition in Athens in the year 404 BC. This year is called a year of 
anarchy, which for the Ancient Athenians means a year in which Athens was without an 
archon or without a political ruler.
60
 However, Athens was not without a ruler during 404 
BC, in fact there was an oligarchic regime installed by the Spartans following their victory 
in the second Peloponnesian war. The regime has become known as the ‘The Thirty 
Tyrants’ and they have also installed Pythodorus as the archon of Athens.61 In other words, 
there was a political ruler and there was a political regime, but the year is still described as 
a year of anarchy. 
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Is it possible that 404 BC is a year of anarchy because the Ancient Athenians considered 
that year as a year in which their city has been abolished? According to what has been 
discussed previously, the polis arises in reference with a founding principle or a 
constitution, but this means that prior to its constitution there is no polis. Without an arché 
there is no context or in this case there is no polis, but in this case Athens did not 
disappear. It may have not been Athens in the sense the Ancient Athenians considered it 
because it was now subject to the Spartan rule.  
Does this mean though that the Ancient Athenians are right in defining this year as a year 
of anarchy? They may be right from their point of view; Athens was not Athenian but 
subjected to Spartan rule. Is it thought possible for everyone that does not accept another’s 
rule to define this condition as anarchy? That would turn every denial of domination of 
others over oneself into anarchy. This to say the Athenian denial does not make 404 BC a 
year of anarchy; it was a year in which Athens was subjected to Spartan rule. This means 
there was an arché albeit not an Athenian one. Thus, the denial of the Spartan arché does 
not instantly define Athens in 404BC as anarchy. This is an important point in which I will 
return to in chapter 6, to contest contemporary individualistic understandings of anarchy, 
such as post-leftist anarchism and post-anarchism. 
Therefore, an ordering that is based on an alternative founding principle than the 
established one does not qualify as anarchy. In the same way, I also claim that the 
transitional period from the abolition of a founding principle to the establishment of a new 
one should not be seen as anarchy. For example, Schürmann argues that Heidegger’s 
anarchy refers to what arises at that moment in time where there is confusion between 
principles and the arché, in the change from one epoch to another.
62
 An epoch, in 
Heidegger’s philosophy, is a historical or chronological period that is defined or comes to 
be by a founding principle.
63
   
Anarchy in this case appears to be describing the transitional period during which the 
anarchic principle or the antithesis overthrows the existing founding principle or the thesis; 
it is the period in which the antithesis turns into the thesis. If anarchy is a transitional 
period, does not this make anarchy nothing but a mere principle or a rule that arises from 
the same primary cause whose absence is supposed to be signifying? Indeed, I say that 
anarchy, understood as the confusion of the established order, becomes a rule that applies 
in every case that there is a deviation from what is the norm. It is the effect of the deviation 
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and as a result it is a principle that arises from the same founding principle out of which the 
order, which withers away, arose.  
Schürmann says that anarchy arises through the confusion between principles and the 
founding principle. In other words, he distinguishes between the two. Indeed, the 
distinction between a principle and the founding principle goes all the way back to the pre-
Socratic philosopher Anaximander. Anaximander is arguably the first that talks about a 
founding principle of the cosmos and possibly the one that lays the foundations of 
ontology. His thought plays a significant role in Aristotle’s concept of arché, as well as in 
Heidegger’s ontological anarchy. So, with regards to what defines and distinguishes a 
founding principle, he says that ‘there is no principle of this, but it is this which is held to 
be the principle of other things and to encompass all and to steer all.’64  
Anaximander then says that a founding principle is the principle of principles or the 
source, to which everything that there is can be traced back to. Indeed, the word principle 
comes from the Latin word princip, which is also the root for the Latin principes. It is not a 
coincidence that principes is a term used within the military context of the late Roman 
Republic. The principes are political rulers that were a result of the culmination of a long 
series of military commanders.
65
 Their political rule was authorized from the military 
imperium. The imperium, refers to the founding principle or the arché out of which the 
principes acquired their significance or their authority to rule.   
The term principle, then, is not a synonym of the arché. In fact arché appears to be the 
source or the reason, principles come to be; without a founding principle or a primary 
cause there can be no principles. As Schürmann, with his interpretation of the Aristotelian 
philosophy, says, ‘we will have to think the arché of a principle as its beginning and its 
rule.’66 The principles serve the cause of their origin; they are rules or axioms that come to 
be as a result of the contextualization. For instance, it would be plausible to say that even 
the simplest principle of behaviour is a rule that is meant to direct towards a certain end. In 
other words, it is not the principle itself that drives the behaviour but the source of the 
principle (arché). 
Principles, then, are to be understood as parts of the completeness of the founding principle 
that serve the purpose of contextualization. In practical terms they could be compared with 
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or described as laws or internalized and consolidated rules that arise from the origin of the 
order and serve or make contextualization possible. For example, it would be fair to say 
that when one says that ‘it is a matter of principle’ one recognizes, intentionally or 
unintentionally, the domination or contextualization of its behaviour by a principle.  
Thus, it appears that anarchy, according to Schürmann, is when the principles are not in 
line with the founding principle. Practically this refers to a case where the internalized 
principles of behaviour that arose from the established founding principle are in 
contradiction with the constitution. For example, it is arguable that in the Western World 
slavery is no longer justified through the constitution.
67
 However, the internalized rules of 
behaviour, which came to be through the constitution that used to justify slavery, may still 
be in effect. As Aristotle says, it is hard, if not impossible, to remove the traits that have 
long since been incorporated in the character.
68
  
This means that there is confusion between the principles of contextualization that used to 
define the way of being within the context and acquire their significance from a founding 
principle and the founding principle that has replaced it. Hence, it would be accurate to say 
that this understanding of anarchy turns it into nothing other than a part of the process of 
contextualization. It turns anarchy into a principle that serves or comes to be due to the 
process of replacement of an established founding principle with an anarchic or a new one. 
As stated above, the new one is described as anarchic because it arises as the antithesis of 
the established one until it becomes itself established or the thesis.  
Anarchy seems, in this understanding, to be a necessary stage or phase of the process of 
contextualization. This is because, according to the foregoing, the process of 
contextualization entails this period of confusion that precedes the crystallization of the 
arché. If this is the case, then, anarchy is not without a definer, as even if it signifies the 
period or the condition in which the definer is not yet established and thus arguably not an 
arché, it is still defined in accordance with it. To clarify, as stated above anarchy is not the 
non-polis of the polis or what comes to be after its collapse. This is because that would 
make anarchy akin to disorder and if the argumentation of the previous section is correct 
this is not or cannot be the case. Indeed, even Schürmann’s very description of anarchy as 
confusion points mainly towards disorder. 
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Thus, anarchy cannot be referring to the non-context of the context or the part of the 
contextualization that is defined by the fact that contextualization has not yet been 
crystallized. The confusion that this conception refers to is actually confusing anarchy with 
a principle or with what signifies the non-context that follows the collapse of a founding 
principle and precedes the establishment of a new one. Hence, if anarchy is a principle, 
then it simply is not anarchy or without arché.  
Additionally, to complete the current discussion, if anarchy is to be understood as the 
signifier of what is not yet contextualized it becomes indistinguishable from an arché.          
For example, Heidegger lived in an era of great changes in Germany, and it seems that he 
identifies the political confusion and the period of transition that followed the collapse of 
the Weimar republic as anarchy.
69
 But, if this is to be accepted then the passing of the West 
from the industrial age to the information age or the industrialization of China and every 
major change in what used to be the norm should also be identified as periods of anarchy.  
Nonetheless, that is problematic because on the one hand, as stated, it makes it impossible 
to distinguish between arché and anarchy and on the other hand it is like suggesting that 
the fact that not one arché prevails is synonymous with anarchy. Indeed, this 
understanding that defines anarchy as the condition in which there is not a single prevailing 
definer is the dominant assumption in the field of International Relations.
70
 It goes beyond 
the scope of this study, to comment and contest theories in the field of International 
Relations. Instead, this conception that wants anarchy to be confused with the absence of 
prevailing founding principle is further contested through Heidegger’s notion of 
ontological anarchy in the following chapter. 
All in all, this section provided further support to the preliminary definition of anarchy 
proposed in this chapter. In particular, through the introduction of the distinction between 
anarchy and the anarchic as well as through the brief examination of Heidegger’s 
understanding of anarchy, it showed that anarchy is not antithetical or an alternative 
principle. As a result, it cannot be associated with disorder or the corruption and alternation 
of the current established order. It rather refers to what is beyond or what cannot be 
defined with reference to the hierarchical ordering or contextualization of the arché.  
                                                          
69
 De Beistegui M. (1998), Heidegger and the Political: Dystopias, (London, New York: Routledge), pp. 18-
25. 
70
 Milner, H (1991), ‘The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique,’ Review of 
International Studies, 17 (1), pp. 67-85. 
41 
 
Conclusion 
So, in line with the aims of this chapter as set in its introduction, I argued here for a 
preliminary definition of anarchy based on a philological or linguistic analysis of the 
concept. In particular, I claimed that anarchy refers to what is beyond the contextualization 
of a primary cause or what cannot be spoken of in terms of it. To do so, I started by 
looking into the concept of arché, which plays a fundamental role in the contemporary 
debate around the meaning of anarchy and with which anarchy shares a common linguistic 
root.   
In relation to that, I have shown, based on Aristotle’s writings on the concept, that arché 
refers to a primary cause or an absolute definer and signifier that dominates by 
contextualizing. It has also been highlighted that the context that arises from an arché is 
fixed and the order is clear and undisputed. The completeness of the contextualization of 
an arché produces closure of meaning. This means, in line with the above discussion about 
the hierarchical contextualization that all significance is traced back to it.  
Based on the main points of this analysis, I then argued against the association of anarchy 
with disorder, demonstrating through the use of examples that it is impossible to do so. 
This is because it is paradoxical to say that anarchy signifies the absence of its own 
founding principle or of the signifier that provides it with meaning. Hence, I claimed that it 
is more accurate to understand anarchy as what cannot be described in terms of the order 
that stems from an arché rather than as disorder.  
To make this clearer and provide it with further support, I suggested that anarchy should be 
distinguished from the anarchic and that it is the anarchic that is akin to disorder. In 
particular, I argued that antithetical or alternative principles and orderings, to what is 
established, do not signify anarchy. They can be rather more accurately defined as anarchic 
or as arising from and against the same founding principle the rest of the context is. Within 
this discussion, Heidegger’s understanding of anarchy was also briefly introduced to 
support the suggestion that anarchy is not an alternative or an anarchic principle.      
Moving forward, it has to be emphasized that anarchy is not the opposite or a derivative of 
what is the dominant order. It is not a principle or a rule that comes to be from the 
founding principle whose absence it signifies. This is what the term anarchic refers to and a 
principle as well as a rule can be anarchic but never in anarchy. Thus, anarchy is to be 
understood as referring to indefiniteness or non-contextualization of what is or what comes 
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to be. In needs to be emphasized again that the preliminary discussion that took place here 
is very important for the development of this study’s definition of anarchy as the way of 
being.  
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Chapter 2: Anarchy, Ontology and the Metaphysical  
Introduction 
Philosophy in the Western World can be traced back to the thinkers that have become 
known as the pre-Socratics. The writings of these early philosophers are arguably the first 
attempt to theorize about the physical world or it is the first step towards a scientific 
inquiry about the cosmos. This is why the early pre-Socratics are also known as the natural 
philosophers or the first physicists.
71
  
It is physis or nature that this chapter is concerned with. In particular, it is the relationship 
of anarchy with the natural world that this chapter examines. This is mainly because, in the 
foundations of Western philosophy, as in the Ancient Greek philosophy, anarchy appears 
as something unnatural or more accurately something that deviates from the natural order. 
This starts with the early pre-Socratics, is formalized through the introduction of ontology 
as a first philosophy by Parmenides and is completed with the Aristotelian argument that 
physis or nature is the arché, in the sense of the primary cause, of everything.   
Hence, the main aim of this chapter is to make the case or to establish the plausibility of 
arguing for anarchy for the cosmos or for the natural world. This is important because of 
the primacy of ontology as a first philosophy or as an approach to the cosmos that 
presupposes a founding principle. Thus, the discussion of this chapter establishes the 
foundations for defining anarchy as a way of being, which is what the following chapters 
argue for. 
To do that, I examine the concepts of spontaneity and chance, because Aristotle associates 
them with anarchy or with what is contrary to reason. I draw upon Democritus’ writings 
about spontaneity to argue that indeed spontaneity refers to the indefiniteness of anarchy 
but, unlike chance, it is far from being contrary to reason. Based on this, I then claim that 
Aristotle’s physis or nature is but an imposition, upon the cosmos, of the deliberate 
intentionality or teleocracy of the human production method or téchne. As a result, I say 
that spontaneity or anarchy and the Democritean conception of the cosmos are more 
sensible approaches to that of Aristotle’s.    
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Moreover, to complete the formation of a plausible basis for the argumentation that 
follows, while providing more insight into what anarchy as indefiniteness stands for, I 
draw a distinction between metaphysics and ontology. This is to show that anarchy can be 
seen as synonymous with the pre-philosophical notion of chaos and the metaphysical; 
referring to the natural prior to the contextualization of ontology or to the coexistence of all 
possible ways of being in the absence of a superior one. Finally, I distinguish the anarchy I 
argue for from Heidegger’s ontological anarchy, by proving that what he argues for can be 
more accurately described with the term panarchy or as an anti-essentialist ontology rather 
than anarchy.   
2.1. Anarchy, Spontaneity and Chance 
This section draws on Aristotle’s philosophy as well as on Democritus’ writings about 
spontaneity and chance in order to reveal the association of anarchy with spontaneity. In 
fact, as will be discussed, it is Aristotle that identifies a relationship of anarchy with 
spontaneity and chance. This relationship plays a fundamental role in his argument for the 
existence of a primary cause for the cosmos as well as for his justification of political 
ruling, as chapters 4 and 5 discuss.  
However, whether anarchy is related with spontaneity and/or chance is important for the 
development of this study’s definition of anarchy. In particular, I agree here with Aristotle 
that spontaneity is indeed associated with anarchy but I disagree with his understanding of 
spontaneity and its equation or close relationship with chance. To do so, I draw upon the 
work of Democritus, who, as stated in the introductory chapter, is the Ancient Greek 
thinker that fundamentally opposes the Platonic/Aristotelian argument for an arché.  
Thus, my main aim here is to demonstrate that anarchy is related with spontaneity or that 
the indefiniteness of anarchy refers to spontaneity. This is fundamental for the main 
argument of this chapter and makes the analysis of the rest of this chapter possible. In 
order to do that, I claim that Aristotle is wrong in presenting spontaneity and chance as 
being contrary to reason. Instead, I say that it is chance that it is contrary to reason and not 
spontaneity. Spontaneity is not contrary to reason or logos. It rather escapes it and that is 
what makes it anarchy, or without an arché. 
So, to start with, Aristotle argues that even though physis or nature is the founding 
principle of the cosmos and operates in an intentional way or that it has a logos or a 
45 
 
fundamental reason, ‘some events are for the sake of something, others are not.’72 This 
means that Aristotle admits that chance and spontaneity exist as ways of coming to be. 
However, he downgrades them to secondary or ways of coming to be that exist as by-
products of the teleology of nature. 
For Aristotle spontaneity and chance are akin to anarchy because spontaneous generation 
lacks a telos, i.e. what comes to be is not for the sake of something. As he says, anything 
that comes to be by nature is for the sake of something and always or usually comes to pass 
in the same way.
73
 He asserts that nature is the founding principle of the cosmos and in line 
with the discussion of the previous chapter regarding the meaning of arché, it has a final 
end or moves towards it. Hence, his argument is that if nature is the founding principle of 
the cosmos and if it has a final end or what it brings forth is the final end it intended, then 
spontaneity and chance are akin to anarchy because they lack a final end. 
Meanwhile, if nature is the founding principle of the cosmos or the primary cause of 
everything there is, then he says that spontaneity and chance must be by-products of it. 
Thus, anarchy is for Aristotle a by-product of a founding principle or the corrupted result 
of what is done for the sake of something. He says that ‘every result of chance is from 
what is spontaneous, but not everything that is from what is spontaneous is from chance.’74 
Following this logic there are three ways through which what comes to be does so: the 
intentional or the way of nature to which belong those things that may come to pass for the 
sake of something; the by-chance products that do not come to pass for the sake of what 
actually results; and, the spontaneous that have an external cause or a cause that is not for 
the sake of anything.
75
  
In other words, he identifies spontaneity and chance with reference to nature and ends up 
positioning them contrary to it.
76
 This is because, as he says, unlike nature, spontaneity and 
chance are indefinite.
77
 Nevertheless, it needs to be emphasized that they are both 
secondary and posterior to nature and thus they would not exist as causes if it were not for 
the reason of nature. As he says, the results of spontaneity correspond to no determinate art 
or faculty, as such, but they are nevertheless possible only because they become possible 
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by nature at first place.
78
 This is to say, if beings and things did not have the potentiality 
they have by nature to attain nature’s final end, spontaneous and by-chance results would 
be impossible.  
The Aristotelian understanding of potentiality and its role in the justification of his cosmic 
hierarchy, upon which his politics is founded, is looked upon in the next chapter. For now 
it must be pointed out that paradoxically this study agrees with Aristotle that spontaneity is 
anarchy and is indeed indefinite. However, I disagree with the apparent equation of 
spontaneity with chance, which renders anarchy as something that is contrary to reason or 
something irrational.   
With regards to that I argue firstly for a clear distinction between spontaneity and chance. 
Following this, I attack Aristotle’s fundamental assumption with regards to the reason of 
nature. To start with the first claim, I say that spontaneity is indeed a way in which beings 
and things come to be, while chance is not. Through this distinction, which becomes 
clearer later, I want to establish that spontaneity is not a by-product of a primary cause. 
Subsequently, it is not indefinite because it arises as a corruption of reason or as an 
unintended result, but its indefiniteness refers to the fact that it is void or free from this 
specific/specified intentionality. 
Aristotle says that chance requires the ability of deliberate intention by the actors.
79
 Thus, 
chance is for him something that can characterize only results of the being that is able to 
deliberate intentionally. The being, according to Aristotle, that is able to deliberate 
intentionally is the being that has reason, which is none other than the human being or 
more accurately the political animal.
80
 I will withhold a detailed analysis of the way the 
political animal operates until chapters 4 and 5, which are concerned with anarchy and the 
political.  
However, what has to be said for the purposes of the present analysis is that the political 
animal is what Aristotle refers to as the zóon lógon échon (ζῶον λόγον ἔχον).81 Now, 
Heidegger argues that this description refers to the ability of the human being to gather and 
express itself through language in a rational manner.
82
 Meanwhile, Arendt emphasizes the 
difference between reason and contemplation and argues that the human being is the 
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animal that can contemplate or rationalize.
83
 Both interpretations emphasize the fact that 
the human being has the ability to reason. This is what distinguishes it from other animals.   
However, these interpretations seem to be missing the main point of the Aristotelian claim, 
which plays a fundamental role in his concept of nature as well as in his justification of 
ruling in his politics, as will be discussed later in this study. In other words, I am saying 
that the term ‘logos’ here does not refer to language or contemplation but to what defines 
the whole Aristotelian philosophy; the telos or the final end. This is to say, the human 
being is the animal that has a logos to be or a reason to be; it possesses its own final end. 
By ‘possessing its own final end’ I mean that it is the only being that has a say on its 
existence or it can deliberate over it.  
All other beings and things have no reason to be in themselves, because they are unable to 
be in a way that is according to their own deliberation. Their lack of deliberation or 
intentionality renders them lower animals or slaves by nature as they are unable to control 
or command their own existence.
84
 The term lower animals here, refers mainly to non-
human animals but it also includes humans that are incapable of controlling their 
animalistic nature, as well as inanimate things such as rocks.
85
 Thus, their existence 
appears to be for the sake of nothing or their final end, in the sense of what they become in 
the end is a result of chance. 
In other words, chance is indeed posterior to reason, in the Aristotelian sense of 
deliberating towards a final end. This can be understood in two ways. Firstly, chance and 
what results from chance refers indeed to what arises from reason but contrary to it. In 
other words, chance is not what causes the result, but chance describes precisely the fact 
that the result of a deliberate action or of something that intended a specific/specified end, 
does not come to pass. For example, based on the foregoing, this can be described as the 
instance in which there is a clash between the deliberate intentions of two agents capable 
of doing so or based on Aristotle between two political animals. Thus, chance in this case 
refers to what Democritus defines as the intersection between two lines of causality.
86
  
It seems clear from this example that chance is not causing but rather is caused. In 
addition, it becomes apparent that chance is a subjective matter; chance exists only in 
relation with a specific/specified primary cause. There is no chance or by-chance result 
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where there is no intention towards a final end. More accurately, it appears only within the 
field that the political animal or the animal that has a reason to be operates. This field is the 
political or the polis, but I will look into the way this field comes to be in chapters 4 and 5. 
So, from the foregoing, it would be fair to say that chance is not akin to anarchy, as it 
obviously has a primary cause. It could be more accurately compared with what I have 
described in the previous chapter as anarchic, since it requires a founding principle but 
appears as being contrary to it. Chance is contrary to reason, but, in a sense, it reaffirms the 
intentionality of reason, because the results of chance are always the results of an action 
that is for the sake of something. This comparison is of minor importance for the purposes 
of this discussion. What is important is that this reveals what appears to be the true 
relationship between chance and spontaneity, which refers to the second understanding 
mentioned above. 
To be more specific, based on the foregoing, it would be accurate to rephrase the above 
conclusion by saying that chance appears when spontaneity withers away or in its absence. 
If spontaneity refers to the absence of a final end or deliberate intentionality and chance 
appears where deliberate intentionality operates, then chance appears in the absence of 
spontaneity. Furthermore, if chance is what is contrary to reason and if it appears in the 
absence of spontaneity, then it would be logical to say that chance replaces spontaneity 
rather than being analogous to it. As Democritus says, chance appears in the absence of 
responsibility or it is installed in its place.
87
   
Democritus associates spontaneity or being in a spontaneous way with the freedom of 
being of one’s own accord.88 Furthermore, by not distinguishing between natural and 
spontaneous causes as what brings forth beings and things, he appears to be relating this 
freedom to nature or the way in which beings and things come to be.
89
 Thus, it would be 
correct to say that spontaneity in Democritus, as a way of being according to one’s own 
accord, entails the notion of responsibility. This is because one is entirely responsible for 
one’s own existence. Meanwhile, this appears to be the natural way in his thought. 
So, if Aristotle’s characterization of every being other than the political animal as a lower 
animal is to be accepted for the purposes of this discussion and if their way of being as 
being spontaneous is also to be accepted, then it appears that spontaneity or anarchy is 
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indeed not irrational or contrary to reason but merely what escapes the Aristotelian 
conception of reason. If for example, a horse, as a lower animal, is in a spontaneous way or 
in anarchy, as it is unable of deliberate intentionality, then the way of being of the horse is 
simply a way of being that cannot be defined according to the way of the Aristotelian 
physis. In other words, its way of being is not part of the context which physis represents in 
Aristotle or not part of the context of the political animal.  
This is until its way of being is contextualized. This is because once it is, it is no longer in 
anarchy or in a spontaneous way, but it becomes a part of the context and thus it acquires 
an end or a reason to be. From the moment the horse ceases to be the spontaneous animal 
that is responsible for its own being and it becomes the animal that, for instance, is to carry 
the political animal, it is absorbed into its context and it acquires a nature. What it becomes 
is not necessarily what it is but something other or something defined by someone else. To 
put it differently, at the moment the spontaneity of the horse withers away, it ends up being 
a product of chance.  
This is to say the horse’s own being or existence is no longer up to it but up to the definer 
that imposes upon it an end; to pull a carriage for example. Thus, its spontaneous way of 
being or its responsibility to be in its own accord is replaced with chance, which is the 
result of the imposition of a reason for it to be that is not its own. Does this mean though 
that I argue that the horse has a reason to be in itself? Because if I were to, then it seems 
that there would be no difference between my argument and Aristotle’s. I will return to this 
point later in this chapter.   
Nevertheless, the above claim also presupposes that Aristotle is wrong and that 
Democritus’ association of spontaneity with nature is true. Thus, the next section seeks to 
clarify this and to demonstrate why this study considers anarchy or spontaneity to be the 
way of being or why Aristotle is indeed wrong. This is very important not only for the 
argumentation of this chapter but for what follows in chapter 3 with regards to the concept 
of being, as well as with regards to the opinion of this study about the origins of the 
political or the polis in Ancient Greece later on. All in all, the main point made in this 
section is that the indefiniteness of anarchy refers to what is spontaneous or to what is not 
absorbed or does not belong in the hierarchical ordering of a primary cause.    
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2.2. Anarchy and Aristotle’s Physical Teleocracy  
As stated previously, I look here into what makes the Aristotelian conception of physis or 
nature problematic or what makes the Democritean more plausible. This is mainly in order 
to support the above claim that anarchy or spontaneity, as what is indefinite in the sense of 
being without a final end or a telos, is not irrational or the result of the corruption of 
reason. Hence, I argue that the Aristotelian concept of nature is based upon a false 
inference which renders it an artificial construct that serves the Aristotelian philosophy. 
Moreover, I claim that the falsity of his inference is due to the absurd fundamental 
assumption he makes about the superiority of the human being or the political animal.   
I claim that Aristotle’s concept of nature is more of an instrument employed by him to 
justify his views than a genuine attempt to describe and define nature. This may sound 
farfetched but I am not the first to make such a claim for Aristotle’s understanding of 
nature. For example, Schürmann argues that the Aristotelian conception of nature, which 
he defines as teleocracy, seems to be born from reflection about téchne alone.
90
 Now, 
teleocracy here refers to the Aristotelian argument that the primary cause intends for a 
specific effect to prevail in the end. Based on the analysis of the previous chapter, the telos 
or the final effect is what the primary cause intends to bring forth. 
Meanwhile, the term téchne, referred to by Schürmann, is employed by Aristotle to signify 
true knowledge. He makes, then, a clear distinction between experience (empeiria – 
εμπειρία) and knowledge, téchne or episteme; ‘for men of experience know that the thing is 
so, but do not know why, while the others know the “why” and the cause.’91 As Heidegger 
says téchne ‘is a form of knowledge; it means: know-how in, i.e., familiarity with, what 
grounds every act of making and producing. It means knowing what the production of, 
e.g., a bedstead must come to, where it must achieve its end and be completed.’92 This 
means that he presupposes that there is a fundamental reason for anything that comes to be 
and as such it can be identified. But, the meaning of the term téchne is more complex and it 
is from this that his teleocracy arises.  
Aristotle says clearly that there are two ways in which a being or a thing comes to be; 
physis or nature and téchne or human reasoning/art. These two ways both refer to his 
concept of arché. In other words, they both refer to a primary cause. The main distinction 
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between them is that the thing or being that comes to be by nature ‘has within itself a 
principle of motion and of stationariness.’93 This means that the beings and things that 
come to be by nature entail their origin, while in manmade things the origin is external. 
Indeed, Aristotle emphasizes the relationship between natural and artificial coming to be. 
He uses numerous examples to demonstrate the similarities in the two processes. However, 
architecture and the hierarchical ordering it employs to produce things appears to be for 
him the true paradigm of how téchne is an arché.
94
 Thus, what he says is that the natural 
coming to be of beings can be seen as similar to the way the architect produces the 
building. The relationship between the two processes is identified by Aristotle in the 
following way: ‘generally téchne partly completes what physis cannot bring to a finish, and 
partly imitates her. If, therefore, artificial products are for the sake of a telos, so clearly 
also are by physis products.’95  
Is it farfetched then or implausible to argue, for someone who says that nature is no 
different than architecture, that nature is for him an artificial or a manmade product? Or is 
it not evidence enough that he infers that because a house is made for a reason then nature 
also must be producing things for a reason? What I am saying is that physis is the answer 
that Aristotle comes up with to satisfy the rules he identifies with regards to what 
constitutes knowledge; it is the founding principle that he considers philosophy requires 
and not a genuine investigation of the cosmos. This is not to say that his work is not 
genuine. Instead, this means that the purpose of his concept of physis seems to be other 
than describing the cosmos or the world.  
In the view of this study Aristotle’s primary attempt is to found philosophy upon a first 
principle in the same way architecture is or to establish a first philosophy in the sense of an 
inquiry that forms the basis for every other inquiry. To clarify, for Aristotle knowledge is 
‘knowing why’, which refers to grasping the primary cause or arché of a thing.96 And if it 
is to be accepted that the fundamental philosophical question, as Heidegger says, is: why 
are there beings at all instead of nothing?
97
, then, the Aristotelian physis or nature is 
precisely the answer to this question; it is the founding principle that establishes 
philosophy as an episteme proper. Even more so, it establishes philosophy as the one that 
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stands above all others because philosophy is concerned with the primary cause of the 
cosmos.
98
 
However, the Ancient Greek word episteme comes from the verb epistamai (επίσταμαι), 
which literally means to stand over something.
99
 In addition, episteme and téchne are the 
two terms that refer to true knowledge that seem to be indistinguishable or synonymous in 
Aristotle. If this is the case, and if philosophy is the episteme of nature, then it would be 
fair to say that philosophy is also the téchne of nature. If this correct, then philosophy is, 
similarly with architecture as the paradigm of téchne, the primary cause of nature, which 
means that nature, according to Aristotle, is but the final end or telos of philosophy. 
To clarify, it seems that in Aristotle the roles of philosophy and of the philosopher are to 
provide beings and things with significance or bring them forth to presence. Philosophy is 
the primary cause of nature in the sense of being the way through which the 
contextualization or ordering of beings and things takes place and brings forth the physical 
world.  For example, a thing that is produced by the human art acquires its meaning from 
its utility or from what it does; the chair is for sitting and the bed is for sleeping.  
In the same way, Aristotle appears to be arguing that a being or a thing comes to presence 
by being contextualized or categorized. ‘Comes to presence’ here means that the being 
appears as something that can be spoken of in reference with the human being and thus 
becomes a part of the physical context. For instance, in this way tame animals and beasts 
appear, with the former referring to those animals that can be used by human beings and 
the latter to those that are wild and of no apparent use.  
It would be fair to say that this is also reaffirmed by his abstract claim that physis makes 
nothing incomplete and nothing in vain, thus it has made all animals for the sake of man.
100
 
It would be accurate to say that this claim can only make sense in relation with the above 
that téchne completes the work of physis. It is up to the human being to define the beings 
and things that it comes across. This way it completes them by providing their meaningless 
existence with a reason to be. If this is the case and this is how the physical or the natural 
comes to be in Aristotle, then it seems fair to say that the Democritean association of 
nature with spontaneity seems more plausible. More importantly, it demonstrates that 
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anarchy or spontaneity far from being irrational is what escapes the teleocracy of 
Aristotelian reason.   
This is because his teleocracy is an understanding that arises not through the use of reason 
alone but through the imposition of the deliberate intentionality of téchne. As Castoriadis 
says, in Aristotle the possible and impossible of the human way of producing things 
(téchne) and of human language (logos) extends its determinacy over the whole of 
creation. In other words, as he says, everything that is possible is determined as something 
that is intended as well as the way through which it comes to be, while what is impossible 
is also determined as something that does not have the power or potentiality to be.
101
  
Now, it would admittedly be absurd to say that it is wrong to employ reason to make sense 
of the cosmos. However, there is a difference between employing reason systematically to 
study nature and arguing that human reasoning is the way the cosmos comes to be. I am 
not disputing that the human being is the being that is primarily making sense of the 
cosmos through its reasoning. Is not though human reasoning or the way the human being 
makes sense of the cosmos, one of the indefinite ways in which this is possible?  
In answer, I say that even if the deliberation that Aristotle argues for is the way the human 
being makes sense of the cosmos, it is wrong to claim that this is the only way or the way 
that should be imposed upon other animals and things. To make this more precise, anarchy 
in the sense of the absence of a fundamental way of being seems more plausible. Every 
being makes sense of the cosmos in its own way; the ant through its antennae, the dog 
mainly through its senses and the human being mostly through its reasoning. Each one of 
them is unique and corresponds to a single being; the cosmos of the ant is not the cosmos 
of the human and so on. 
For example, in the Ancient Greek mythology, the titan Prometheus seeks desperately a 
way to ensure the survival of the human being. This is because it is the being that 
according to the myth is naked or stripped of anything that could ensure its existence and 
being with the cosmos. To that end, he decides to gift it with fire, which represents 
arguably the intelligence through which it will be able to respond to the challenges and 
dangers of existence.
102
 This means, the way humans make sense of the cosmos, by 
looking for causes and patterns, is one among indefinite number of ways.    
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As Democritus says, all possible worlds exist.
103
 This arguably refers to the fact that every 
possible way of being exists or more accurately that they co-exist. In relation to that, the 
philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy provides a brilliant definition of the cosmos or the natural 
world as being ‘precisely that in which there is room for everyone: but a genuine place, 
one in which things can genuinely take place.’104 The genuineness here refers to the fact 
that every single way of being, or making sense of the cosmos, contains its own truth.  
This must be correct, since in order to say that one of these ways of being or truths is the 
correct one, all possible ways of being must be reduced to one. If this has to take place then 
this is a process that ends up imposing this one way of being rather than actually 
identifying it. To put it differently, Aristotle totalizes under a single superior principle the 
whole of the cosmos by eliminating all possible ways to be that are not in line with the 
ability to deliberate towards a telos. The Aristotelian claim that there is a fundamental way 
of being is based on the false assumption that teleocracy is the superior way of being. 
Nevertheless, the claim that the telocracy of human art or craftsmanship is necessarily the 
superior way of being is unsupported. This is because it requires an understanding that is 
beyond human knowledge.  
This means that in order to say that the humans are superior to horses, one must be able to 
know the way the horses make sense of the cosmos and be in a position to compare them. 
What the human being has achieved through science may have no value for the horse and 
thus its superiority rests on nothing but a false assumption that what the human being 
values is what is valuable in itself. As Democritus says, because other animals and in many 
cases among individuals there are differences in the way they make sense of the cosmos, 
there is either no truth or to us at least it is not evident.
105
  
It is then literally impossible to put or express the whole of creation in terms of an arché. It 
is false to project the value of the achievements of humanity upon the whole of creation as 
if nothing else exists or has value other than the human way of being or the human 
reasoning. The idea that nature does everything for the human being is dangerous, as it 
could be seen as justifying domination over every being that does not possess téchne. As 
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Schürmann says; the principle of domination of the mastery of mind over nature starts with 
Aristotelian totalitarian relation-to-one (pros en – προς εν).106  
Moreover, it is also wrong because it is based on a one-sided/anthropocentric comparison 
that is impossible. For example, it is like saying that no matter what are the strengths and 
weaknesses of each being, every being will be judged on whether they possess reason or 
not. Of course in a competition such as this the being that ends up winning is the being that 
possesses the specific type of reasoning the competition lacks, but is this fair or even 
logical when each being has a different way of making sense of the cosmos?  
It would be accurate to say that this is unjust and illogical, because it eliminates otherness 
and in the process it overlooks the fact that the human animal is not the fastest or the 
strongest, neither the oldest living creature on earth. Such a claim, which presents as 
undisputable the superiority of the human being, is one-sided and ignores deftly the 
fragility of the human being as well as the fact it is a species that has only been on earth for 
the past 0.2 million years.
107
  
However, to overlook this or to neglect the recentness of the appearance of the human 
being is like saying that the fact that beings and things have been living on earth for 
millions of years does not matter. More accurately, since order and meaning, as Aristotle 
says, appears with the human being, it is like saying that all these eons were filled with 
meaningless and disordered existence. Indeed, the nature in the sense of the physical 
context that is hierarchically ordered, arguably appears with the human search of a starting 
point for nature. Based on the foregoing, to claim that nature does everything for the 
human being is absurd because it is contrary to evidence.     
As a result, it would be more plausible to say, in line with the Democritean argument, that 
nature is more accurately described by the indefiniteness or spontaneity of anarchy. Or that 
the indefiniteness that anarchy is, refers to the coexistence of all possible worlds in such a 
way that none of them is superior to the other. If this is correct, then anarchy is far from 
being synonymous with disorder or the corruption of order. Instead, it appears to be akin to 
an order that is other than or beyond the hierarchy of the Aristotelian teleocracy. As 
Levinas says, with reference to the term imperium employed in the previous chapter to 
describe the way Aristotle’s primary cause operate, anarchy ‘is not formed out of 
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resistance to the same, but is prior to every initiative, to all imperialism of the same.’108 
This is to say anarchy is not a by-product that is contrary to the attempt to contextualize 
everything under a sole sovereign principle, but what precedes and escapes it.        
2.3. Anarchy as Metaphysical and the Notion of Chaos 
Following the discussion of the previous section and in particular following on from its last 
sentence, I look here into what I have referred to as the attempt to contextualize the cosmos 
under a sole origin. Through the examination that takes place here I draw a distinction 
between ontology and metaphysics based on which I unveil a relation between anarchy and 
the metaphysical. In particular, I argue here that anarchy is to be seen as synonymous with 
the Ancient Greek notion of chaos, which I claim refers to nothing else than what is 
metaphysical, as what is beyond the physical as a context.  
The distinction drawn here plays a significant role in the definition of anarchy I develop in 
this study because it makes it possible to contest Heidegger’s conception of anarchy as 
ontological. In addition, the association of anarchy with chaos introduces the discussion of 
the following two chapters about why anarchy is the way of being. Moreover, it provides 
an answer to the question posed in the previous chapter about whether the paradox about 
the common meaning of anarchy is merely a linguistic issue of the Ancient Greek 
language. I aim to demonstrate that chaos is the term that refers to anarchy prior to the 
emergence of nature or prior to the contextualization of everything by the human téchne.         
To start with, according to the Oxford Companion to Philosophy, metaphysics is the most 
abstract branch of philosophy. The subject of metaphysics has been disputed, over the 
years, as has its validity and usefulness.
109
 So, what is the subject of metaphysics? It would 
be fair to say that if the term physics is employed to refer to the study of the physical then 
metaphysics is the study of the metaphysical, but what is the metaphysical?  
The term metaphysics can be traced back to Aristotle, as it appears for the first time as the 
title of one of his works. The term simply refers to the Aristotelian work which follows his 
work on physics. Metá (μετά) is the Greek word or prefix that refers to what is beyond, 
what is other than or what comes after.
110
 Thus, meta-physics in the works of Aristotle 
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refers to the work that comes chronologically after his work on Physics.
111
 According to 
the Online Etymology Dictionary the name was given by Andronicus of Rhodes, and was a 
reference to the customary ordering of the books, but it was misinterpreted by Latin writers 
as meaning the science of what is beyond the physical.
112
 
As a result, his Metaphysics can be seen as the continuation of his Physics rather than an 
entirely new treatise. More accurately, it can be perceived as his second treatise on nature 
or the treatise that is concerned with what follows from the establishment of nature as the 
arché. This is a fair way of looking at the issue as indeed Aristotle starts his work on 
Metaphysics by summarizing the arguments and main concepts he employs in Physics. For 
example, the definition of what an arché is, as quoted in the previous chapter, appears in 
both treatises in exactly the same manner.
113
  
Physics is mainly concerned with what is physis or nature, while Metaphysics looks mainly 
into what follows logically from nature. In Physics, nature or physis is established as the 
primary cause of everything there is, while in Metaphysics the main concern is what comes 
after or what are the norms and principles that arise from the established origin. Thus, in 
this case, the term Meta is used to determine a latter point both in the timeline of 
Aristotle’s work as well as with regards to its content. Consequently, the metaphysical 
appears to be nothing more than the physical.  
Now, this equation of the metaphysical with the physical seems to be both right and wrong 
at the same time. If the metaphysical is to be seen as a field of study, then it should indeed 
be considered as referring to the study of nature or of the physical world. If there is to be a 
distinction between metaphysics and physics this should refer to the fact that metaphysics 
is an inquiry about the cosmos rather than about physis. I argue for an understanding of 
metaphysics as what transcends the philosophical inquiry for the identification of the 
primary cause or fundamental reason of the cosmos rather than what is beyond the study of 
the physical.  
In particular, based on the fundamental meanings of the prefix ‘meta,’ I propose a 
definition of the metaphysical as what is other than the physical. If it is to be accepted that 
the physical is a context that emerges through the establishment of a first philosophy, 
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which acts as an absolute signifier that brings beings and things to presence. Then, the 
metaphysical as what is other than this refers to the physical in the absence of a first 
philosophy. More accurately, the metaphysical refers to the physical in the absence of 
ontology.  
Metaphysics and ontology are two terms that have been used by philosophers 
interchangeably.
114
 With regards to that, the Oxford Companion to Philosophy defines 
ontology in the following way: 
Ontology, understood as a branch of metaphysics, is the science of being in general, 
embracing such issues as the nature of existence and the categorical structure of 
reality. That existing things belong to different categories is an idea traceable at 
least back to Aristotle. Different systems of ontology propose alternative 
categorical schemes. A categorical scheme typically exhibits a hierarchical 
structure, with ‘being’ or ‘entity’ as the topmost category, embracing everything 
that exists.
115
  
Moreover, Levinas offers a somewhat more aggressive definition of ontology. In particular 
he says that Western philosophy has most often been ontology or ‘a reduction of the other 
to the same by interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures the comprehension 
of being.’116  
He seems to be right, at least for the origins upon which Western philosophy is founded. 
This is because the attempt to identify a primary cause or a founding principle for the 
cosmos arguably can be traced back to the early pre-Socratics: Thales, Anaximenes and 
Anaximander. To do so, they observe the natural phenomena familiar to them and narrow 
down the possibilities, towards the identification of a sole origin. Consequently, Thales and 
Anaximenes argue respectively that water and air are the first elements of the cosmos or 
essential parts out of which what comes to be does so.
117
 In other words, they say that if 
one strips the world of everything there is, what remains in the end is either water or air. 
What is important here is that this systematic attempt to reduce the cosmos to a single 
origin is evident in almost all pre-Socratic accounts.  
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However, the point where ontology seems to be taking over the philosophical inquiry or 
the quest to identify a sole origin of the cosmos is with Parmenides. He is the thinker who 
formally introduces the notion of being (einai – είναι) as what is, or what exists. For 
Parmenides, there is only being or infinite being and nothing else. There is no change; 
generation and corruption are phases of the same being and as a result nothing really 
changes, since what appears as changing is in fact the same thing. Thus, according to him, 
a being either is or is not, which means that every possible way in which something 
appears is already entailed in what he calls being.
118
  
To clarify, he says that everything that comes to be or appears as being emerges from the 
same source or shares a common essence. In other words, the reduction of everything to 
one and the same that the thinkers prior to him attempt is occurring with Parmenides’ 
notion of being. It is with his writings that the philosophical question of why there is 
something instead of nothing becomes an ontological question that now asks about the 
essence of being.  
If first philosophy is essentially, as stated above, the establishment of a final end for 
philosophy or for the philosophical inquiry into the cosmos, and if a first philosophy is the 
starting point of all philosophy, then indeed Parmenides turns philosophy or the origins of 
Western philosophy into ontology, a question about the essence of being. Heidegger 
appears to be validating this view by saying at the beginning of his most famous 
philosophical work, Being and Time, that being is the most universal concept, one that is 
used constantly by everybody but with nobody really understanding it.
119
 To that end, he 
later argues that the question about the ‘why’ of something is in fact referring to the 
essence of being.
120
   
Now, the similarities between the Parmenidean being and the Aristotelian concept of 
physis or nature are striking. Thus, if the establishment of a first philosophy is realized 
with Parmenides and ontology, then it would not be an exaggeration to say that it is 
completed with Aristotle. If this is correct, and it appears to be, then it would be accurate to 
say that Aristotle’s concept of nature is another way of referring to what Parmenides 
defines as being.  
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Parmenides turns philosophy into ontology and Aristotle completes this by presenting 
ontology as physiology, making physis the founding principle that orders the cosmos. The 
term physiology comes from the words physis or nature and logos or reason. This means 
that physiology is the science or philosophy of defining something in terms of nature or in 
it terms of its nature or essence.
121
 In the light of this, it is now possible to say that the 
metaphysical I argue for here is not what transcends the physical, but what transcends the 
physiological. Thus, the metaphysical is another way of referring to the physical without 
ascribing to it a specific/specified telos or final end.  
Now that what I mean by metaphysical has been established, it is safe to say that the 
metaphysical refers to the physical or the natural world in the absence a founding principle. 
The metaphysical is synonymous with anarchy, in the way this has been defined above as 
spontaneity. If the above analysis is correct and indeed Western philosophy is founded 
upon ontology or ontological tendencies, in the sense of attempting to reduce everything to 
one and the same. Does this mean that I am arguing here, in a way similar to that of the 
philosopher Paul Feyerabend, for anarchy as being an understanding of the cosmos that is 
against or beyond the philosophical method?
122
 To put it differently, is the up to this point 
identification of anarchy with the metaphysical and the indefiniteness of spontaneous 
generation, making a case for epistemological anarchy?  
The answer to this question is that the distinction between metaphysics and ontology, and 
the definition of the metaphysical proposed here expand on the argumentation of the 
previous two sections. I do not say that anarchy describes the condition of human 
knowledge prior to the identification of a founding principle. Instead, I say, in line with 
Democritus, that to look for an origin of being or of the cosmos is like asking for a cause or 
looking for a beginning for something that is boundless.
123
  
Now this claim can indeed be traced prior to the emergence of ontology or prior to the 
establishment of a first philosophy. In particular, the claim that the cosmos is void of a 
starting point or an end can be arguably traced in Hesiod’s Theogony and the notion of 
chaos. Theogony is a poem through which Hesiod recites the creation of the cosmos. With 
regards to that, Hesiod says that chaos comes first: ‘Chaos was born first’ (πρώτιστα χάος 
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γένετ’) and after came Gaia, Tartaros and Eros.124 As Castoriadis argues, chaos 
etymologically, comes from the Greek verb chainó (χαίνω) or chaskó (χάσκω) and it 
signifies a chasm, the void or abyss.
125
          
Since Hesiod refers to the generation of the cosmos and chaos, as the void or the abyss, is 
what precedes everything. Hence, it would be fair to say that what he says is that the 
generation of the cosmos is untraceable or it cannot be reduced to a single origin. Is chaos 
then signifying the inability of the pre-philosophical approach to identify a founding 
principle? On the contrary, it appears that chaos is precisely the answer to the 
philosophical question. Chaos signifies the absence of a starting point or the anarchy and 
indefiniteness of the cosmos and in this same sense the groundlessness of knowledge. As 
Democritus says with regards to the absence of a founding principle for knowledge, ‘the 
truth is hidden in an abyss.’126  
Democritus is a renowned philosopher recognized as probably the first scientist or the 
father of modern science.
127
 The fact that he adopts the pre-philosophical notion of chaos 
and draws upon it is evidence enough that chaos is not merely signifying the inability to 
provide an answer to the philosophical question. I am not making the case for 
epistemological anarchy. Instead, the analysis and argumentation of this chapter establishes 
the plausibility of a cosmos without a founding principle which I develop further in the 
following chapters arguing for anarchy as a way of being.  
The distinction between metaphysics and ontology that took place here is not concerned 
with whether there is a right or wrong way of making sense of the cosmos. It is rather 
concerned with providing the ground for arguing that there is no specific/specified reason 
to be or that there is no superior way of being. This may imply anarchy in epistemological 
terms as well, if epistemology follows ontology necessarily. Nevertheless, discussing what 
constitutes knowledge is not a primary aim of this study.  
Hence, this section identified anarchy or the spontaneity of anarchy with what it defined as 
the metaphysical; referring to the physical or nature prior to the imposition of a founding 
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principle or prior to the emergence of ontology. Similarly, it identified anarchy and its 
indefiniteness with chaos, as the groundlessness of the cosmos or what is prior to the 
establishment of an arché. Subsequently, it offers an answer to the philological question of 
the previous chapter, by demonstrating that chaos is the Ancient Greek term that refers to 
anarchy, as what is prior to the hierarchical ordering of a primary cause. It appears then 
that since the establishment of a primary cause, as what encompasses and orders 
everything, chaos is largely abandoned as a term, and anarchy is employed to refer to 
anything that deviates from the order of the arché.       
2.4. Heidegger’s Ontological Anarchy as Panarchy 
Up to this point, I have argued and demonstrated that the indefiniteness of anarchy or 
anarchy can be understood as mainly referring to the absence of a ground or a sole origin 
for being and the cosmos. I have discussed how anarchy can be expressed in terms of 
spontaneity or as synonymous with the notion of chaos and the metaphysical; as the natural 
or physical that is other than the physiological/ontological. 
In addition, I have also stated that this study sees anarchy as the way of being and not as 
what refers to the absence of a starting point for epistemology. However, the question that 
probably arises is, how is my account of anarchy different from Heidegger’s ontological 
anarchy? After all, he also argues that the human being is essentially free, a freedom that 
refers to the absence or the abyss of ground for the being’s essence.128 Meanwhile, the 
looming question, since section 2, with its assertion that all possible ways of being co-
exist, is whether I am arguing that anarchy refers to every single entity being a starting 
point or a primary cause?  
The two questions posed here are related. In fact I claim that this what Heidegger’s 
ontological anarchy is about – every human is the primary cause of its own self – while I 
argue that this is not anarchy but what I define here as panarchy. Thus, in order to answer 
these two questions, I look into Heidegger’s ontological anarchy, while introducing 
Heraclitus’ thought, as he is the thinker Heidegger draws upon mainly. Moreover, 
Heraclitus’s ideas play an important role in Aristotle’s politics, as will be discussed later in 
this study. Furthermore, the discussion that follows introduces the idea that has been 
implied up to this point that anarchy is a type of ordering, while clarifying further the 
argument of chapter 1 that anarchy is not the non-order of the order.  
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So, as stated previously, Heidegger considers being to be a universal concept and dedicates 
his most famous work in studying it and its essence. However, later on in his life 
Heidegger changes his mind and decides that the being has no fundamental or essential 
way to be. He claims that being, or to be, is ‘being without why.’129 To make this clearer, 
given that he considers the question of why to be referring to the essence of a being or to 
its reason to be, being without why means to be without a reason to be or an essential way 
of being.   
It appears then that Heidegger is arguing, similarly with this study, for an understanding of 
anarchy as the way of being. However, to make the argument of this section more specific, 
the claim I make here is that Heidegger’s ‘without why’ or the absence of an essential way 
of being is the founding principle of being. He proposes a non-essentialist or an anti-
Aristotelian ontology. In other words, his philosophy is a philosophy of being or ontology. 
As Levinas says, Heidegger even after his renouncement of Socratic philosophy, after his 
turn, maintains his obedience to the essence or truth of being through the pre-Socratic 
thought.
130
 
So, Heidegger argues that being appears in the world by unconcealing itself. The 
Heideggerian unconcealment refers to the emergence of the being out of its essence or true 
nature and in the world.  He employs the Greek terms, léthe (λήθη – concealment) and 
alétheia (αλήθεια – unconcealment, truth), to illustrate his point. Thus, as he says, ‘being 
means: to appear in emerging, to step forth out of concealment.’131 Moreover, as 
Schürmann argues, the Heideggerian being comes to be through its emergence or 
appearance in the world and this emergence refers simultaneously and identically to the 
absence of that out of which emergence takes place.
132
    
In order to understand what this means, one should look at the writings of the pre-Socratic 
philosopher Heraclitus. Thus, Heidegger’s argument about the unconcealment can be 
traced back to the Heraclitean claim that ‘the true nature of things tends to hide itself.’133 
This means that it is out of what is hidden or what is not there that what is there or being 
arises. Hence, it would be fair to say that what is there, or being, arises from what is not 
there or the essence.   
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Heraclitus demonstrates this by saying that ‘cool things become warm, warm things cool 
down, moist things dry out, parched things become damp.’134 What this means is that the 
warm comes from the absence of the cold and the cold form the absence of the warm. The 
essence of the warm is to be found in the cold or is the same as that of the cold. More 
accurately, the essence of the warm is that it is not cold. In the same way, he says that the 
‘road up and down it’s still the same road.’135 Or that ‘it makes no difference which is 
present: living and dead, sleeping and walking, young and old. For these changed around 
are those and those changed around are again these.’136    
If this is correct then Heraclitus and Heidegger claim that being comes from non-being. 
This is indeed antithetical to ontology, as this starts with Parmenides’ argument that prior 
to everything there is being and is completed with the Aristotelian concept of physis as the 
primary cause of everything there is. It is correct, then, to say that Heidegger argues for 
ontological anarchy in the sense of arguing indeed for the absence of a primary cause for 
being.  
However, my objection is that an observation such as this one misses the fact that non-
being or what can be taken as referring to the absence of an essence is in fact the essence 
of being in Heraclitus and by extension in Heidegger. One should not overlook the fact that 
essence and being form a unity because they are actually two opposing signifiers of the 
same thing. Being is what is only in relation to its essence which is what is not; the being 
makes the essence what is not and the essence makes the being what is. For example, the 
day is the essence of the night because it is the absence of day that signifies what the night 
is and the other way around.  
Similarly, being is being because it is not non-being. In other words, if this analysis is 
correct, the essence of being is that it is not non-being; the definition of being starts with 
the non-being. In other words, what something is emerges from what it is not. Is this not 
arguably another way of arguing for a signifier? Or is this not what the non-being is to 
being and the being to non-being? It seems logical to say that it actually is, since in their 
understanding non-being signifies being in the complete way that characterizes the 
Aristotelian arché or founding principle. For example, living means non-dead in the 
absolute and complete way that day means non-night and warm means non-cold and the 
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other way around. As Castoriadis says, Heidegger’s concept of being is something 
determined.
137
      
It would be reasonable to say that what the introduction of non-being does is to restate the 
importance of being, while at the same time contesting its primacy. If non-being is indeed 
the signifier of being, since as stated above it is out of this that being comes to be, then it 
follows logically that Heidegger proposes an ontology or a study of being in which the 
absence of essence for being is the starting point. The problem with what Heidegger argues 
for, is that it is not anarchy; not without a primary cause. This is because, if it is to be 
overlooked that non-being or the absence of essence is an absolute signifier or the primary 
cause of being, and if it is to be considered as referring, in a more practical way, to the 
absence of an essential way of being which is ascribed to the being by a founding principle 
such as the Aristotelian nature, then, what he argues for is panarchy rather than anarchy.  
Panarchy as the anarchist historian Max Nettlau says is a forgotten idea or at least one that 
is not employed by many. According to Nettlau, this idea is formulated by the writer Paul 
Emile De Puydt in 1860 and refers to the existence of all possible ways of government at 
the same time.
138
 However, if one were to look for the etymology of the term, it would 
become clear that it is a composition of the Greek words pan (παν) and árcho. Thus, based 
on the analysis of the previous chapter about the meaning of arché in relation with the fact 
that term pan refers to everything there is.
139
 It would be more accurate to say that 
panarchy signifies the condition in which everything is a primary cause. In a similar way, 
the anarchy argued for by Heidegger refers to essentially every entity or animal being a 
primary cause. In other words, he argues for the simultaneous existence of infinite number 
of primary causes.  
This must be correct since being remains the starting point of his philosophy but is now 
without an essence. What exists does so by itself alone. As Schürmann argues,  in the 
‘originary’, as deconstructed arché, ‘no entitative giving occurs’ and the entity is true or 
authentically as it enters into presence, without any determination by an arché.
140
 In other 
words, the ‘originary nature’ of being, as that out of which the being comes to be, belongs 
to the being and not to a founding principle that is outside the being itself. This is also 
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demonstrated by the unity between being and non-being as presented above; the non-being 
or that out of which being emerges belongs to being – the being belongs solely to being.   
Heidegger appears to be arguing that his being has no origins in the way the first principle 
of Anaximander does. As discussed in the previous chapter, Anaximander argues for an 
origin that has no origins other than itself; it is the founding principle out of which other 
principles arise. Hence, if what has been said up to this point is correct, Heidegger is 
indeed arguing for being to be the origin of itself or to be without a primary cause other 
than itself.     
Hence, his anarchy refers not to the absence of a primary cause, but to the absence of an 
ultimate one, in the way téchne is in Aristotle. Or, in line with the preliminary discussion 
of his anarchy in the previous chapter, anarchy refers to the confusion or non-hierarchy 
among the infinite primary causes. This argument is restated and examined again in more 
practical terms with reference to politics in chapter 5. 
To summarize, this section demonstrated that Heidegger’s anarchy is in fact not without a 
primary cause. In other words, it is not anarchy, which means that the groundlessness he 
argues for is not the indefiniteness or spontaneity of the metaphysical or of chaos; notions 
with which I have identified anarchy. Instead, I have employed the term panarchy as a 
notion that better describes Heidegger’s argument for being to be the origin of itself. With 
this I have also provided an indirect answer to the question of whether I argue for that very 
thing. Nonetheless, I will return to this and clarify it in the following chapter.  
Most importantly, through the employment of the Heraclitean thought that he draws upon, 
I have shown that the non-being of the being or the non-essentialism of his ontology is not 
synonymous with anarchy. Therefore, it would be accurate to say that his anarchy or his 
philosophy mainly after Being and Time is to be understood as an attempt to liberate or 
more accurately resuscitate ontology from the closure of meaning Aristotle imposes upon 
it. His anarchy can be seen more as referring to the dislocation of being from the arché or 
as Schurmann says ‘the attributive schema.’141 It is arguable that this is what he means 
when he says that the ‘end of metaphysics’ is but the resurrection or the beginning of new 
metaphysics.
142
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Consequently, it is fair to say that he undertakes this endeavour by proposing an ontology, 
in which anti or non-essentialism is the founding principle of being. However, based on the 
distinction between anarchy and the anarchic, it would not be wrong to conclude that he 
proposes an anarchic ontology as one that stands in opposition to the Aristotelian one. It is 
nevertheless an ontology, as Levinas accuses Heidegger’s philosophy to be, that requires 
the Aristotelian one, as the thesis against which his, as an antithesis, arises.   
Conclusion  
The discussion and analysis that took place here can be summarized by saying that this 
section has established or demonstrated the plausibility of arguing that the cosmos is in 
anarchy. It has demonstrated the possibility that the foundations of Western philosophy 
that presuppose an arché or a primary cause for the natural world may be wrong. In 
particular, I have proposed here that spontaneity or spontaneous generation should be seen 
as a more logical way of making sense of the cosmos. 
In order to do that, I have started by showing the relationship between the concepts of 
anarchy and spontaneity, as this appears in Aristotle. In particular, I agreed with the 
Aristotelian association of anarchy with spontaneity but argued against its identification 
with chance or with what is contrary to reason. As a result, I drew upon the Democritean 
conception of spontaneity to distinguish spontaneity from chance while maintaining the 
association with anarchy. Subsequently, I argued that spontaneity refers to the 
indefiniteness that anarchy has been identified with in the previous chapter as what escapes 
contextualization under an absolute definer. 
I then argued against the Aristotelian concept of physis or nature, to prove its inadequacy, 
the fact that it ends up serving a purpose other than providing an objective conception of 
the natural world. Specifically, I demonstrated that his work is a teleocracy, i.e. that it 
draws upon the concept of human téchne or human know-how, to provide a final end to 
philosophy, to establish a first philosophy. In other words, I claimed that Aristotle comes 
up with his conception of physis in a way similar to that of the architect or any other 
craftsman. This means he starts by envisioning the final end and then brings it forth. As a 
result, his concept of nature is but a construct of the human téchne that unavoidably 
imposes the way of human téchne upon the cosmos.  
68 
 
In relation to that, I discussed how the establishment of a first philosophy has been the 
main aim of the first known philosophers, the pre-Socratics. Within the same context, I 
explained how this took shape with the Parmenidean ontology and was completed with 
Aristotle turning the physical into the physiological. As a response to that and in order to 
leave the field clear for the argumentation of the following chapter, I proposed a definition 
of the metaphysical as what refers to the physical in the absence of a primary cause or to 
the physical beyond the physiological/ontological.  
To do that, I drew a distinction between metaphysics and ontology claiming that the pre-
philosophical Ancient Greek notion of chaos signifies the anarchy of the metaphysical, as 
it refers to the groundlessness of the cosmos. Based on this discussion, I explained that the 
argument of this study should not be confused with epistemological anarchy, as it is not 
about the method of knowing the cosmos but about being and the cosmos. Similarly, I 
argued that the term panarchy rather than anarchy is what best describes Heidegger’s 
ontological anarchy or his anarchic, in the sense of anti-essentialist or anti-Aristotelian, 
ontology.    
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Chapter 3: Anarchy, Being and the Cosmos  
Introduction 
Cosmos or the natural world and being, as what exists, have been identified as the 
fundamental concepts of Western philosophy or at least of its early days. Cosmos has been 
defined by Aristotle, who is the one that is arguably completing the work of his 
predecessors, as a hierarchical order that begins and ends with the human being. This 
means that all beings and things of the natural world derive from or exist in reference with 
this absolute being. Hence the claim that everything comes to be for the sake of the human 
being.  
However, in line with Democritus, I have contested the plausibility of the portraying the 
cosmos as a hierarchical order. Instead, I have proposed that the cosmos is in anarchy and 
without an all-encompassing reference point, and that all possible ways of being co-exist in 
a non-hierarchical way. Subsequently, the question that follows is: what does it mean that 
the cosmos and the being are in anarchy? Why is anarchy the way of the cosmos and of 
being and not the Aristotelian teleocracy?  
In answer, and following the establishment of the possibility of arguing for the cosmos 
without a primary cause, I start here by doing precisely this; I argue that the cosmos is in 
anarchy. In particular I say that the cosmos is in fact a communion of beings or othernesses 
rather than a hierarchical ordering. To do that, I introduce the terms ataxia, to refer to the 
incompleteness and indefiniteness of the cosmos and the term communion to refer to the 
indefinite or metaphysical interplay among beings and things. To support my argument I 
draw mainly upon the Democritean philosophy, while demonstrating the ultimate failure of 
Aristotle to prove the world is complete or a closed hierarchical ordering. 
Based on this, I then argue for anarchy to be the way of being. Specifically, I argue that 
being is something that is never complete but indivisible from the world it comes to be 
with, and thus always constituting and being constituted. To do so I discuss the notion of 
non-being as the part of being that is beyond the way it makes sense of the cosmos. 
Meanwhile, I introduce the term idiosyncrasy, as the term that defines more accurately 
being, as being with the world. In relation with that, I contest the Aristotelian 
understanding of being, as something that is over and above the world, while arguing that 
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the entelechy he identifies, as the way living things come to be, is akin to death rather than 
being.       
3.1. Anarchy, the Communion of Othernesses, and Ataxia 
The main aim of this section is to start formulating an answer for the above question. To do 
so I propose here a definition of the cosmos as a communion rather than a closed 
hierarchical ordering. The discussion that takes place here is important for the definition of 
being as being with the world that follows. Moreover, it demonstrates how the co-existence 
I argue for here is different from that of Heidegger’s.     
So, up to this point I have argued for the detachment of the meaning of anarchy from 
disorder. Meanwhile, based on the discussion of the previous chapters, one could claim 
that I am implying that anarchy is a type of order that pre-exists hierarchical ordering. For 
example, it has been stated, in the contestation of Aristotle’s notion of physis in chapter 
two, that it would be impossible for order to arise in the world with the human being or the 
political animal since it is a fairly recent being. Then, it has been argued in both of the 
previous chapters that anarchy is prior to the arché or that it refers to what exists prior to 
the ordering of the arché. In relation to that Levinas says, anarchy ‘is but another order’ an 
order that is not ‘tamed or domesticated by a theme.’143 
However, in this case I will not agree with Levinas, at least not with the characterization of 
anarchy as an order. This is because, according to the analysis of chapter one, anarchy 
cannot be spoken of in terms of an arché or in reference to an absolute signifier. Now, it is 
arguable that this is what Levinas says with the phrase ‘not tamed or domesticated by a 
theme’ or that anarchy is not a hierarchical order, but I have identified anarchy with 
indefiniteness, spontaneity, and chaos. This is to say, it would be ironic to employ the term 
order to describe anarchy.  
If it is not disorder or the corruption of the order and if it is not an ordering itself, then 
what is it? It would be fair to raise this question and even question further that the terms 
with which anarchy has been associated to this point – indefiniteness, spontaneity, the 
metaphysical, and chaos – do not provide an indication of how the cosmos or beings come 
to be. This question must be answered in order for this study to argue that anarchy is the 
way of being.     
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However, the dissociation of anarchy from the order-disorder continuum creates a problem 
or a shortage of terms that can be used. This is because the natural world appears arguably 
as something ordered or an ordered whole. If this is to be accepted as a premise for now, 
then what term can be employed, to describe that which points towards or implies ordering 
but does not fall within the terminology or the thematic of order-disorder?  
In response to that, I introduce here the term ataxia, which is nowadays used in English, 
within a medical context, to refer to the ‘irregularity of bodily functions.’144 However, the 
term originally comes from the Greek αταξία, which rather than signifying disorder it can 
be more accurately described as referring to what cannot be disciplined in the sense of 
being impossible to be classified or taxonomized.
145
 To clarify this further, a useful parallel 
can be drawn with the way Castoriadis defines the notion of chaos as referring to an order 
that is never complete and thus not possible of being subject to meaningful laws.
146
  
Thus, it would be fair to say that ataxia is a process that is not an ordering, while by 
definition being incomplete or not able to be conceived in terms of an ordering origin or an 
arché. This may still sound vague and impractical as an exegesis of how the cosmos comes 
to be or appears as an ordered whole. It may seem as if the cosmos is a product of chance. 
This should not be the case because based on the analysis of the previous chapter, chance 
and the results of chance require a primary cause or more accurately are the results of the 
human deliberation. Since, ataxia does not fall within this spectrum; it cannot be seen as 
referring to chance. 
On the contrary, it would be logical to say that ataxia is indeed providing the indefiniteness 
and spontaneity of anarchy with substance. Or it provides an indication, albeit not yet very 
specific, about spontaneous generation or the process through which the natural world 
comes to be in the absence of a founding principle. In the same way, the incompleteness of 
ataxia should also not be confused with the Heraclitean notion of flux. It is important to 
emphasize this here, to provide some extra insight on the type of process ataxia is, before 
proceeding to its application in a more practical way.            
So, Heraclitus claims that the cosmos or everything that exists is in constant motion or in 
flux; everything gives way and nothing is stable.
147
 One would say that this sounds similar 
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if not identical to the definition of ataxia above. Indeed, a process is something that is in 
motion or refers to something that is not stable and the adjective ‘constant’ may be seen as 
referring to endlessness and thus incompleteness. However, such a claim would be missing 
out the fact that Heraclitean motion is a pattern or more accurately a complete cycle. Based 
on the discussion of chapter two about the Heraclitean philosophy, the motion he argues 
for is a constant alternation between two opposites or a cyclical pattern; for instance day 
gives way to night and back again.  
Even though the motion Heraclitus argues for is infinite, the cyclical pattern between 
opposites perpetuates itself; what appears every time through this cyclical motion entails 
the whole pattern or is the manifestation of the completion of the cycle. Thus, based again 
on what has been said in the previous chapter, what is alive is at the same time dead in the 
sense that it is in its nature or the nature of the cycle of life and death for what is alive to be 
dead. Or the being appears and disappears with the completion of the cycle.  
Hence, what moves does so constantly but towards its end and this is what makes the 
motion constant or never-ending; it is the fact that the end is a beginning that makes 
motion infinite. This means that completeness, rather than incompleteness, is what defines 
Heraclitus’ constant motion.  Nonetheless, through this comparison ataxia can now be 
described as an endless motion of beings and things that is impossible to be completely 
conceived or contextualized under a primary cause.  
The question, though, is what this means in practical terms or what this means specifically 
in terms of the generation of the cosmos. Now, with regards to that, the main premise is 
that the cosmos is in anarchy or without a primary cause. This has been identified with the 
co-existence of all possible ways of being, which has been interpreted as refereeing to the 
co-existence of all possible ways of making sense of the cosmos. However, co-existence 
implies interaction and interaction in terms of beings signifies a form of symbiosis or 
living together.  
Hence, claiming that ataxia refers to motion, as in the way in which beings and things 
interact in the cosmos would be logical. Moreover, it would also be logical to claim that 
the cosmos in anarchy refers to the interaction or interplay between all possible ways to be 
that does not have an ultimate final end. Then again, the kind of interplay that this is 
remains unidentified. For example, is it not this that Heidegger argues for: the absence of 
an ultimate final end and the co-existence of beings?  
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That is a fair point, which has been left unaddressed or not directly addressed in the 
previous chapter. Indeed, Heidegger argues against the Aristotelian argument that the 
principle of motion belongs to the being but it derives from the primary cause of the 
cosmos or from physis. As he says, ‘physis always implies a subject in which it inheres.’148 
Instead, as discussed, Heidegger argues that being has no ground other than itself; that it is 
the primary cause of itself. Does this mean then that the interplay I argue for here is no 
different than this?   
To answer to this objection, I have demonstrated that his notion of ontological anarchy is 
more accurately described by the term panarchy. This is to say: indeed in Heidegger’s 
understanding beings appear in the world ‘without a why’ or without a reason that pre-
exists them, but if every being is the primary cause of itself, does not this mean that every 
being has its own final end? If the analysis of the previous chapter is correct then that 
would be a fair statement. Moreover, if this is the case then anarchy is not the way of the 
cosmos. This is not only because what he argues for is panarchy, but because, if put in 
practical terms, in a situation where every being moves towards its final end competition is 
inevitable.  
If the cosmos is a symbiosis or interplay between beings and every being has its own final 
end then the way beings interact is necessarily a competition that eventually leads to the 
prevalence of one final end. That would make the cosmos an arena in which beings are 
thrown to fight for their own end and anarchy the period during which this conflict lasts. 
This understanding has been dismissed in chapter one as not referring to anarchy. 
Meanwhile, the possibility of arguing that the conflict is never-ending and thus there is 
never a final end has also been dismissed as it would turn anarchy into the primary cause 
of the cosmos. However, I will get back to the eventuality of conflict in Heidegger in the 
discussion about anarchy and freedom in chapter five.   
The only way that this would be avoided is if there was no interaction among them at all. 
That is impossible to argue, since interaction among beings and things is evident 
everywhere in the natural world; from the mere communication among human beings to 
the most complex sequence one can imagine. Moreover, the absence of interaction would 
point towards a conception of being that is self-sufficient or god-like and this is not what 
Heidegger stands for. However, this becomes clearer later in this chapter.     
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Consequently, I claim that anarchy for the cosmos means a symbiotic coexistence or a 
metaphysical interplay. To make this clearer, I will introduce now the term communion as 
what describes this metaphysical interplay. So, communion is a term that is usually 
employed within a spiritual or religious context to refer to sharing.
149
 The reason I choose 
this term to explain the notion of metaphysical interplay I employ here is that it escapes the 
limitations of the term community, which is usually confined to a place or a defined 
space.
150
 It would be paradoxical for something that is characterized by indefiniteness to be 
associated with a notion that implies confinement and limits.  
Most importantly, the spiritual connotations of the term enable its employment for the 
signification of something that goes beyond the physical. Thus, I draw a parallel here 
between the spiritual and the metaphysical on the basis that both refer to what is beyond 
the physical.
151
 This does not mean that I am suddenly concerned with the spiritual world; I 
am not in any way implying that metaphysical, as has been defined in this study, has 
anything to do with the spiritual. On the contrary, I adopt the term communion to refer to a 
sharing that is other than the physical, in the sense of the physiological/ontological. 
Communion here refers to the natural world, as the interplay between beings and things 
that is not driven by a primary cause or towards a final end. 
The question that arises then is what makes this communion possible? In response to that, I 
say that otherness is what should be identified initially as what enables the communion, 
which points to incompleteness as the final answer to this question. Otherness has been 
employed in the previous chapter in relation with indefiniteness and spontaneity. 
Meanwhile, the phrase ‘being other than’ has been employed a few times, to this point to 
describe the relationship of anarchy with the arché or what cannot be spoken of in terms of 
a sole origin. As Castoriadis says, being other is being ‘not simply as a consequence or as a 
different exemplar of the same.’152 
So, otherness is arguably another way of referring to the detachment of the possible ways 
of being from a superior or absolute way of being. More accurately, in line with the 
analysis of chapter one, otherness signifies the impossibility of classifying beings, as the 
entities that exist, as modes deriving from an absolute way of being. For example, the 
existence of the horse as being cannot be defined in reference with the way the human 
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being makes sense of the cosmos. To put it blatantly, otherness means that the horse does 
not come to be because the human being requires a strong and fast animal to carry it 
around. I will return to that though later in this chapter to discuss the impact this 
conception has on being. 
It must be clear by now that otherness is only possible in the absence of arché or in 
anarchy. Consequently, it is safe to say at this point that the cosmos in anarchy or the 
absence of a primary cause means that the cosmos is a communion of othernesses. So, does 
this mean that the interplay between beings that I argue for here is a communion or 
metaphysical because it takes place among othernesses? This means that otherness is in 
fact what all beings and things have in common, which is to say that they all share their 
otherness. To put it differently, every being is inextricably linked to the otherness of other 
beings.  
Consequently, no being possesses the origin of itself. Instead there is no origin: there is a 
void of origins. Otherness is not simply referring to the uniqueness of every being to make 
sense of the cosmos. It is not merely the fact that each of them is unique that they share. It 
is rather that they share, as a constituent of their own being and existence, the otherness of 
other beings. 
To answer the question about how otherness makes the communion possible I will employ 
the following example, which demonstrates how the communion of othernesses manifests 
itself as the natural world or why the cosmos is in anarchy. It is, based on current 
knowledge, accurate to say that the bee, as an insect, is a being that makes sense of the 
cosmos in its own unique way. As a result, or as a being, the bee experiences the need of 
hunger and looks to satisfy this need. It has to be stated here that I will not look into the 
concept of need here, as I will do so in the following chapter because it plays a 
fundamental role in the discussion that relates anarchy with the political. 
Now, it is common for the bee to look for the satisfaction of its hunger in flowers; this is 
why one can usually find bees where there are flowers. Moreover, again according to the 
best of our knowledge, the bee is a hairy insect.
153
 As a result, while the bee is feeding 
itself pollen, which is produced by flowers, is entrapped on its hairy body and is carried 
without any intention to other flowers. This is how pollination occurs, through which other 
flowers become fertilized. 
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The being or existence of the bee depends on the pollen that is produced by the flowers, 
while the fertilization of flowers depends on the bee. Furthermore, the vast majority of 
crops whose fruits or seeds the human being consumes are also fertilized by bees or other 
similar insects.  The otherness or uniqueness of the bee’s way of being or making sense of 
the cosmos is not only affecting but constituting the existence of others in a spontaneous 
way.  
It would be correct then to say that otherness is literally and metaphorically a fertilizer of 
being and thus of the natural world. Rather than being a primary cause, it is what makes 
the communion, I argue for here, possible. The interplay is metaphysical in the sense that is 
spontaneous. To clarify this, based on the definition of spontaneity or being in a 
spontaneous way, of the previous chapter, this refers to taking responsibility for one’s own 
being or be according to it. The bee of the example takes responsibility by responding to 
need, which is something that arises from its own being and is satisfied through the way 
the bee makes sense of the cosmos.   
It is important to point out that being in a spontaneous or a responsible way means to take 
responsibility for one’s own existence as well as for other beings in an unintentional way. 
This is important also for the discussion of the following chapter about the political animal. 
Now, it is arguable that this is what Democritus describes with his argument that 
spontaneous coming together is one of the ‘like to like.’154 As he says, ‘that like is 
naturally moved by like, that things akin are borne to each other.’155 This is demonstrated 
from the above example, where the bee is responsible in absentia, or without willing it, for 
the existence of flowers as well as of human beings. This example can be expanded 
indefinitely, since the interplay among beings and things appears to be indefinite.    
Consequently, the cosmos is a communion of othernesses or it appears as an ordered whole 
due to the fact that beings and things share their existences or their othernesses. Or as 
Castoriadis says ‘it is because there is a common world and private worlds that there is a 
world.’156 The natural world comes to be because beings and things share their uniqueness 
or otherness. To put it differently, the cosmos in anarchy is the communion or interplay 
among beings and things that is characterized by ataxia or a motion that is impossible to be 
classified and contextualized under a single origin. It would be fair to summarize this 
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section by saying that there is no natural world in the absence of beings and there are no 
beings without the communion. 
3.2. Natural Incompleteness or Anarchy prior to Arché 
So, the previous section discussed that, in the absence of a primary cause that encompasses 
everything the natural world is a communion of othernesses. It is a constant metaphysical 
interplay or ataxia among beings and things. Meanwhile, I have employed an example 
from the natural world to demonstrate this motion or interaction and associated it with the 
Democritean ‘like to like’ exegesis of spontaneous generation. It is this association that 
triggers the discussion of this section.  
In particular, I start here by arguing that the communion of othernesses is not a result of 
necessity but of the natural incompleteness. Based on this, I then discuss and contest the 
Aristotelian argument for the completeness of nature. Specifically, I challenge the validity 
of his claim that nature makes everything complete and nothing in vain. This claim, as the 
following chapters show, is fundamental in his political philosophy, but, as discussed, it is 
one of the main claims upon which he develops his account of physis or nature. The 
plausibility of this claim has been already questioned in the previous chapter. However, 
here, in relation with my claim about natural incompleteness, I aim to show that Aristotle 
fails to prove this claim to be true.   
Now, necessity is a notion employed in Ancient Greek philosophy on many occasions to 
describe the divine logos or reason which determines the fate of human beings.
157
 
Meanwhile, necessity appears as something analogous to the Aristotelian primary cause 
but is not the same, as necessity lacks a final end. As a matter of fact Aristotle criticizes his 
predecessors for their disregard of the telos. He says that they identify, in one way or the 
other, the matter, the form and the source of change as the arché, but they employ telos or 
‘for the sake of which a thing is done’ incidentally and they do not identify it as an arché 
in the primary sense.
158
 Necessity appears to be the primary cause of the cosmos that is 
analogous to the Aristotelian arché but does not share its completeness. 
Does this mean that I argue here for necessity to be the reason beings and things come 
together? The Ancient Greek biographer of philosophers Diogenes Laertius argues that the 
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Democritean ‘like to like’ is essentially referring to a coming together that is out of 
necessity.
159
 Does this mean, since I have identified the communion of othernesses with the 
Democritean ‘like to like,’ that the anarchy I argue for is akin to necessity? My response to 
that is that it would be wrong to equate the incompleteness of anarchy, as this has been 
discussed above, with necessity. 
This is because the very term necessity refers to the unavoidability of something and thus 
points towards a complete or closed system.
160
 When something is attributed to necessity, 
it is implied that every possible result has played out and the one that occurs does so 
because it was not possible for it to do not. Necessity indeed points towards completeness 
or it entails a conception of completeness that is different from the Aristotelian one, but 
nevertheless it is completeness. Necessity can be better described as probabilistic 
inevitability. For example, the gambler that is able to calculate and keep track of the odds 
and possibilities that play out in a game of cards in a casino will be a winner out of 
necessity or because there was no other way things could play out. Looking into the 
probabilistic decision-making process of gamblers goes beyond the scope of this study. 
Nevertheless, it would be fair to say that it is common to listen to stories about gamblers 
that have been able to do defy the odds and win consistently by being able to track the 
possible outcomes. 
What needs to be emphasized is that a result that is out of necessity points towards 
completeness or a close system of probabilities, which also means that it plays out in the 
same way every time. Every time the card player has counted three aces on the table, it is 
inevitable that there is only one left in the game and so on. If the incompleteness of 
anarchy were to be equated with the incompleteness, in the sense of the absence of a final 
end, of necessity, then this study would not be arguing for anarchy but for something that 
is closer to chance rather than spontaneity. 
Chance has been defined as what arises from reason. Chance refers to the probability of 
something happening that may appear as opposite to reason but reaffirms reason. Here 
reason is used in the Aristotelian way as something that has a final end and not to the way 
human beings respond to need. I will however get back to this in the following chapter. For 
now, it would be fair to say that chance refers to the probabilistic inevitability or to 
necessity. For example, meeting someone one did not intend to meet on the way to the city 
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centre can be equally defined as a result of chance or necessity. This is because it refers to 
something that takes place inevitably or because the odds played out in such a way that 
made it possible. Moreover, every time the odds will play out in the same way the result is 
going to be the same no matter if one intends it or not.  
Spontaneity or ataxia, as the term employed above that defines more accurately the 
interplay in anarchy, is an incompleteness that is different. The spontaneous result is not 
subject to necessity; anything that occurs cannot be predetermined with certainty. This is 
arguably captured by what Levinas calls the infinition of infinity. For him, ‘infinity does 
not first exist, and then reveals itself. Its infinitum is produced as revelation.’161 As 
Democritus says, ‘the same configurations can sometimes have opposite effects and 
opposite configurations the same effect.’162 Hence the idiom, ‘one man’s meat is another 
man’s poison.’163  
As Heraclitus says, in a similar manner, the water of the sea that is drinkable and nutritious 
for the fish is poisonous and undrinkable for humans.
164
 Even more so, the very food one 
eats that provides the body with valuable nutrients may at the same time wear out the 
organs and bring forth the being’s perishing. This is to say there is not a single way in 
which anything that comes to be does so or more accurately there is no completeness in 
nature. If this were the case then the doctor would be able to treat everyone with the same 
disease in the same exact way, but this is evidently not the case. More importantly though, 
this means that what is good for me today may not be good for me tomorrow or what I 
need today is not necessarily what I may need tomorrow. This is because, as stated above 
with the term ataxia, there is constant change and what is being if not constant change?  
However, I will not answer this question here, as it is addressed in the next section. What 
has to be made clear here, is that necessity requires a closed system, or change and motion 
that is determined, and brings forth probabilistic inevitable results. It would be fair to say 
that it is natural incompleteness or anarchy that makes change possible and brings forth 
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beings and things rather than completeness.
165
 Or the communion of othernesses is not a 
result of necessity but of the freedom of being in anarchy or in a spontaneous way.  
In relation to that and in support of natural incompleteness, I will now challenge the 
Aristotelian understanding of natural completeness. I will put his claim that nature makes 
everything complete and nothing in vain, to the test. This is, as stated above, in order to 
complete the questioning of the plausibility of this claim that the previous chapter initiated. 
Besides, the results of the following analysis will be useful for this study’s definition of 
being that comes next as well as for the contestation of political as the ultimate way of 
being that follows this chapter. 
So, the question that arises from the Aristotelian theory about the generation of the cosmos 
and how being comes to be is: how is it possible for something that makes everything 
complete and nothing in vain to allow for chance and spontaneity to arise? To clarify this, 
as discussed previously, he argues that there are three ways in which things come to pass. 
The first is that things come to pass for the sake of something and out of this the two other 
ways arise, chance and spontaneity, as deviations from this rule. Even though it is safe to 
say that it has been proven that spontaneity, as anarchy, is not a deviation from the 
Aristotelian rule but something that is beyond it, for the sake of the discussion that follows 
this will be overlooked. This is in order to prove that he ultimately fails to demonstrate the 
completeness of the deliberate intentionality of physis or nature, as the primary cause of 
everything.     
To do that, two cases will be considered; one in which physis is the origin of the human 
being only and a second one in which nature is the origin of everything there is. Now, the 
first of the two cases may be seen as implausible or unfair to Aristotle as it is inherently 
problematic. Indeed, it is problematic in itself because it instantly renders the rest of beings 
and things unnatural, in the sense of not being in the way of nature. However, it is not a 
product of this study’s imagination; it is rather based on Aristotle’s claims, while it can be 
traced to the writings of his teacher Plato. It also provides an explanation, even an odd one, 
to why there is spontaneity in the natural world.   
So, the reason for looking into two cases is the Aristotelian indication that only the human 
being apprehends and thus is according to the way of nature. This has been identified as 
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referring to the teleocracy of human craftsmanship or to the fact that the human being only 
has a reason to be, as in a final end to move towards. Based on this understanding he also 
claims that the human being is the one that through following the teleocracy of nature, is 
able to complete what nature does not. This, in relation with his assertion that spontaneity 
is the way of the lesser beings or of all other beings apart from the human being, implies 
that indeed it is possible to say that his nature or physis is responsible only for the 
appearance of the human being.  
Furthermore, according to Aristotle, the soul is the place where reason and spontaneity, in 
his view of spontaneity as the unreasonable, lie. The reasonable part is the prevailing one 
in some human beings and the unreasonable or spontaneous prevails in the lower animals 
as well as in some human beings.
166
 This claim that the soul contains the know-how of 
nature can be traced back to the Socratic argument as it appears in Plato. In particular, 
Socrates argues for the division of the human being into a mover, the soul, and a moveable, 
the body. For him the soul comes from another world or ‘another life,’ as he says and 
struggles to release itself ‘from the chains of the body.’167  
The reason for this is that the soul comes from the world of essences or of absolute forms. 
The true way of being is the way of the soul, which is according to the absolute forms. The 
true way of being comes or exists in a world that is beyond or over the material world and 
the way the soul, as the true part of the being, returns to this world is through death.
168
 This 
Socratic/Platonic division of the being into a soul and a body is fundamental in the 
Aristotelian conception of the human being. However, this division between a mover and 
the moveable is contested in the following section. 
For now, it would be fair to say that it is not unsupported to claim that Aristotle argues that 
the human being is the only natural being or product of nature. Moreover, even if it is clear 
that this is problematic, it does offer an explanation about the appearance of spontaneity in 
his theory. Spontaneity is something that the human being comes across once it appears in 
the cosmos or the natural world. However, since the human being, by its nature, is rational 
then it seems that the spontaneous part of its being is not its own but what comes with the 
world in which it appears. It is what the human being has to overcome in order to be in its 
true way.  
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If the natural world is a place where spontaneity reigns or is the prevalent way of being, 
since the vast majority of beings and things are in a spontaneous way, then incompleteness 
rather than completeness is the way of the cosmos. Moreover, this means that the nature of 
the human being is other than the nature of the other beings or it appears as an 
otherworldly being that stands over and above the world. Based on the foregoing as well as 
on what has been discussed in the previous chapter this assertion is not farfetched. It rather 
seems logical for someone that argues that all beings and things are for the human being to 
use or utilize. If this is correct then Aristotle fails to demonstrate that human reasoning is 
what underlies the whole of existence. It rather appears to be underlying the human 
existence solely. 
The dominant position of the being that has reason or the political animal is contested in 
the following chapter. Meanwhile, the division of the human being into a reasonable and 
an unreasonable is what I argue against in the following section. Nevertheless, because this 
case is clearly problematic, even though it is supported by his writings, the case in which 
physis or nature is the origin of all beings should be addressed. Through this, the ultimate 
failure of Aristotle to prove there is completeness is demonstrated. More accurately, it is 
shown that it is impossible to reduce the cosmos under a single understanding without the 
imposition of it upon the cosmos. 
Under this scenario, which seems as the most probable interpretation of his words, 
Aristotle says that in all the ways nature presents itself through and in beings and things, 
the human being is the superior one. This means that it is the one through which nature 
manifests itself in a more complete way. Therefore, this is why it is capable of 
apprehending the way of nature and make use of beings and things in a way similar to 
nature or by utilizing them in a way they are unable to be if left on their own. More 
accurately, in this case the rationale seems to be as follows. 
He says that since manmade products imitate the way natural beings and things come to be 
and since human art is able to bring forth products from natural things that would 
otherwise not be possible, then human art not only imitates but also completes nature. If 
this is true and manmade products have a reason to be, then natural products should also 
have one, since human art is a power that the human being possesses by its nature. If 
nature grants the human being with such ability then nature must itself be operating in the 
same way. He says, then, that is impossible for human art to not be according to the way of 
nature, since it is nature that grants the human being with this ability. 
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This is to say that since the human being comes from nature, so does its reasoning. If its 
reasoning is moved by nature, which is the prime mover, then, by observing the way of the 
human art or craft one can understand the way of nature. In the same way, by observing the 
way of the ant or the horse one can apprehend their nature. However, since the human 
being is able by nature to accomplish much more or more complex things, then, one should 
look at the way of the human being to understand nature rather than the way of other 
animals.  
If this is correct, it appears as a more logical and a less aggressive way of arguing for the 
primacy of human reasoning over nature. Moreover, this conception of humans, because of 
their reasoning, as being the purest or the most complete paradigm of the works of nature 
is evident in most of the Ancient Greek literature. For example, Heidegger quotes the 
description of the Ancient Greek historian Xenophon who says that the human being is ‘the 
animal that has turned out best.’169 
However, it appears as if he is saying that nature produces beings and things that are in 
themselves unable to be by themselves in a complete way. Subsequently, they require the 
human being to do that for them. This closely resembles the previous interpretation in 
which all other beings are of a lesser nature and have no reason to be. Consequently, it 
would not be an exaggeration to say that what the human being brings forth through téchne 
is in fact what nature does; through its manifestation as the human being. If this is to be 
accepted, then, a very odd argument emerges. It appears as if Aristotle is arguing that 
nature exists or more accurately lives through the human being and through it, it unfolds its 
plan. It is not the human being that makes use of other beings but nature itself through the 
human being.  
So, if this were to be the case, then, his nature is evidently incomplete and thus not a 
founding principle. This is because that would mean that the way nature operates 
resembles human learning rather than human art. To clarify, if the most complete 
manifestation of nature is the human being, then, this means that all beings and things prior 
to it, including its natural ancestors, as well as all the beings that are its contemporaries are 
either failed attempts to manifest itself or they are not products of an arché; they do not 
have an arché. Does not a failed attempt to produce something have an origin? For 
example, the author of a book may try several times until he/she attains the complete or 
final form of a book or an article.  
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With regards to that, an author is someone that is able to produce something complete. 
Prior to that he/she is indeed the cause of the writing, the writing can be traced back to 
him/her, but he/she is not an author and may never be. It is the completion of a work that 
makes someone an author. Or to use an example that is closer to Aristotle’s own examples, 
one is a carpenter when one makes things out of wood. A person that carves wood is not a 
carpenter until he/she makes something complete.  
Completeness, or bringing forth what one means to, is precisely what defines his physis 
and incompleteness or the inability to do so is synonymous with anarchy or spontaneous 
generation. The above analysis suggests that his concept of nature is far from signifying 
completeness. It appears that the completeness that Aristotle sees in his human being is 
more likely to be a product of chance or a product of probabilistic inevitability of countless 
failed attempts. If this is true then his concept of nature has indeed no reason or no final 
end; how else can one justify the production of unprecedented number of beings that 
according to Aristotle have no reason to be.  
The two cases considered here have implications in the way Aristotle defines being, as the 
next section discusses. However, if anything, the failure of Aristotle to prove the 
completeness of nature shows that the natural incompleteness which characterizes the 
cosmos in anarchy is the more plausible out of the two. As Democritus says, the cosmos 
appears as an ordered whole not because of an omnipotent entity or a god neither because 
of man.
170
 It rather, as Heraclitus adds in similar manner, was and is and always shall be a 
constant change – even if as argued above his argument for change is in fact a complete 
cycle.
171
  
The present analysis shows, in line with the claim of the previous chapter that his concept 
of nature is more likely to be the founding principle for the establishment of a first 
philosophy. It is now clearer that Aristotle indeed imposes the teleocracy of the human 
téchne or craftsmanship as the true or only way of making sense of the cosmos. It is now 
apparent that Aristotle’s nature refers to the hierarchical ordering that derives from the 
human being. It is from this one-dimensional ordering, which disregards other beings and 
things that the cosmos appears in him. It does so, as stated previously, by providing the rest 
of beings and things with significance. Meanwhile, their significance is what ranks them in 
the order in terms of their utility towards the attainment of the human being’s final end.     
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3.3. Being in Anarchy: Being, Non-Being and the World 
Now that it has arguably been established that the cosmos is in anarchy or that it is a 
communion rather than a hierarchical ordering, it is appropriate to examine what anarchy 
means for being. As discussed above, beings are for this study the active constituents of the 
cosmos; they constitute it and they are being constituted by it. Consequently, I argue here 
that being in the sense of what exists is something that is indivisible from the world it 
comes to be with. In fact the indivisibility of being refers to the fact that being in anarchy 
is being with the world rather than over the world.  
This argument follows from the discussion of the previous section in which I have claimed 
that being in Aristotle is something that is over and above the world. I provide here an 
explanation of what being is for Aristotle, as this is necessary for the development of my 
argument as well as for what follows in this study. In order to develop my argument and 
support it, I introduce the term idiosyncrasy, as what describes being in anarchy best, while 
I draw upon the Democritean fragment about being and non-being.   
To start with, the primary definition that Aristotle provides for the concept of being has 
been introduced in the previous chapter as what has within itself a principle of motion and 
of stationariness.’172 Based on what has been discussed, especially in chapter one, this 
principle refers to the origin of being or the arché of the being, which is physis or nature. 
In other words, a being is for Aristotle something that comes to be according to nature. 
This means that being is something that has the innate ability to change and stop changing 
once it reaches its final end as this is defined by nature or its nature.  
To describe this process, out of which being appears, he coins the term entelechy 
(entelecheia – εντελέχεια).173 In particular, the term entelechy is coined to describe motion 
or change that has its end in itself or a motion that comes to a rest by itself. Meanwhile, 
Heidegger says that Aristotle with the term entelechy refers to being as what is ‘having-
itself-in-its-end.’174 Entelechy in this case refers to the essence of being as something that 
appears when the motion or change reaches its final end. As Schurmann says, the natural 
process of becoming refers to the way in which the good (eidos – είδος), or what a thing 
essentially is, is rendered entirely and durably visible.
175
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However, what is important is that being is something that appears through a process of 
change that has a final end or a telos. With regards to what a final end or a telos is, in 
addition to what has been discussed in chapter one, he says that ‘goods must be spoken of 
in two ways, and some must be good in themselves, the others by reason of these.’176 As he 
says, ‘the chief good is evidently something final.’177 The chief good or the final end 
(telos) is that ‘which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something 
else.’178 In this sense, telos or ‘the chief good’ is the final end and its finality is signified by 
its completeness or self-sufficiency.
179
 
This means that being in Aristotle, as what appears as the final end of the process of 
motion or change, is something that is complete and is the reason this process, out of which 
it emerges, takes place. Subsequently, he says that the nature of beings refers to their 
immediate material substratum which has in itself a principle of motion or change as well 
as to the shape or form which is specified in the definition of the thing.
180
 In Aristotle then, 
one can talk of the nature of a being in terms of its primary matter as long as this matter 
entails the power or potentiality to bring forth the form of the being as this is specified by 
its nature. This means that matter can only be seen as the nature of a being when it has the 
potentiality or as Heidegger says ‘the capacity, or better, the appropriateness for.’181  
For example, the material substratum of animals is arguably the same and it can be broadly 
defined as flesh and bones. However, there are many different animals and thus Aristotle 
says that it is mainly the final form of the animal that defines it and not the material 
substratum.
182
 Nevertheless, the material substratum also defines being in a secondary 
sense, since it distinguishes it from other beings such as insects as well as from things such 
as rocks and wood and so on. In relation with that final statement, it is also important to 
say that from the foregoing it becomes apparent that there is also a difference between a 
being and a thing. The difference is precisely that a being is complete, in the sense that it 
possesses its own principle of motion and change. On the other hand, a thing is what does 
not; for example a stone is arguably not a being because it cannot change itself: instead 
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change is inflicted upon it. However, I will return to this later in this chapter, as it will be 
useful in the argumentation that follows. 
For now, it has to be emphasized that the presupposition that there is a primary cause or an 
all-encompassing founding principle for the cosmos leads to the above understanding of 
being, as something that is complete in itself. Moreover, anything that is not defined by 
this completeness can arguably be defined as a non-being. Based on the discussion of the 
previous chapter regarding the unity of being and non-being in ontology, a being is a being 
because it is not a non-being and the other way around. It is fair to say then that what is not 
complete, in the way this completeness has been defined above, is a non-being. As will be 
discussed later this may refer to a thing, an animal or a human being.  
This understanding of being turns it into something that is predetermined or predefined and 
this is the issue I will be concerned with here. To put it differently, what the being can do 
or be is determined by its physis or by physis or nature as the primary cause of everything 
there is, which pre-exists the material substance of being. What appears in the natural 
world as a being is in fact the material manifestation of what nature intended to be. This 
means that the final end of the being is prior to the being itself. Since the being appears 
when it attains its final end, then it would be fair to say that being, as a final end or as the 
form of what appears later in the world, stands over and above the world.  
However, if the above claim about natural incompleteness is correct it follows that being is 
never something complete. If ataxia is what describes the interplay among beings and 
things, then being itself, as a constituent of the cosmos, should also be something 
incomplete. As Democritus says, ‘being no more is than the non-being.’183 The usual 
interpretation of this saying is that being refers to matter, while non-being to the void, as 
the two fundamental elements that have an equal role in the creation of the cosmos.
184
 To 
clarify, Democritus says that motion occurs within the void.
185
 In particular, he says that 
the void is necessary for motion and that without the void, motion and change are 
impossible.
186
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Now, based on the definition of the metaphysical, as what escapes the ontological or the 
reduction of the cosmos under a sole origin, I propose here a different reading of the said 
Democritean claim. In particular, I argue that what appears as being is as much being as it 
is non-being. If the above claim is correct, then the world appears as an ordered whole 
because there are private worlds and a common world. Similarly, the being appears as 
something ordered equally due to its own uniqueness to be and its communion or 
spontaneous interplay with other beings and things.  
I say that non-being refers to what is never owned by the being in the sense of being 
impossible to be comprehended in its totality without being reduced. For instance that 
would mean that all the beings and things that constitute the cosmos are as much a part of 
me as my own way of making sense of the cosmos. This claim could also be rephrased as 
being is as much physical as it is metaphysical, which means that being does not end when 
its own way of making sense of the cosmos does. This is to say, the being never owns itself 
in a complete and absolute way, but the communion of othernesses is equally an active 
constituent of it.   
This is only logical because in the absence of a founding principle, which dictates being 
and the cosmos, every being is an active constituent of the cosmos. This claim is similar 
with the early pre-Socratic saying by Thales that ‘all things are full of gods.’187 This is 
arguably referring to the fact that everything is moving.
188
 However, what is more 
important, is not simply the fact that everything is moving but that every being constitutes 
in an active way the cosmos and thus other beings and things. Being is as much a single 
entity as it is the cosmos.  
Now before I look into an example, it must be made clear that I am not arguing here for a 
different type of distinction. I am not saying that it is more accurate to distinguish being 
into being and non-being rather than form and matter or soul and body. Instead I argue for 
a different type of relationship between the being and the cosmos. Where Aristotle sees a 
ruler-subject relationship between nature, as the arché, and the material world, I argue for 
a synergy or the indivisibility of being from the world. 
For example, the lion hunts the antelope in order to satisfy its need. Hunting other animals 
is the way the lion responds to need or takes responsibility for its own being. The lion 
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through its own way of making sense of the cosmos or its private world sees every being 
similar to the antelope as the way to satisfy its need to eat and stay alive. Staying alive here 
is the same as saying sustaining its being or maintaining its motion as what makes it an 
active constituent of the cosmos.   
It is not uncommon to perceive the behavior of the lion as aggressive and the lion as a wild 
and dangerous animal. This is indeed a fair way to put it if one finds oneself in the 
unfortunate position of becoming its prey. But this is an unfair description of an animal 
that is much more than this. For instance, the lion is as much an antelope and other beings 
as it is a lion. Or the lion is only possible because of the antelope and other similar beings, 
which in their turn are possible because of the plethora of vegetation and so on. The lion 
does not end with its definition as dangerous nor can it be described without taking into 
consideration the world it comes to be with.  
This may sound absurd but this does not mean that the lion is literally an antelope because 
it eats it; even though this could be true to some extent from a biological standpoint or in 
terms of nutrients and other substances the consumption of flesh and blood provides the 
lion with. Instead, this means that the lion’s existence is indivisible from the existence of 
these other beings to such an extent that they are active constituents of its own being. To 
put it plainly, there is no being that is known as lion if there is no being that is antelope.  
The lion, in this case, does not dominate the antelope; the antelope is not there for it to 
utilize it. Instead the antelope constitutes its being in an active way that is beyond the 
lion’s private or spontaneous response to need. It is not that there are no distinctions among 
beings; it is not that there is no way of saying what is what. On the contrary, beings in 
anarchy are unique manifestations of the ways in which the communion among beings and 
things takes place. To make this clearer, the term idiosyncrasy, as another way of 
describing the being in anarchy, has to be introduced. 
The term idiosyncrasy is used in English to refer mainly to ‘the physical constitution of an 
individual.’189 The term is a composition of the three words: idio (ίδιο), syn (συν), and 
crasy (κράση). The word idio stands for one’s own in the sense of uniqueness and not 
ownership. Syn stands for together or togetherness and crasy stands for mixture or 
composition.
190
 Consequently, I employ the term here to refer to the unique way in which 
the interplay among beings and things manifests itself as being. Thus, being in anarchy or 
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idiosyncrasy refers to an amalgam or a synergy rather than something that is complete in 
and by itself.  
To clarify, Heidegger says that the Aristotelian physis is pure energy that is an autonomous 
and constant presence based on nothing but itself.
191
 Indeed, the Aristotelian nature refers 
to a self-sufficient process of coming to be. It initiates the process of becoming and 
controls it until the outcome is complete. It can be understood as energy in the sense that 
its actualization produces the being. It works by shaping the matter towards a 
specific/specified end. Energy or energeia (ενέργεια) derives from the words ‘en’ and 
‘ergon,’ which literally means in the work or in the process.192  
Thus, contrary to the Aristotelian approach that considers being to be something that arises 
as the result or the end of the energy of physis or nature, this section has suggested that 
being is rather a synergy or the unique amalgamation of indefinite synergies. What is the 
being’s own is this very way in which it forms synergies or constitutes and is being 
constituted. This is the being’s own not in the sense of ownership but in the sense of being 
its uniqueness that makes it a being or that distinguishes it as an active constituent.  
It would have been a paradox to say that the being owns itself, as it has been argued that its 
own constitution goes beyond itself. Instead it seems correct to say that the being is 
responsible for sustaining itself as a being or as an active constituent of the cosmos. These 
two assertions play an important role in the discussions about the political as well as in 
relation with the contemporary understandings of anarchy in the following chapters.        
For now, it has to be said that if being is in anarchy or an idiosyncrasy then it is indivisible 
from the world it comes to be with rather than over the world. Here I employ the term 
indivisible in a way similar to Democritus. In particular, Democritus in his theory about the 
physical world argues that matter can be traced to a particle that is so small in its size that 
is no longer divisible and he calls that an atom.
193
 Similarly, the being is indivisible means 
here, firstly, that it cannot be divided but it is one thing and secondly that it cannot be 
reduced into something lesser than it is.  
This means, firstly that the private and the common or the physical and the metaphysical 
are not two different things that meet at some point to form one thing. They are rather, in 
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line with the previous section, an obligate symbiosis.
194
 The one pre-supposes or requires 
the other in a way that none of them can be in the absence of the other. The common 
constitutes the private in the same exact way the private constitutes the common without 
any of them being prior to the other. It is a relationship that is not for the sake of a final end 
but is arguably captured by Levinas’ ‘the-one-for-the-other.’195    
Furthermore, to sum up the present discussion, the indivisibility of being from the world it 
comes to be with refers to the fact that it cannot be reduced to a mere mode of being that 
derives from an overarching founding principle. Instead every idiosyncrasy, as the unique 
amalgamation of indefinite synergies between being and non-being, should be seen as a 
Democritean atom. This is not in the sense of being very small to be divided, but in the 
sense of being impossible to be contextualized under an absolute signifier; either itself or 
an all-encompassing primary cause.              
3.4. Being in Anarchy versus the Death of Being  
So, the previous section argued about the indivisibility of being against the Aristotelian 
conception of the being as something that is over the world. In other words, I have claimed 
that being is with the world or that it is as much an active constituent of the cosmos as it is 
constituted itself by it; being is as much being as non-being. I argued that if the cosmos is 
in anarchy, which means that it is a communion of othernesses rather than a hierarchical 
ordering, then being is in anarchy or it is something that is never complete. Instead it is 
more accurately described with the term idiosyncrasy, which refers to the unique 
manifestation of ataxia, or indefiniteness and spontaneity, of the synergies out of which it 
arises as a being among beings and things.    
This section consequently aims to demonstrate that anarchy, rather than the Aristotelian 
teleocracy or entelechy is the way of being. In particular, I argue here that the Aristotelian 
entelechy, or the conception that being appears when motion or change comes to its natural 
final end, is actually signifying the end or death of being. In other words, I say that anarchy 
or the absence of a predetermined reason to be is the way of being because the opposite is 
in fact signifying the death of or the disappearance of being. The discussion that takes 
place here is also important for the contestation of the Aristotelian argument for slavery in 
the following chapter.          
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To start with, the meaning of the death of being will be addressed. It has been stated above 
that motion, in an incomplete manner, is what characterizes the being. More accurately, it 
is that this motion, or through this motion that beings constitute the cosmos actively. It 
would be fair to say that when this motion comes to an end or when it stops the being 
ceases to exist or that it signifies the death of being. In relation to that the pre-Socratic 
Empedocles says in his own lyrical way that ‘no mortal thing has a beginning, nor does it 
end in death and obliteration; there is only a mixing and then a separating of what was 
mixed, but by mortal men these processes are named beginnings.’196  
Empedocles seems to be in line with what this study argues for; he seems to be arguing for 
a constant interplay that is not possible to be defined in terms of beginnings and ends. 
However, when it comes to the end or death of being he is wrong. The death of being 
means the end or disappearance of being, because it ceases to be an active constituent of 
the cosmos. In other words, even if as Empedocles appears to be claiming, one is to see the 
dead being as something that is still active, it certainly is no longer that unique amalgam of 
synergies that it used to be. Moreover is no longer something that is actively constituting 
but something that merely remains as a constituent of the cosmos in a passive way. 
For example, one may say that the death of someone, like a friend, a parent or even a pet, 
does not instantly mean its disappearance. This is because they will always be a part of 
those with whom they had a connection with or even to the extreme that through being 
with the world they have shaped the world one lives. This last part does not necessarily 
point towards someone that had a significant societal role; it does not have to be a ‘public 
figure.’ This rather means that the now dead being once was an active constituent of the 
cosmos and since the cosmos remains once the being is gone then it still lives through the 
cosmos it constituted actively. 
The problem in this case is that a past tense has to be employed to refer to the active 
participation of this being in the constitution of the cosmos. It can no longer be seen as an 
active constituent but as something that remains a part of the cosmos in a passive or more 
accurately non-active way. Even in the case that the memory of someone still has an active 
role in someone else’s way of being or making sense of the cosmos, the being as a unique 
manifestation of synergies or as an idiosyncrasy no longer exists. It would be also fair to 
say that a memory is hardly something which can be described as active. If a memory is to 
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be associated with action then that would be an action of the one that has the memory 
rather than of the memory itself. 
Furthermore, one could say, in a macabre way, that the matter of what used to be a living 
entity constitutes the cosmos because it provides other beings with a way to satisfy their 
hunger and thus remains a fertilizer of being and the cosmos. Even in this case and even if 
this is to be accepted, the being is no longer there; it is not an active constituent of the 
cosmos but a passive one. It could be said, in an alternative way, that it turns from a being 
into something that is active through others but not in itself.  
Therefore, the attempt to conceive the end of motion that characterizes a living thing as a 
dead being rather than the death of being or the disappearance of being can only be 
successful if one were to equate it with another way of being. For example, Aristotle, even 
if he is dead, arguably still constitutes the cosmos in the sense of constituting the way we 
make sense of the cosmos. Even if in writing about him one uses present tense, Aristotle 
says this or that, in reality it is the one that writes about Aristotle that says something or it 
is through him that Aristotle speaks.  
More importantly, I or anyone that employs his sayings can use them in ways Aristotle 
may have never imagined and to put it blatantly he cannot do anything about it. The being 
that was known as Aristotle can be seen also as being constituted still but not on its own 
accord or spontaneously. It is shaped and reshaped, rather, in the ways others want. For 
example one may present him as a democrat and another as an authoritarian. In other 
words, it could, in a somewhat strange way, be said that Aristotle is still alive through 
others or only insofar as he is used or utilized by others. This should be emphasized as it 
plays an important role in what follows in this chapter as well as in chapter five in relation 
to the notion of freedom in anarchy.   
Consequently, it would be inaccurate to claim that the end of motion is a mode of being or 
that it does not signify the being’s disappearance. This is because in every case examined 
in the previous paragraphs the being ceases to be an active constituent of the cosmos. 
Instead it remains, in an odd way, a part of it but in a passive way that has nothing to do 
with the indefinite motion that characterizes being. Consequently, the term death of being 
here refers to the moment when the being ceases to be an active constituent of the cosmos.      
Nevertheless, based on the analysis of his teleocracy and the term entelechy he coins to 
describe teleocracy as the way of being, Aristotle argues that it is through the end of 
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motion or change that the being comes to be. However, I have associated here the end of 
motion to the death of being or to it ceasing to be an active constituent of the cosmos. In 
the following paragraphs I demonstrate that Aristotle’s entelechy, as the way of being, fails 
to escape the death of being or that he renders the vast majority of the living things that 
exist in the world as inactive. 
Based on the analysis of the previous section, entelechy refers to the process through 
which the final form of the being appears in its totality for the first time and thus it is the 
moment when motion or change stops and the being has appeared in the world. In other 
words, the Aristotelian being has a potentiality to be something specific/specified and it is 
itself when this potentiality has been fully actualized. For example, in the process of 
becoming out of which the man appears, the boy also appears as a non-final end or as a 
potential being. As Heidegger argues, it is not a non-being, but what is un-actual in the 
sense that it is not actualized.
197
 What is potential is at the same time actual and non-actual 
or as Aristotle puts it, ‘every potency is at one and the same time a potency of the 
opposite.’198  
Hence, the boy is not a being or an end in itself. The boy appears as an end but not as a 
final end in the process out of which appears the man, which is the final end. This is to say 
nature does not intend to create the boy, but in the process of creating the man it 
necessarily has to create the boy. The boy as a potential being is a mode of being that is 
defined by its privation of completeness; it is not a non-being per se but not as yet a being.  
The first question that arises is why the boy, or the girl for that matter, is not a being? It is 
a strange thing to argue for, since it is pretty clear that the boy is an active constituent of 
the cosmos. In other words, according to what has been argued in this chapter, there is no 
apparent reason for which the boy should not be seen as a being. As a matter of fact the 
same could be said for the newborn, which is not even a boy or a girl yet. Is not the 
newborn an active constituent of the cosmos, when the way its parents make sense of the 
cosmos and their way of being are radically affected or constituted by its presence?  
It would be safe to assume that the answer here is yes. Indeed, the newborn is constituted 
by the world of its parents, which are its whole world at the beginning, as it is with them 
that its communion with otherness is realized. At the same time, it constitutes the world 
again through its parents and the interplay with them which affects their interplay with 
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others and so on. Moreover, it could be claimed, similarly with Aristotle, that the 
newborn’s interplay is passive; in the sense that is unable to respond to its needs. But this 
would again be false, because the newborn responds to need and communicates it through 
mainly crying. 
If this is the case for the newborn, it would be fair to say that the same is also true for the 
boy. Meanwhile, it appears that Heidegger, with the assertion that ‘it is not a non-being’ 
recognizes the fact that the boy even if it is not a man, it is not something inactive. In other 
words, the boy and the newborn are arguably beings in their own unique way and not in 
relation to the man. Nevertheless, what needs to be emphasized is that Aristotle with this 
process turns a large number of beings into not beings or not-yet-beings. Now, this may 
not appear as a proof or not convincing enough evidence that Aristotle entelechy points 
towards the death of being. But in fact it is, because through his conception that every 
being comes to be through the actualization of its potentiality he ascribes to every living 
thing a potentiality or an end to their motion. This potentiality or dynamis, as he says, is 
there because of actuality. This means he argues that actuality is prior to potentiality ‘both 
in formula and in substantiality, while in time is prior in one sense and in another not.’199  
This means, firstly, the potentiality of a being or a thing is in line with the form of the 
being, which similarly with the Platonic theory of ideal forms precedes the being and 
directs its becoming. For example, the form of the man precedes the newborn and the boy, 
and directs their motion and change towards the competence or the being that is the man. 
On the other hand, his claim about substantiality can be understood in two ways; in one 
sense it refers to importance or significance and in another sense in the substance of a 
being or a thing. Actuality, as in the actual being, is much more important than the not-yet-
being. At the same time, the substance of the not-yet-being comes from an actual being; 
the newborn’s substance comes from the parents, which are actual beings. This is similar 
with his claim that actuality is prior in time; we know that a boy can become a man 
because we have seen this occurring. Meanwhile, actuality is posterior in time to 
potentiality means that from the actualization of potentiality the being emerges.     
However, this understanding is problematic because it turns being into a thing or an object. 
Now, based on the foregoing, it would be fair to say that the difference between a being 
and a thing is that the being is an active constituent of the cosmos. Subsequently, a thing is 
something that passively constitutes the cosmos. For example, in line with what was said 
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above about the death of being, a hammer is a thing and not a being because the hammer 
does not move by itself but requires an external power to move it. In the same way, it is not 
possible to call a hammer alive. The hammer rather becomes alive in a sense when it is 
used for a specific reason. It would be accurate to say that a thing, like the hammer or a 
stone, is something that constitutes the world in a passive way or through others. 
So, if the being has a potentiality to be something and this potentiality is acquired for a 
reason or for the sake of a telos, which is arguably not its own, does not this mean that the 
Aristotelian being is but a instrument, a tool or a thing. If the final form, the significance 
and the substance of it are prior to it in time and direct its motion is this not like saying that 
the being does not move but it is moved? Indeed, as has been discussed, Aristotle argues 
for an arché or for a prime mover from which all motion stems. This is what his concept of 
physis or nature signifies. With regards to the question posed here, he says ‘if the prior 
does not set it in motion the other does not move, and if it sets it in motion it does 
move.’200 
If this is the case with beings, then it seems that, in his view, they are no different from 
things. Or, if a thing is something that constitutes the world in a passive way and if this for 
a being is equal with its death, then Aristotle is actually arguing for the death of being. To 
put it differently, if the being is no different than the thing then it is safe to say that there is 
no being in Aristotle or he argues for the annihilation of being as an active constituent of 
the cosmos.  
This claim though seems to contradict the above claim about Aristotle arguing for being to 
be over the world. In other words, how is it possible for being to be over the world and at 
the same time the subject of it? In addition, it seems fair to say that it is the actualization of 
potentiality the reason Aristotle says that being appears when motion or change stops. In 
other words, it is this motion’s end, which is not controlled by the being that he talks about 
and that when this stops the being is ready to be by itself. 
With regards to the first question/objection that may fairly arise from the above discussion, 
I would like to say that this points towards the previous claim of this study that Aristotle is 
in fact arguing that there is only one true being; the political animal. This is the being that 
has a reason to be in itself, while the rest of beings are lesser ones. If this is the case the 
then the world is filled with things or non-active beings that await the political animal to 
actualize them. The argument for the death of being is not inaccurate if one considers that 
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in this case Aristotle turns the vast majority of living things into objects that exist for the 
sake of the political animal. But I will leave it at that and return to it in the following 
chapter, where I will respond to this objection more completely. 
About the second objection, Heidegger, in his interpretation of Aristotle, argues that when 
the process of becoming attains its end or when potentiality is fully actualized, motion does 
not stop but changes. This is to say, it no longer shapes the being, but sustains it or 
prevents it from changing. As Heidegger says, when the actualization of potentiality is 
complete the being appears in its totality for the first time.
201
 In this study’s view it is at 
least inaccurate to say that the being appears at this peak point for the first time. As stated 
above, an understanding such as this renders anything that is prior to this alleged point of 
completeness into a non-being.  
However, if it is to be accepted that potentiality is the natural power of beings to appear 
then what is it that makes beings disappear? To put it differently, if one is to employ the 
term potentiality for the development of being, from a boy into a man for instance, why not 
use the same term for what makes the being perish. Is it not, in the same sense, a 
potentiality of being to perish and die? Why is not the perishing of a living thing 
considered as natural motion and motion stops at the point where the potentiality of being 
is supposedly actualized in full?  
This probably starts with the fact that it is difficult to conceive perishing as a power or a 
potentiality, because it is not something that the being does but it is something that happens 
to being. As the philosopher Peter Morriss says in his account of power that is rooted in 
Aristotle’s concept of potentiality, power ‘is always a concept referring to ability, capacity 
or dispositional property.’202 As a result, perishing is not a capacity that the being has but it 
is something that the being suffers. 
If this is correct then it is surely not farfetched to say that the actualization of potentiality 
Aristotle argues for is but a suffering the being endures rather than an active way of being. 
Meanwhile, if this is correct then the whole existence of the Aristotelian being is defined 
by passivity and thus is akin to death rather than being. To clarify, as discussed above 
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Aristotle, following Plato, conceives the being or more accurately the human being as 
something that strives to free itself from the spontaneity or irrationality of the natural or 
material world. The whole process of becoming a being or getting to the point where one is 
able to be and what follows may be conceived as a strife; firstly a strife to attain the final 
end of becoming and then the strife of attaining the final end of liberating oneself from the 
spontaneity or anarchy or the natural world.  
Consequently, if this is right, then the Aristotelian being is in fact something that is mainly 
inactive or passive; it is something that endures rather than acts. As he says, ‘that which is 
in the primary sense potential is potential because it is possible for it to become active.’203 
Hence, during the period of the actualization of potentiality the living thing is actually 
passive; it undergoes change. Meanwhile, after it becomes a being it inevitably suffers the 
process of perishing. Therefore, to not stretch this any further, it would be fair to say that 
the end of motion or the completeness Aristotle argues for is akin to the death of being 
rather than describing the way of the living things of the world. It describes something that 
undergoes change or that is constituted but allows no or very little room for activity. Thus, 
he ends up with a being that is no different than a thing that becomes alive through being 
used.       
Conclusion  
To sum up, following the establishment of the plausibility for arguing against the 
Aristotelian understanding of the cosmos, this chapter made the case for anarchy to be the 
way of being. In particular, I have argued that the cosmos is in anarchy; it is a communion 
of othernesses rather than a complete hierarchical ordering. In other words, instead of an 
ordering that takes place towards a specific/specified final end, I have demonstrated the 
incompleteness of the cosmos or the ataxia of the interplay among beings and things. 
To do that, I drew upon the Democritean notion of the ‘like to like,’ while providing 
examples from the natural world, to show the anarchy of the cosmos. Moreover, I 
supported my argument in favour of natural incompleteness over the 
Aristotelian/ontological natural completeness by explaining how he fails to demonstrate 
the completeness he argues for. Instead, in order to do so, he appears to be putting forward 
paradoxical claims about the world and being. 
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In accordance with the argumentation about the cosmos being a communion of beings and 
things characterized by ataxia, I argued that anarchy is the way of being. In particular, I 
claimed that the way living things come to be and are is indivisible from the world they 
come to be with; being is being with the world. More accurately, I argued that being is 
better described as an idiosyncrasy or as the unique amalgam of indefinite synergies 
between the private and the common.  
To do so, I drew upon the Democritean concept of the atom as what is indivisible, while 
arguing against the Aristotelian perception of being as something that is complete and prior 
to the world it appears in. Moreover, to support my argument I demonstrated how 
Aristotle’s notion of entelechy, as a the way the being comes to be when its motion or 
change comes to an end, signifies the death of being rather than the constant motion and 
interplay of the living things. The discussion that took place here paves the way for the 
contestation of the political way of being as the only true way to be and of the perception 
of the human being as the political animal. Meanwhile, this discussion, which takes place 
in the next chapter, is of the utmost importance in challenging the perception of anarchism 
as a political ideology.    
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Chapter 4: Anarchy and the Political   
Introduction 
The human being has been defined by Aristotle as the political animal. This definition of 
the human being is arguably the most commonly used one in the field of political theory.
204
 
As discussed in chapter two, it is tightly associated with the description of the human being 
as the animal that possesses reason or the ability to communicate by articulating its thought 
through language. However, this definition, coming from Aristotle, rests upon his 
teleocracy or the ontological position that wants the cosmos to be a hierarchy of beings.  
I have argued in the previous chapter that the cosmos is in anarchy or a communion of 
othernesses. Drawing upon this, I argue here that human being is but a being in need, and 
the political animal is what describes merely a specific kind of human being. In particular, 
I start by arguing that need is the missing link that brings beings and things together in 
anarchy or the medium that makes the communion of othernesses possible. I argue that 
what defines the human being, much like every other being, is the way it responds to need 
and that is something that is unique among every being. 
To prove my point, I examine the Aristotelian conception of the political animal, alongside 
other Ancient Greek accounts, to demonstrate that the political animal is what he refers to 
otherwise as the ruler by nature. His is a very specific and reductionist approach to what is 
human that is in fact a projection of his idea of the philosopher as the ontologist or the 
being that brings other things to a presence. In relation with this claim, I then challenge his 
justification of slavery. As a matter of fact, in order to show the false perception of the 
human being he puts forward, I argue that slavery is but the way the political animal 
satisfies its needs.  
As a result, I propose a definition of the political animal as a needy being or an animal that 
cannot come to terms with natural incompleteness or anarchy. Subsequently and in 
response to the Aristotelian assertion that anarchy is a perversion, I put forward an 
understanding of the polis or the political association as a perversion of anarchy. In other 
words, I argue that the political rather than being the way the human being is meant to be, 
is the result of imposition or irrationality.     
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The argumentation of this chapter contributes to the main argument of this study by 
looking deeper into the differentiation of anarchy with the political, which has been already 
brought forth in chapter one. It also provides a link between the discussion of the previous 
chapters or more accurately between the metaphysical and the ontological as well as with 
the political. Moreover, this link enables the contestation of the depictions of anarchy as a 
political end or a political association, in contemporary anarchist studies.        
4.1. Being in Anarchy as Being According to Need  
To start with, I have argued thus far that anarchy is the way of being. In particular, I have 
claimed that being is indivisible form the world it comes to be with, which means that 
being actively constitutes and is being constituted by the cosmos or other beings and 
things. I have argued that anarchy is not an ordering but a communion of othernesses or in 
plain terms an endless and incomplete organizing. The term communion has been 
employed because it signifies a coming together of beings and things that is metaphysical 
or spontaneous and not towards a specific/specified final end.  
I consequently argue here that need is what brings otherneses together in anarchy. The 
terms communion and communication share the same root. This is to say, the coming 
together in anarchy, as this has been described in the previous chapter, is a communication. 
Specifically, it is a communication among othernesses. Now, there are several scholarly 
attempts to define communication in terms of organization or relate the two notions.
205
 The 
vast majority of these attempts fall outside the area of this study. Nevertheless 
communication is a notion that implies a medium, with language being the main one, at 
least among human beings.
206
  
I make the case here for need to be seen as the medium through which the othernesses or 
beings and things that constitute the cosmos communicate. In particular, I argue that need 
is the missing link that makes the communion of othernesses possible and thus being in 
anarchy is being according to need. Need is to be seen as the medium through which 
natural incompleteness manifests itself through being and as what inspires the spontaneous 
response of being.  
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The discussion that takes place here provides further insight into anarchy as the way of 
being, while it makes it possible to argue against the Aristotelian depiction of the human 
being as the political animal. So, I have previously employed the term need to refer to the 
spontaneous way of living things in anarchy, without providing a detailed explanation. I 
have referred to it in both the examples used to demonstrate the communion of beings and 
things. In the examples, need appears as what drives the behaviour of the bee and of the 
lion.  
In both of them it is the response of the bee and of the lion to the need for food or hunger 
that appears to be driving them and what brings forth a chain of spontaneous events. 
However, I have said that it is not merely the fact that the chain of events is unintended, 
spontaneous or beyond the being’s control, but that the response to need is spontaneous. 
The question is: why is the response to need spontaneous, or, more accurately, why if need 
drives being is it not an arché or the prime mover? 
To start with, it must be clarified that need, for this study, does not drive but inspires the 
response of the living thing. The verb drive is usually employed to refer to something that 
moves something else or itself towards something else. For example, it is common to say 
that “it was an internal drive that led someone somewhere, be it a place or an action.” This 
is to say, the verb “drive” is used in cases when there is a final end.  
However, I claim that need does not have a final end and thus it does not drive the being 
towards something, but rather inspires the response of being. For example, hunger is 
arguably the need that is most commonly identified among beings and one may say that 
hunger arises for a reason namely the survival of the being. If this were the case then 
Aristotle would be right; there is a reason for need and this reason pre-exists it or need 
emerges in order for the being to survive. With regards to that, I say that the survival of 
being through the satisfaction of its hunger is but an unintended result. Or that one does not 
feel the urge to eat because one wants to survive. It rather is because one is alive or a living 
thing that one has an urge to eat. 
The existence of need is a testament to the incompleteness and anarchy of being. Need 
does not arise for the survival of being, this is merely what may be the result of the 
response of the being towards its need. Instead, need arises because of the incompleteness 
of being or the fact that being is always being with the world and indivisible from it. To 
put it differently, need reveals to being its incompleteness or the fact that it is alive. Need 
is always a call for something that is other. It is a call for what is beyond the being or for 
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what being is incapable to fulfil by itself, which is yet another proof of the being’s 
incompleteness.  
For example, it is arguable that the cry of the newborn when it comes out of its mother’s 
womb reveals the fact that it is alive as well as the incompleteness it feels outside of the 
womb. One of the first things the newborn human being does is to communicate its 
incompleteness or its need. Meanwhile, at the same time this reveals the fact that the 
newborn is now a being. Need exists because being exists or need is indistinguishable from 
being. In other words, hunger exists not in order for the being to survive but because the 
being is alive and not dead. Need is what distinguishes being from not being or what is 
alive from what is dead.  
Need is what comes with being with the world or with being alive, because what is dead or 
what is inanimate, in the sense of not being an active constituent of the cosmos, does not 
have any needs. For example, the flower’s need for water or to be pollinated comes with it 
being alive. It comes with the fact that it is a being with the world and not an object that 
becomes alive only when it is used. On the other hand, the hammer and the chair, for 
instance, are inanimate things or objects that have no needs. Even so in order for a chair to 
be a chair and a hammer to be a hammer they need or have to be used in such a way; it is 
from their utilization towards an end that the inanimate things acquire their reason to be. 
But, similarly with Schürmann’s claim that the rose does not have a ‘why,’ the rose does 
not need an end or a reason to be.
207
  
A being needs precisely because it is an active constituent of the world. This means that 
need is indistinguishable from being or it is what communicates that something is indeed 
an active constituent of the cosmos. For instance, the rock is not a living thing precisely 
because it does not have needs; it constitutes the cosmos in a passive way but never 
actively. It can be used to create a shelter for the human being or it can roll from a 
mountain and result in death and destruction of beings and things. But, these would never 
be considered as occurrences that were inspired by the rock’s needs.  
On the other hand, it would be fair to say that to be an active constituent of the cosmos or a 
being is to need. I claim then that it is need that underlies the communion of othernesses: it 
is need that instructs the spontaneous response of being that brings together beings and 
things. For example, it is the need for shelter that inspires the human being to look for a 
cave. This need comes with being with the world or because of, for example, the bad 
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weather or the carnivore animals. Meanwhile, it is by entering the cave, as a response to 
need, that the human being comes across other beings that may already live in the cave and 
so on. The need for shelter of one being, which comes with the fact that it is alive or with 
the world, inspires its response and its response brings forth a chain of events.  
Need is to be seen as the missing link that makes the communion of private worlds 
possible. The private world, I have argued, refers to the spontaneous way each being 
makes sense of the cosmos. The spontaneous has been described as referring to the being’s 
own accord. Meanwhile, since the being is indivisible from the world it comes to be with, 
need is what makes the communication and organizing in anarchy possible; the link or 
medium between the private worlds and at the same time the link between the private and 
the common. If the private world or the spontaneous way it responds to need is indivisible 
from the common then need is also what instructs the being’s spontaneous response to it. 
Therefore, the spontaneous response of a being to need is in fact the response inspired by 
need. For example, I have employed the Ancient Greek myth of Prometheus in chapter two 
to indicate that reason is nothing more than what the human being needs in order to be. Or, 
for this study, what the myth is trying to communicate is that this specific idiosyncrasy in 
order to respond to the needs of being alive or to be an active constituent of the cosmos 
needs reason. As Democritus says, need arises from the very life of the being.
208
 
In other words, the reasoning of the human being has been developed arguably as a 
response to need. In relation to that Democritus says the following:  
For as a general rule in all things need itself was people’s teacher, providing the 
appropriate instruction in each area for a creature that was both well endowed by 
nature and had helpers for everything, namely hand and language and a shrewd 
mind.
209
 
What Democritus says here is that the response of the human being to need was instructed 
by need itself. 
Moreover, is not need that reveals the being to itself and announces its existence to others? 
It must be since it is, as it usually said, that in need one finds out what one is capable of 
being or even the relationship one has with others. Here “capable of being” does not refer 
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to the Aristotelian dynamis or potentiality. What Aristotle defines as potentiality or 
potency is in fact a delayed observation of what emerges as a response to need or it is 
incompleteness and anarchy manifesting itself through the being. Instead, here I refer to 
what arises out of nowhere or to a way of being that cannot be traced back to something 
else. 
For example, where was the being that is now known as the Homo sapiens five hundred 
thousand years ago? Is the modern human being something that was there all along waiting 
as a potentiality? If this is the case then this means that if it would be possible to go back in 
time and bring an early human to the current age and time, it would be only a matter of 
actualizing the said potentiality in order for it to become a modern human.  
This must not be right because it disregards thousands of years of evolution and points 
towards what the previous chapter has defined as the death of being. It is like arguing that 
there is in fact no change and everything that now exists is what has been there all along, 
but evidently this is not true. This is because, if beings can go extinct and historically most 
of them have, then it would be fair to say that in a similar manner new beings can arise. To 
put it differently, if extinction is possible then change is and if a being can disappear as if it 
was never alive or if a being is now nothing then it would be logical to say that a being can 
appear out of nothing.  
This is another testament to the incompleteness of being and what has been said in the 
previous chapter that what comes to be is not out of necessity or not a probabilistic 
inevitability. It rather is spontaneous or it comes with being alive. In other words, 
extinction proves that it is equally possible that a being’s response to need may be 
inadequate.
210
 Most importantly though, if an inadequate response can be seen as what 
facilitates the disappearance of a specific living thing, then it is equally plausible and 
accurate to say that an adequate response to need enables its appearance.   
To complete the distinction of need from survival, every time that a being responds 
adequately to need the appearance of a new being is enabled. It is not the survival of being 
that is ensured but the perpetuation of the interplay out of which beings and things come to 
be that is enabled. Furthermore, the present discussion is also testament to the fact that it is 
need or what comes with being with the world that provides something with significance 
rather than an all-encompassing principle or an absolute definer as Aristotle has it.  
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For instance, the Heraclitean saying that donkeys would prefer refuse to gold and pigs 
would prefer filth to clean water is but a proof of this.
211
 Heraclitus aims with this 
statement to demonstrate the superiority of humans, but what he achieves is to show that 
being is an idiosyncrasy that is inspired or instructed by need. If gold means nothing for 
the donkey and if filth is what the pig needs then this is nothing more than their 
idiosyncrasies. In the same way, the sea water is what the sea creatures need in order to be 
and night is the environment in which the nocturnal animals thrive, while daylight is 
needed by others in order to be. 
To sum up the present discussion, it would be fair to say that need is the missing link or 
what inspires the communion of othernesses out of which beings and things come to be. It 
is the medium that brings together the ‘like to like’ of the othernesses. It is what comes 
with being with the world; as long as there is being there is need and as long there is need 
there is being. Need is the physical manifestation of incompleteness and serves as a 
reminder that one is not over the world nor despite the world but with the world. Every 
time one needs something one realizes the incompleteness of its existence and the fact that 
is a being that is in need or a being that cannot be without others. 
Humans are but beings among beings in a constant and incomplete interplay or in the 
anarchy that comes with being with the world. This is arguably what Levinas wants to 
communicate with the abstract ‘I am my child.’212 The Levinasian language is open to 
interpretation but it seems, in relation with his other claims that what he says is that one is 
always a ‘hostage,’ to the other.213 One is always, until the moment it is not anymore, 
making sense of the cosmos with the others the way my child does through me at least at 
the beginning of its existence. It would be safe to say now that being according to one’s 
own accord or being in anarchy is actually being according to or in response to need. 
4.2. The Political Animal as the Ontologist and the Enslavement of 
Beings 
So, the previous section made the case for an understanding of need as the missing link or 
what brings together the private and the common. It argued that need is what comes with 
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being and it concluded that humans, as beings among beings, are according to need. 
Meanwhile, humans, as active constituents of the world, have been identified as 
components of a communion of beings and things. This communion is in anarchy; it is 
characterized by ataxia in the sense that it does not have a specific form or a specific place 
or time that arises. It rather exists indefinitely and as long as there are beings.  
In relation to that, I look here into the popular Aristotelian definition of the human being as 
the political animal. I start by providing a brief analysis of what the political is in Aristotle 
and based on that I argue that the political animal is but a very specific type of human. 
Specifically, it is a being that employs téchne to reduce the cosmos under a common 
principle. In other words, I put forward the case that that the Aristotelian human being is in 
a primary sense the ontologist or the being that through its mastery over the arts and 
sciences brings other beings into presence.  
What the ontologist is exactly becomes clearer later. Now, it is necessary to look into what 
the political is in Aristotle. The analysis that follows brings together the political and the 
ontological, which is an association that has been implied throughout this study. This 
makes it necessary and of the utmost significance for what this study argues. It provides a 
link that enables a better understanding of anarchy as a term that appears in politics but has 
ontological foundations, as discussed previously. It paves the way for the chapters that 
follow, while providing additional support for the argument against the Aristotelian physis, 
as the primary cause of everything there is.   
Now the most common understanding of the Aristotelian definition is that it refers to the 
ability of the human being to be in a political way. This, as has been stated already, is 
associated with its ability to reason or to its ability to communicate in a rational way. 
However, the most important part of the Aristotelian definition is the term political, since 
by animal, as discussed, he refers to something that is made of flesh and blood and has its 
principle of motion in itself. It is the term political that differentiates and distinguishes the 
human being from other animals. The common view, which comes with the wide 
acceptance of the Aristotelian definition, is that it refers to the social nature of humans or 
their ability to create communities and reflect or contemplate upon their constitution.
214
  
It is precisely this understanding of the political animal’s sociability that I contest here and 
in the following sections, to demonstrate that the human being is not the political animal. 
But, to start with, Aristotle argues that indeed it is necessary and expedient for human 
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beings to come together. Coming together with others is necessary for the purposes of 
completeness, because as he says only a beast or a god and not a human being can be 
sufficient being by itself.
215
 It is in the nature of the human being to do not live a life of 
solitude as it is with others that it can actualize its potentiality in full. Thus he says that the 
attainment of completeness comes through forming the highest form of political 
community, namely the polis (πόλις).216 It is from this basic syllogism that Aristotle comes 
up with the idea that the human being is the political animal. However his idea of the 
political is not equally straightforward.   
To form this idea he engages in an in-depth analysis of the various forms of the Ancient 
Greek city-states and ends up employing three different terms to refer to it, namely polis, 
politeia (πολιτεία), and politeuma (πολίτευμα). He says that polis is a partnership, and is a 
partnership of politai (citizens) in a politeia.
217
 Polis then refers to the more general 
coming together of people, while politeia is the term that explains the way this partnership 
is formed; politeia is essentially an association of rulers and subjects. This becomes 
clearer, when he says that the terms politeia, the association of the people that constitutes 
the polis, and politeuma, which refers to the regime or form of government, designate the 
same thing.218 
Consequently, it would be fair to say that the political in Aristotle refers to a coming 
together of people that is based on ruling. Ruling and being ruled is the foundation of the 
polis. Meanwhile, the polis as the highest form of political community is the final end of 
the political animal. The fact that the polis is the final end of the human being is clear by 
its identification as being prior even to the individual being. As he says, the city-state is 
‘clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the 
part.’219 This is in line with the Aristotelian teleocracy or that the final end is what initiates 
and directs motion; actuality is prior to potentiality.   
As a result, Aristotle says that the most complete form of political association pre-exists 
the household, the village and the individual. It is because of this or towards this that every 
other political form comes to be and it is because of this that the human being is the 
political animal. In relation to that, I have claimed previously that the political animal is 
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the being that has a reason to be. It is now clearer that this reason is to bring forth the 
polis.
220
  
Now, in line with what has been said about Aristotle’s thought up to this point, the way 
through which this particular political association comes to be is through téchne. In 
particular it is through the téchne of politics. In other words, he sees politics as a téchne or 
know-how much like carpentry. For Aristotle politics or to be political is the essential 
function for the human, much like there is an essential function for the carpenter and the 
tanner.
221
 As he says, politics is the master art. This means, in his words, that politics is 
what ‘ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of 
citizens should learn and up to what point they should learn it.’222  
Is this not though what ontology or physiology does? Recalling from the analysis of 
chapter two, ontology is the first philosophy, the science or téchne out of which every 
philosophical inquiry starts and returns to. It is what provides beings with significance or 
what brings them forth into presence. Moreover, their significance is measured in terms of 
potentiality or with regards to what they can do or be in relation to a specific/specified, by 
nature, final end. It is in terms of this that they are positioned within the cosmic 
hierarchical order that Aristotle argues for. 
Does this mean that politics is the first philosophy? I argue that indeed this is what 
Aristotle seems to be saying. In fact I also claim that the political animal is in a primary 
sense referring to the ontologist or to the only true being and it is in reference with it that 
other beings acquire their significance. For Aristotle, what defines the being is 
completeness or having an end in itself. The political animal is according to him, the only 
being that has a reason to be, an end in itself. Hence, it follows logically that the political 
animal, as the only being that has an end in itself, is the only true being. 
This may seem an obscure argument. It certainly signifies an extreme departure from what 
is commonly conceived as the political animal, but is it farfetched for someone who claims 
that nature makes everything for the human being? It is not, and this becomes apparent 
once one looks into the way slavery or what makes one a slave is defined. So, he says that 
the slave’s nature is inferior because it is unable to apprehend the telos; the slave does not 
know the form of the good/final end or lacks the ability of completeness.
223
 If the final end 
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of the human being is the polis, the slave is someone that by nature is incapable of 
comprehending this. 
The slave by nature is a being that has no reason to be or it is a lesser being. A lesser being 
is every living thing that lacks completeness in the sense of not having a reason to be. This 
includes human and non-human animals, such as ox or the horse among others, which are 
unable by nature to apprehend the final end and thus are without one.
224
 In relation to that 
he says that lesser beings are not meant to participate in politics as they are unable to 
understand the final end of politics. So, apart from the non-human animals, which are by 
definition excluded, the following are excluded too: the slave, which lacks by nature the 
faculty to rule; the child, which is not yet a being but a potential being,
225
 and the woman 
or the wife, which is of seemingly the same nature as the man but lacks by her essence the 
authority or gravitas to rule.
226
 
It would be fair to say that the definition of the political animal excludes the vast majority 
of living things. In addition, it appears that the political animal is what Aristotle identifies 
as the ruler by nature. As he says, the difference between the political animal and the rest 
of being is that ‘from the hour of their birth some are marked out for subjection, others for 
rule.’227 This is because, as he says, ‘that some should rule and others should be ruled is a 
thing not only necessary, but expedient.’228  
What does rule mean here though? If politics is the art that defines what one should learn 
and up to what level then it could be argued that ruling here refers to defining what one can 
do or be or to the ascription of potentialities. Heidegger in his reading of Aristotle says, 
that the actualization of potentiality in human beings occurs through phronesis (φρόνησης), 
which is the Greek word that refers to contemplation or to reflecting over one’s experience 
through reason. According to Heidegger, phronesis is the equivalent of sophia (σοφία) or 
true knowledge. It is the knowledge one acquires through contemplation on the origins or 
‘the why’ of a thing.229 
Hence, if the political animal decides what one can study and learn and to what level, then 
it is plausible to say that it decides what one’s potential is and what one can be, since in 
Aristotle it is through the actualization of potential that the being comes to be. It follows 
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then that it is up to the political animal as the ruler by nature to define the rest of beings in 
the polis. If the non-human animals and the slaves by nature are incapable of apprehending 
this type of knowledge or the ‘why’ of a thing, then does this mean that even among the 
political animals there are some that are more suitable for ruling? Does this mean that the 
notion of the political animal can be narrowed down more than already is? If yes what is 
the political animal actually referring to in the end?  
To answer this question, according to Aristotle attaining the polis is the common end of all 
human beings. It appears then that in Aristotle those that cannot apprehend this or are 
unable to act towards it are not political animals, which essentially means they are not true 
human beings. It follows then that the political animals or the human beings that bring 
forth the polis are of equal nature and it is because they apprehend the polis as the highest 
good that are able to participate in the political association. But the political association is 
an association of ruling and being ruled, as stated above.  
With regards to that, he argues for plurality among the beings that form the polis. In 
particular he says that polis is a composition of citizens or a plurality of citizens and it 
requires them to be of different kinds in order for the polis to be self-sufficient; a coming 
together of similar does not constitute a polis.
230
 It needs to be stressed that the plurality 
refers to the various occupancies or abilities of the political beings that participate in 
ruling. It does not refer to the lesser beings. These are not part of the political association 
and thus do not participate in ruling and being ruled. In other words, they are clearly the 
subjects of the political animals or of the political association. 
In other words, the ‘ruling and be ruled’ canon applies to the political animals alone. As he 
says constitutional ruling, as a political regime in which ruling is temporary and is being 
performed in turns, is the most appropriate among equals.
231
 If knowledge of the ‘why’ of 
beings and things or apprehending the telos is what makes someone more suitable to rule, 
then does not that make philosophers the better suited to rule?  Indeed, Plato is the one that 
argues for the wise as being better suited to rule over all of the others because they know 
the habits of the soul.
232
 He argues that philosophers would be the best rulers because, as 
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lovers of reason and of the truth, they could direct the others towards the true way of 
being.
233
  
Plato argues for the philosophers to be kings or for the kings to be philosophers. He does 
not argue for constitutional ruling. Could Aristotle be saying the same? It seems he does 
but in a less emphatic or direct way. So, similarly with Plato, Aristotle argues for his own 
wise or virtuous ruler as one who is also able to identify the nature of beings and things 
and order them in such a way that the result will be the well-being of all.
234
 It seems then 
that it is in fact a kingly type of ruling that Aristotle argues for rather than an actual ruling 
in turns.  
It is probably the fact that he allows for the possibility that among those that are considered 
as equals there may be some that are more suitable for ruling. For example, he identifies 
kingly or royal ruling as the way the father rules over his children.
235
 This is because they 
accept his superiority as something indisputable but at the same time the children have the 
potential, the male ones, to become like their father. In the same way, those that partake in 
ruling and being ruled are not philosophers but they share the same nature with them and 
thus they could be. 
To sum up, it is now safe to say that in the end the political animal as the natural ruler of 
the highest form of political association is the philosopher. This is if the above analysis is 
correct and the political animal rather than referring to the human being refers to a very 
specific type or category of the human being. Moreover, with regards to the claim that the 
political animal is the ontologist, it is now clear that the ontologist is another way of saying 
the philosopher in the sense of the political ruler as defined above. This is because, as 
discussed, Aristotle reduces or turns philosophy into ontology as the science or art of 
being. Hence, this section’s claim that the political animal is the ontologist. 
It may still be difficult for someone to accept such a departure from the common 
understanding of the political animal. But, this reduction of the human being to one 
specific being that is defined based on merit or in this case on its wisdom is not something 
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rare in Ancient Greek philosophy. For example, as Arendt says, discussing the Heraclitean 
definition of the human being: 
The distinction between man and animal runs through the human species itself: 
only the best (aristoi), who constantly prove themselves to be the best (aristeuein, a 
verb for which there is no equivalent in any other language) and who “prefer 
immortal fame to mortal things”, are really human; the others, content with 
whatever pleasures nature will yield them, live and die like animals.
236
    
This definition shows the strictness of Ancient Greek philosophers with regards to what 
should be considered as a human being. It also provides a glimpse about the association 
between immortality and freedom in the polis that the next chapter discusses.   
According to the analysis of this study, the political animal is primarily referring to the 
ontologist or the being that is by nature meant to rule by defining beings and things. For 
instance, it is the ontologist that defines what a man is and what a man can do or be and it 
is out of this process that the man appears as something that one can speak of. In a 
secondary way it refers to all other human beings that possess téchne or the know-how to 
bring things to presence; the sculptor, the architect and the carpenter and so on.  
It is the composition of these human beings that the polis is in Aristotle. Meanwhile, in 
relation with what has been argued previously, it is now clearer that it is from the 
participation of them in ruling and being ruled that the nature or physis appears. In other 
words, it would be fair to say that it is in and through the polis as the highest political 
association that the cosmos of the human being comes to be.  
As Heidegger concludes from his reading of pre-Socratic Ancient Greek literature, 
everything that makes up the human world belongs to or comes to be though the polis. As 
he says the polis is: 
The name for the site, the Here, within which and as which Being-here is 
historically. The polis is the site of history, the Here, in which, out of which and for 
which history happens. To this site of history belong the gods, the temples, the 
priests, the celebrations, the games, the poets, the thinkers, the ruler, the council of 
elders, the assembly of the people, the armed forces and the ships.
237
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However, what Heidegger forgets to mention is that slavery, domination and the 
elimination of being also belong to the polis. This will be discussed further later.     
For now, it should be emphasized that being political means in one sense to participate in 
ruling and being ruled and in another sense, a more specific one, to rule or reign over 
others in the complete way an arché does. Or to rule all other beings through ascribing 
them their potentiality to be and thus make them appear as beings or as parts of the cosmic 
hierarchy Aristotle argues for. Politics then in Plato and Aristotle, who are arguably the 
founders of Western political philosophy, is ontology or the way beings and things appear. 
It is the art of ruling in the sense that it completes nature by providing beings and things 
with significance or it completes the hierarchical ordering of the Aristotelian physis or 
nature. This link between the political and the ontological that this section identified plays 
a fundamental role in chapter six’s contestation of the anarchist view of anarchy as a 
political association.          
4.3. Being in Need and the Neediness of the Political Animal  
So, up to this point, I have argued that the human being is but a being among beings or a 
living thing, which much like every other living thing is in need or according to need. 
Furthermore, I have contested the common understanding of the political animal as 
something that refers primarily to a very specific being or to the ontologist. In relation with 
that I claim that if the term political animal is to be accepted as what defines the human 
being then humans are but a needy creature or not according to need. 
In particular, I claim that the political animal is a needy being or a living entity that cannot 
come to terms with being with the world or with need. As a result it enslaves other beings 
in order to overcome or satisfy its neediness. In other words, I claim that slavery is not 
natural, in the sense of one being born to be the slave of another, but a product of the 
political animal’s neediness. If this is correct then I propose that the distinction of what 
makes one a human being is but the result of imposition rather than what comes with 
being.  
Firstly, a needy being has to be differentiated from the being in need as this has been 
defined here. I claim that a needy being refers to what cannot cope with its own 
incompleteness and the incompleteness of nature, or it cannot come to terms with its 
perishable nature and the fact that as a being with the world is always a being in need. 
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Now, the incompleteness of the human being is something that even Aristotle, who argues 
for completeness, recognizes. As stated above, he thinks that human beings come together 
to form the political association to attain completeness.  
However, as he says, there is only one being that is able to attain completeness and that is 
the political animal. This is because it knows the form the polis should have or it knows 
what is good for every being according with its nature. In relation with that he says that the 
master needs the slave and the slave needs the master, but the slave needs the master more. 
This is because, as he says, those that can be without other things are prior to those that 
cannot be without them.
238
 This means that the ruler being without the slave would be able 
to be, as it is able to apprehend the way of nature, but the slave, due its inability to do so, 
would be unable to be without the ruler. 
In other words, he says that it is also for the sake of the slave that the master rules over 
him/her, or that they in fact share the same final end, even if the slave is unable to 
apprehend it. Now, this is problematic, because if it is to be accepted that one is unable to 
apprehend a final end that is supposedly shares with someone else that does, is it not this 
like saying that in reality the final end is what the master wants it to be? For Aristotle this 
is not the case because he considers the ruling of the master over the slave as something 
that slave actually needs in order to be. 
With regards to that, it may at first seem that indeed Aristotle is right and that those that 
are incapable of understanding the arts and crafts or the way things come to be are better 
off in the end. This is because they are profiting by participating in their own way in 
something that is beyond their abilities or that they could not be able to bring to an end by 
themselves. But is not this like arguing that someone else knows better what I need? Is this 
possible when, if the above definition of need is correct, what I need is something that 
corresponds only to my idiosyncrasy or being with the world? 
In answer, I will employ the analogy of the shepherd and the sheep. This is because the 
argument that the ruler by nature knows what is good for the slave is analogous with 
saying that the shepherd knows what is good for the sheep. According to what has been 
argued thus far in this study, it is impossible to know the private world of another being 
and thus impossible to know what is good or bad for it.  
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Then again it appears that the shepherd covers most of the needs of the sheep and works 
hard for it. It is not uncommon for people to see the sheep or other domesticated animals as 
being fortunate because their needs are taken care of by someone else. However, to draw 
another analogy for the sake of this discussion, the prisoners can be seen as people whose 
fundamental biological needs are taken care of by the institution that keeps them confined. 
It would not be a surprise if there are people that consider the care the institution provides 
to the prisoners as being very generous. 
But is it for the sake of the prisoners that the institution holds them in captivity? In the 
same sense, is it for the sake of the sheep and for that of the slave that the shepherd and the 
master are looking after them? It is fair to say that it is pretty clear that in all these similar 
cases the profit of the subject is a by-product towards the attainment of the ruler’s end. 
There is no common end between the two; there is only the end of the ruler. Thus, for this 
study, the slave is not by nature meant to be ruled, but it becomes a slave because its needs 
are utilized towards the satisfaction of the needs of others. 
The slave appears in the natural world the moment it is deprived of the possibility to be 
according or to respond to its own needs, as in the needs that come from its idiosyncrasy. 
This means, according to what has been argued thus far that the slave is the one whose 
reason to be is defined and determined in absentia or without having a say on it. It is a 
living thing that is deprived of the possibility to live. Instead it becomes an instrument that 
assists towards the attainment of the final end of another being. 
It would be safe to say that this is precisely what Aristotle says with the claim that those 
that are slaves by nature are similar to the tame animals ‘for both with their bodies minister 
to the needs of life.’239 The slave, be it a human or a non-human animal, is but a useful tool 
in the hands of the political animal; the slave is a living possession of the master that 
assists in the maintenance of life.
240
 Even so, could it be that Aristotle is actually arguing 
for a ruling similar to that of the parent over the newborn and not similar to the prisoner?  
At first, this appears as a possibility, or more accurately it seems plausible to say that the 
parent indeed rules over the newborn, by taking care of its needs, for the newborn’s sake, 
because if left alone it is unable to do so by itself. Is it not the parent looking after the 
newborn by responding to the newborn’s call to do so, or is it not the newborn 
communicating, in its own way, its needs to the parent? It arguably does mostly through 
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crying and the beginning of its existence. If this is the case with the newborn, then at what 
point does the slave communicate the need to be ruled over especially, when, as Aristotle 
says, it is from the moment that one is born that one is marked as a slave?   
In answer, I say that the employment of the analogy of the parent with the newborn or the 
child to refer to the case of the master and the slave in Aristotle can only be an inaccurate 
one. This is because the parent rather than ruling over the newborn is taking responsibility 
of the newborn being. It does so, by responding to its response to need or to the call of the 
newborn. The same could arguably be said for the teacher and the student or the doctor and 
the patient and so on; in all these cases taking responsibility for someone else’s being is a 
response to the call of need. There is no such a call in the case of the slave. This is not to 
say that parenting cannot turn into ruling but this precisely the difference; parenting can 
turn into ruling means that it is not but it could be if instead of a response to need turns into 
an imposition of the parent’s way of being upon the child.  
Moreover, I am not saying here that every human being is capable of doing exactly the 
same things in the exact same way. It would have been ironical to do so, when I argue for 
anarchy or for every being to be an idiosyncrasy or a unique amalgam of spontaneous 
synergies inspired by need. Instead, what I am saying is that it is difficult to see exactly 
where the wisdom of the political animal is and the justice of the political association if it 
does not allow for a being to at least prove what is capable of. This is because, if wisdom 
or acquiring the know-how is as Aristotle says something that can be learned and perfected 
through habit, then the slave should at least be provided with the opportunity to prove 
him/herself.
241
  
The injustice or implausibility of the political is for example apparent in the case of the 
Ancient Greek writer and storyteller Aesop. Aesop was born a slave and later in his life 
was purchased, because as a slave was a possession he could be sold, by a philosopher 
named Xanthus. Now, Aesop’s story is one that has a “happy ending” as he eventually 
becomes a free man and advisor of kings.
242
 What this story shows is that firstly, even by 
Aristotle’s criteria, he should not have been a slave and secondly that providing an 
opportunity to a human marked as a slave from the moment of his birth proved that there is 
no such a thing as natural slaves.   
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In fact it shows that slavery is but a product of chance and even Aristotle, in attempt to 
prove the opposite, actually admits it. Here I refer to the Aristotelian contradictory claim 
that ‘men of the highest rank would be slaves and the children of slaves if they or their 
parents chance to have been taken captive and sold.’243 Now this is an ambiguous claim, 
because Aristotle employs it to demonstrate that slavery by law may be problematic 
because it may involve the enslavement of men that were not by nature meant to be 
slaves.
244
 This is why he says that this type of slavery is not by nature but a result of 
chance. 
This is ambiguous precisely because Aristotle argues for a deterministic account of nature, 
in which those that are meant to rule are chosen or marked by nature. It would be fair to 
say, following his line of thought, that those that win the war, were meant to by nature or 
that nature made them more capable in winning wars. Consequently, the losers of the war 
that are now enslaved and ruled by the winners were also meant to lose and become slaves. 
In other words, by following Aristotle’s natural teleocracy or his claim that nature makes 
nothing in vain; it would be fair to say that the slavery of the losers comes naturally or the 
reason for it can be traced back to nature.  
If this is the case and if even Aristotle thinks that this result or the enslavement of these 
people is a product of chance then why is it not all slavery a product of chance? If the 
natural superiority of the winners, which has as a result the enslavement of the losers, is to 
be contested then what makes other types of slavery natural and uncontested? It seems that 
Aristotle has no answer for this or it becomes clear now that slavery is but a construct to 
justify the ruling of some over others as natural. 
It is now apparent that it is in fact the political animal that needs the slave more than the 
slave needs it. To elaborate on this as it discloses the neediness I have identified the 
political animal with, I will employ one more time the example of the lion. The antelope of 
the example, which appears as the weaker or the inferior of the two animals, satisfies its 
hunger by consuming plants. Meanwhile, the lion does so by hunting the antelope, but this, 
as was stated previously, means that in an indirect way the lion also needs the plants, 
because without the plants there is no antelope and thus no lion.  
If the seemingly superior of the two, the animal commonly refer to as the “king of the 
animal kingdom” needs more than the inferior in order to be, then in what sense is the lion 
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superior to the antelope? In the same sense, it can be said that the slave’s existence without 
a master would arguably be a simple or an animalistic one. Now, the master appears as the 
being that needs to be in a way that is more than that of the slave. According to the Ancient 
Greek definitions of the human being in the previous section, it is precisely overcoming the 
animalistic nature of the slave that makes the human a human. But, does not this mean that 
the master needs the slave more than the slave needs the master? 
Aristotle claims that the slave, as well as other non-human animals such as the ox and the 
horse, ministers with its body, the life of the true human being. Arendt emphasizes the fact 
that manual labour was in the Ancient Greek polis linked directly with slavery. Slavery 
was justified as a way through which men, as in the true human beings, could free 
themselves from the necessities of life that require labour.
245
 It would be fair to say then 
that without the slaves, be it human or non-human, the ruler by nature appears to be 
condemned in a life that is no different or marginally different to that of the slave. It seems 
then that the master or the political animal in order to be political, by bringing forth the 
polis, needs the slave much more than the slave needs it.  
It is not merely the fact that the political animal arguably needs the other animals more 
than they need it. Instead, the neediness I argue for here lies with the fact that the political 
animal, unlike probably any other living thing, cannot come to terms with incompleteness 
or with its own nature. To put it differently, it is now safe to say that the neediness of the 
political animal manifests itself in the enslavement of other beings or its justification as 
natural. 
For instance, the lion of the example in the face of need resorts to violence. The antelope 
and every other herbivore living thing has an easier path in satisfying its hunger. The 
carnivores’ way requires hunting and with hunting comes violence or at least a violence 
that is arguably more easily identifiable. This is because rooting out and tearing down a 
plant is a form of violence but hunting down a living thing that resists and tries to escape is 
arguably a more apparent form of violence. Nevertheless, precisely because of the fact that 
the lion faces resistance, its way is arguably more difficult. 
In the same way, the political animal needs more than what Aristotle defines as the slave 
and it resorts to violence, which manifests itself in the enslavement of other beings and 
things. I will get back to what is it that the political animal seeks exactly in the following 
chapter. For now, it has to be emphasized that I am not saying that an arguably more 
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complex being that needs more should not take responsibility for its needs. That would be 
illogical, since being in anarchy, as in being according to need, is what this study argues 
for.  
However, there is a difference between the violence that the lion exerts in the face of need 
and that of the political animal. The lion’s violence starts and stops with the need; it is a 
spontaneous response to need that stops with its satisfaction. On the other hand, the 
violence of the political animal is different because it is not spontaneous but towards an 
end. This is to say, it would be fair to say based on the current understanding of the lion 
and every other carnivore that they do not decide on whether they are going to hunt. They 
do so in a spontaneous way and because of that they do stop when their need is satisfied, 
but the violence of the political animal is not spontaneous. It may start as a spontaneous 
response but because of its idiosyncrasy or because it uses reason to respond to need, it 
ends up being towards a final end. As Democritus says, ‘the needy animal knows how 
much it needs, but the needy man does not realize this.’246 
Firstly the enslavement of beings and things is a most certain proof of the fact that the 
political animal does not stop with the satisfaction of its need. It rather would be fair to say 
that it turns the overcoming of need altogether into an end. As stated above the main 
purpose of the enslavement of other beings is to fulfil the needs of the true human being 
that come with its being with the world. It is through this that humans become political 
animals and other beings become slaves. 
Hence, it would be fair to say that the neediness of the political animal that manifests itself 
in the form of slavery stems from the fact that it cannot come to terms with the 
incompleteness or anarchy of the cosmos. As a being that makes sense of the cosmos 
through reason, it finds it difficult to cope with the endlessness of need or the 
incompleteness of being. As a result, it imposes an end upon what has no end and becomes 
obsessed with completeness where completeness does not exist. I claim then, based on the 
foregoing that this is why the human being, as Democritus says, does not realize how much 
it needs; it is because it looks for an end and a reason in what is in anarchy. 
Moreover, it would be also accurate to say, based on the discussion of chapter two about 
spontaneity, that what is spontaneous cannot be irrational or contrary to reason. It is only 
what is rational or according to reason that can be irrational. In other words, being in 
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anarchy or in a spontaneous way is being according to need. This has been defined as what 
cannot be conceived or put under, in its totality, a specific/specified way of making sense 
of the cosmos.  
The lion of the example and arguably every other living thing acts in a spontaneous way 
and since none of them can be seen as being rational, in the way the human being is, it is 
impossible for them to be irrational. It would make sense to say that the neediness of the 
political animal comes as a perversion of its spontaneous respond to need. It is the 
perversion of reason or it is using reason to overcome need rather than respond to it. It is 
through this that the enslavement of beings and things appears as something natural and 
justifiable. 
The neediness of the political animal I argue for here refers to the fact that it is arguably 
the only being that responds to need by refusing to take responsibility. It rather engages in 
a violent process of defining/contextualizing the nature of other beings, to enslave other 
living things to satisfy its needs. However, the analysis that took place here demonstrated 
that the enslavement is indeed a product of the neediness of the political animal rather than 
what defines these beings from the moment they come to be. All in all, by proving, on the 
one hand, that slavery is not what comes with being, and on the other hand, that the 
political animal, rather than the ruler by nature, is a needy being, this section provided 
additional support to the argument that being is being in anarchy or according to need.    
4.4. The Political as a Perversion of Anarchy or as the Product of 
Chance  
Following the analysis of the previous section, I argue here that the political or the polis, as 
the site in which and through which the political animal exercises its ruling, is a perversion 
of anarchy or of the communion of othernesses. This may seem an odd claim, since 
employing the term “perversion” is like saying that there is an absolute way of being. This 
appears as something that contradicts the whole argument of this study that there is not a 
true or superior way of being. 
It has to be clarified that I employ this specific term as an indirect response to the way 
Aristotle uses it to refer to anarchy. In particular, Aristotle argues, following Plato, for a 
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type of political entropy.
247
 This notion refers to the cyclical alternation between what is 
defined as true political regimes and their perversions. So, he identifies three true political 
regimes: the kingly rule, the aristocratic rule and the constitutional rule. Then, he identifies 
the corrupted or perverted versions that correspond to each one of them; namely tyranny, 
oligarchy and democracy.
248
  
Now, in the Platonic version of this classification, democracy is a true political regime and 
its perversion is anarchy. But, Aristotle equates democracy with anarchy and considers it 
as the perversion of constitutional ruling, which is his own suggestion as the most 
appropriate ruling among equals. I will look into the relationship of anarchy with 
democracy and the way this is related to anarchism in the following chapter. The reason I 
employ the term “perversion” is to emphasize that anarchy is beyond the political and it is 
the political that can be seen as corrupting the anarchy of the cosmos. 
I am not arguing in any way that the neediness of the political animal that brings forth the 
political is an unnatural way of being. This is precisely why I have emphasized above that 
its neediness is in fact what comes from its spontaneous response to need. It is in its 
idiosyncrasy to be needy or irrational. As Castoriadis says, the human being is the mad 
being, because, similarly with what has been said above, it attempts to ground its 
groundlessness.
249
  
I argue that the reason the way of being of the political animal can be identified as a 
perversion is because it resembles the way a virus operates. A virus is not something 
unnatural. It rather is an organism that arguably comes to be with the world or through the 
interplay among beings and things. At least it would be fair to say that it is through the 
interplay among beings and things that it appears as an active constituent of the cosmos. 
This means that a virus is not in itself an active constituent of the cosmos. It would be odd 
or certainly uncommon to define it as a being. Instead, a virus becomes active through 
attacking or imposing itself upon beings.
250
 
The way the virus becomes active then or appears as a constituent of the cosmos is a 
parasitic way. It is through turning the being into an object or the medium through which it 
                                                          
247
 Political entropy appears in Plato’s Republic as well as in the Ancient Greek historian Polybius and 
describes the political sequence in the Ancient Greek poleis, where the failure or corruption of the true 
political regimes brings forth their perverted forms. See Plato (1993), pp. 277-319, and Polybius (2010) The 
Histories: A new translation by Robin Waterfield (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press), p. 373.  
248
 Aristotle (2001), Politics, 1289a, 25-30, p. 1208. 
249
 Castoriadis C. (1987), p. 299. 
250
 Smith E.A. & Helenius A. (2004), ‘How Viruses Enter Animal Cells,’ Science, 304, pp. 237-242. 
123 
 
appears. It is arguable that prior to that, prior to the virus attacking or taking over the 
being, there is no virus or at least not as an active constituent of the cosmos. It is common 
to consider the virus as a threat for the being or something that may lead to its death. This 
is not because it is unnatural but because with the way it operates it ends up disturbing the 
way of being, which is usually why it may lead to its demise or death. A virus then can be 
seen as a perversion of what is otherwise being, because it is arguably a living thing that 
appears through imposing itself upon other living things. 
If the above analysis is correct, then the virus is analogous to the political animal, given 
that it appears or becomes the political animal by imposing itself upon other beings. 
Furthermore, if the analysis of the previous chapter is correct the enslavement or 
contextualization of other beings under the final end of the Aristotelian ruler by nature 
leads to the death of being or to the end of their motion and change. Moreover, is it not 
attacking or warfare the way through which the political animal imposes itself, or is it not 
taking over the cosmos that it aims at? If it does, then similarly with the virus, it can be 
seen as a threat for the communion of othernesses or as a perversion of the anarchy of the 
cosmos.      
I have argued above that the political animal, similarly with the lion of the example, resorts 
to violence. This is the result of the resistance it faces in attempting to satisfy its need, but 
if, as Aristotle says, some are meant to be ruled by the moment they are born and if nature 
does nothing in vain then this should not be the case at least not for the political animal. 
The slaves by nature should without resistance submit to the superiority and rule of the 
ruler by nature.  
However, Aristotle seems to be contradicting himself again. As he says, a war against 
those that intended by physis to be ruled but will not submit to ruling is a war that is by 
physis a just war.
251
 It would be fair to say, based on this claim that Aristotle justifies war 
against every being that resists submission to the political animal. It would be logical to 
think that it is indeed taking over the world that is the political animal’s final end. 
Nevertheless, this claim could be seen in a different way. Instead of referring to war 
against all living things it refers to the justification of waging war against those beings that 
pose a threat to the political life, which is according to him the highest good. 
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Indeed, at some point he says that ‘we make war that we may live in peace.’252 Here, “we” 
means most probably the political animals as the being he identifies himself with. It may 
be claimed that what he says here is that war is necessary for the creation of the polis 
because of the unprecedented natural dangers and the fact that there are others that may 
wage war against the political animal. The fear of the other beings is also highlighted by 
Democritus as one of the reasons that brings humans together; it is the need to feel secure 
that brings humans together.
253
  
This can be taken as a fair objection, but it would also be fair to say that there is a big 
difference in arguing that humans come together to defend themselves against other beings 
from saying that war is the way towards peace. If it is correct to define war as organized 
and strategically executed hostility and violence. Then war can never be the way towards 
peace, unless peace entails the total annihilation or complete subjectification of the other. 
If one is to equate total domination with peace then the world becomes the empire of the 
same or an Orwellian dystopia.  
The writer George Orwell in his famous political novel 1984 employs the phrase ‘War is 
Peace,’ to describe a world order of endless war that ends up having no difference from an 
order of perpetual peace.
254
 In other words, war becomes the way of being and thus is 
naturalized or seen as not being different from peace. If this is the case and Aristotle 
actually says that war is necessary as the only way of attaining and maintaining the 
political then peace refers to the imposition of the ruling of the one being. This, in its turn, 
leads to the empire of the same, following Levinas’ ‘imperialism of the same,’ which was 
employed to refer to the contextualization of everything under a sole origin.   
This is to say, even if it is to be accepted that Aristotle argues that it is outsiders; non-
political animals and barbarians or even non-human animals that are threatening the peace 
of the political animal and its prosperity, war does not appear to be the way towards 
coexistence.
255
 A just war or a just cause of war is a very complicated issue. It is usually 
associated, in international relations theory, as the field that is mainly dealing with the 
                                                          
252
 Aristotle (2001), Nicomachean Ethics, 1177b 5-10, p. 1105.  
253
 Democritus as cited in Cartledge P. (1998), p. 22.  
254
 Orwell, G. (2008), 1984, (London: Penguin Books Ltd.), p. 6. 
255
 The term Barbarians in Ancient Greek literature refers to those that do not speak the Greek language and 
it usually refers to the non-Greek people of the East that are depicted as wild or cruel beings. See Bacon H.H. 
(1961), Barbarians in Greek Tragedy, (New Haven: Yale University Press). 
125 
 
issue, with defending against aggressive acts that threaten one’s right to life.256 Indeed, 
Aristotle lived in an era where war among the Greek city-states and war against foreign 
invaders was a common phenomenon. If defending oneself against others is the reason for 
the creation of the polis, then war appears arguably as a good cause.   
However, by looking more carefully the imperialist tone of the Aristotelian claim with 
regards to war becomes clearer. In particular, he argues, through citing a phrase used by 
the Ancient Greek poets, as he says, that the ‘Hellenes should rule over the barbarians.’257 
This does not sound as a call for defending one’s right to life. It rather sounds as a call for 
an aggressive stance that is again associated with who should rule over whom. It is based 
upon the same understanding that wants some to be naturally superior. The Aristotelian 
justification of war is not, then, about defending but about what he perceives as completing 
the work of nature. Ruling over others is the way of attaining the final end of bringing forth 
the polis.  
Is it also a coincidence that Alexander, the King of Macedon, whose military campaigns in 
the East had as the main purpose to Hellenize the world, was a student of Aristotle?
258
 
There are different opinions. Some say that Alexander disregarded the teachings of 
Aristotle, who urged him to be a friend to the Greeks and treat non-Greeks as animals.
259
 
Instead Alexander did not discriminate between Greeks and barbarians and for this it is 
said that he created a type of unity among the people in his empire, which is expressed 
with the term homonoia (ομόνοια).260 
Homonoia, translated falsely as unanimity, is a notion employed by Aristotle to refer to 
what is akin to friendship but in the sense of sharing the same final end or political end.
261
 
It is the harmonization of everyone and everything in accordance with a single end, but if 
this harmonization is the product of imposition then rather than homonoia there is 
domination. If turning the non-Greeks into Greeks, which is what the term Hellenization 
                                                          
256
 This is the basic definition that emerges from the various arguments about what is a just cause of war and 
what is just in a war. For example, see Walzer M. (2006), Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with 
Historical Illustrations, (New York: Basic Books). 
257
 Aristotle (2001), Politics, 1252b, 5-10, p. 1128. 
258
 The relationship between Alexander the Great and Aristotle is discussed by the Ancient Greek author 
Plutarch who in the section 7.5 of his The Life of Alexander book says that Aristotle’s teaching of Alexander 
covered every aspect of his thought; from metaphysics to politics. See Plutarch (1919), ‘The Life of 
Alexander,’ in The Parallel Lives, as retrieved on 15/05/2018 from 
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Alexander*/3.html 
259
 De Mauriac M. H. (1949), ‘Alexander the Great and the Politics of “Homonoia”,’ Journal of the History 
of Ideas, 10 (1), pp. 104-114, p. 106. 
260
 Thermos I. (1975), ‘Alexander the Great and the Concept of Homonoia,’ The Greek Review of Social 
Research (Επιθεώρηση Κοινωνικών Ερευνών), 24, pp. 217-227, p. 219.  
261
 Aristotle (2001), Nicomachean Ethics, 1067a, p. 1084. 
126 
 
refers to, in order to share the common end, is the way to peace and unity, then there is no 
coexistence of beings, but the domination of a single way of being. 
In other words, war cannot be the way towards peace. Instead war is a threat to being that 
may lead to its death and annihilation. This is because, if the analysis of the previous 
chapter is right, imposing an end upon being is analogous to its death. The being that 
considers war as the way to attain unity is a dangerous entity for the communion of 
othernesses; since it aims to turn every otherness into a mode or a derivative of the same. It 
seems that the deification of Alexander, which was seen by the masses of his empire as a 
god that brings forth homonoia among people, signifies the fact that all unity in the empire 
derives from him.
262
 It is him that is the primary cause of this unity; it starts with him and 
goes back to him.  
This unity is but a product of imposition, which is probably one of the reasons it ceased to 
exist once Alexander died and his empire was broken into pieces. It is arguable that it is for 
the same reason the political entropy or the cyclical alteration between political regimes, 
Plato and Aristotle identify, occurs. It is because they are imposed and the unity, or the 
common end, they are supposedly promote collapses in the pressure of resistance. It would 
be fair to say, based on the foregoing that the analogy of the political animal with the virus 
holds true.  
Consequently, the political as what arises from the war the political animal wages against 
other beings and things is a perversion of anarchy or an imposed way of being instead of 
superior and necessary. It is the result of the irrationality, which refers to the attempt to 
impose one’s private world upon the common, of the specific being Aristotle dubs as the 
political animal. As Democritus says:  
That which the habitation (body) needs is readily available for everyone, without 
trouble and toil; but the things needing trouble and toil, and which bring hardship to 
life, these the habitation does not crave, but the bad habituation of thought does.
263
 
This is to say the political animal is the being that cannot come to terms with its needs or 
more accurately with its own nature, since it is from its idiosyncrasy that its irrationality 
arises.  
                                                          
262
 Thermos I. (1975), p. 222. 
263
 Democritus as cited in Johnson R.M. (2014), pp. 12-13. 
127 
 
Moreover, if the political is a product of war then it is but a product of chance and certainly 
not a final end that all beings and things have to attain by subjecting themselves to the ruler 
by nature. In relation to that, the Aristotelian claim that slaves made by war and not by 
nature are by chance slaves was presented in the discussion of the previous section. Based 
on this, it would be fair to say that since the subjection of beings that resist is justified then 
it is possible all slaves are by chance.  
If war is to be seen as the way, justified by nature, through which the political animal turns 
those beings that resist into slaves and if at the same time it is possible through war to 
enslave beings that are not meant to be slaves then there is no way of saying whether all 
slaves are in fact the products of war or of chance. If this is the case, Aristotle contradicts 
himself and fails to prove that the political is the common end. It rather appears that it is a 
product of chance that disturbs or eliminates anarchy by imposing the private over the 
common. As Heraclitus puts it, ‘war is the father of all and king of all. Some he reveals as 
gods, others as men; some he makes slaves, others free.’264 
It would be accurate to say that the political is a product of war and thus a product of 
chance, since slavery is a product of chance and it is upon this that the political is founded 
or through which the political animal becomes political. Nevertheless, apart from the fact 
that products of chance are by the Aristotelian standards contrary to reason, as chapter two 
discussed, it is also that the political disturbs the communion of beings. If anarchy is 
indeed the way of being and living things are a communion or communicate through need, 
then it is fair to say that the political is a perversion of this as it attempts to replace anarchy 
with an arché. More importantly, the fact that it is a perversion becomes apparent through 
the justification of war. In other words, it seems that the animal that is allegedly the one 
that possesses the most efficient means to communicate, namely language, is the one that 
chooses violence over communication.  
Conclusion  
Overall, this chapter, by expanding on the argument that anarchy is the way of the cosmos 
and of being, proposed that being in need is what describes best the condition of the human 
being. It argued that the human being is no different than any other living thing and as an 
active constituent of the communion of othernesses is a being that is according with need. 
To do so, I have started by defining need as the metaphysical medium through which 
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beings and things communicate. This is to say, I have shown that need is what comes with 
being as being with the world and not something external to it. Thus, it is not a principle 
but what distinguishes the living from the dead and the beings from the things. 
I have then looked into the Aristotelian definition of the political animal in order to 
demonstrate that the political way of being does not apply to all humans but only to a 
specific type that I have identified primarily as the ontologist. I did that by demonstrating 
that the political animal is in fact the projection of the wise man or the philosopher upon all 
humanity. As a result, I showed that political animal is a term that refers only to those 
humans that through mastering the arts and sciences are able to define beings and things. 
As a result, I then claimed that the political animal is what results out of neediness rather 
than need. In particular, I identified the behaviour of this animal as being akin to 
irrationality and madness or as being worse than that of the lion that has to resort to 
violence to satisfy its need. Subsequently, I have shown that slavery is a product of its 
neediness or the result of the violence it exerts upon the world in order to come to terms 
with natural incompleteness or the anarchy of being.  
Finally, to provide additional support to the main argument of this chapter that the human 
being is but a being in need, I have compared the way of being of the political animal with 
that of a virus. Through this, I argued that the polis, as the association of the political 
animals, is a perversion of anarchy or a product of chance. In order to support this claim, I 
have introduced the concept of homonoia as a form of unity that arises out of military 
conquest and discussed this in relation with the threat the virus as a parasitic form of life 
poses to beings. In other words, I suggested that the political as a product of war is but a 
product of chance and far from being the natural way of the human being. This is 
important for the discussion about the relationship of freedom with anarchy that follows as 
well as the discussion about the contemporary depictions of anarchy as a political end. 
  
129 
 
Chapter 5: Anarchy and the Freedom to Be   
Introduction  
Since the emergence of political philosophy, with Plato and Aristotle, the political has been 
associated with the notion of freedom, or has been defined in terms of freedom. For 
example, Aristotle says that the polis is a community of freemen.’265 The freedom that is 
attained through and in the political mainly refers to the enablement of the human being to 
be in a way that is appropriate for the animal that possesses reason. Moreover, based on the 
analysis of the previous chapter this can be seen as referring to the liberation of humans 
from the needs of the body or of the material needs that hinder the development of their 
intellect. 
On the other hand, Heidegger, whose philosophy is the basis of post-foundationalist 
political thought, argues for a freedom for the human being that is arguably realised in 
spite of the political or the world and the others. With regards to these two approaches to 
freedom, which identify freedom as something that is, in one way or the other, associated 
with the polis, I argue that in anarchy there is no freedom or no need for freedom.    
In particular, I start by looking into the fact that freedom as a notion in Aristotle is 
something that requires slavery or that comes alongside the enslavement of beings and 
things. This is to say I claim that political freedom or freedom that is realised in and 
through the polis is a problematic notion because it is difficult to distinguish it from 
domination. Based on this, I then look into two seemingly different ways in which 
Heidegger’s philosophy of ontological anarchy approaches freedom. This is mainly due to 
the peculiarity of his thought or what has been defined as his ‘turn.” 
Nevertheless, from the examination of his thought it appears that freedom is for him 
something that again is associated or does not eliminate slavery, ruling and domination. 
Consequently, I argue that their understandings are not problematic in themselves but it is 
the notion of freedom that is something that arises necessarily alongside slavery. 
Subsequently, I claim that freedom in anarchy is a redundant notion, or one that in not 
needed. This is because there is no freedom in anarchy in the sense of the freedom to be.  
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This is to say, when one is according with need or being in a way that is responsible one 
does not need to be separated from the world. Instead one experiences the originality of 
being or of changing by using reason to respond to need rather than looking for ways to 
overcome or escape the world. The analysis and argumentation of this chapter is useful for 
contesting mainly the post-leftist and post-anarchist contemporary depictions of anarchy as 
ways through which one can regain one’s individuality. Meanwhile, it provides further 
insight on being in anarchy and in particular on the notion of ataxia introduced in chapter 
three. 
5.1. Political Freedom as Authority 
Following the Aristotelian assertion with which this chapter begins, Arendt says that 
within the Ancient Greek polis the human is freed from brutality and is able to act and 
express itself in a manner of reason.
266
 In addition, Castoriadis uses Ancient Athens as an 
example of a community within which human beings, through participation in politics, free 
themselves from superstitious beliefs or are liberated from otherworldly/divine grounds. 
Through politics, he says, questioning and re-arrangement of the established, or naturally 
justified, ordering is possible.
267
   
However, these definitions do not seem to be in line with what has been argued about the 
political in the previous chapter. In particular, I have argued that the political animal is the 
being that possesses téchne or the art of bringing beings and things into presence. This 
primarily referred to the ontologist or the philosopher that is able to define the nature or the 
potentiality of beings. In a secondary sense it refers to all other humans that know the arts 
or crafts through which they are able to produce things.   
In relation with that, I have argued that slavery is necessary for the political animal to be 
political. This is to say, it is in one sense necessary to have slaves, as they are the 
instrument it uses to satisfy its needs, and in another sense what the political animal does is 
in fact enslave beings and things in order for the polis to appear. As a result I have defined 
politics as the art of ruling through contextualizing beings and things in reference with the 
final end of the political animal. Politics is ontology in the sense of the art of the 
enslavement of the other to the same or the contextualization under an absolute definer. 
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In what way is then politics and the political something that can be associated or defined in 
terms of freedom? I argue here, contra Aristotle, that there are in fact no freemen in the 
polis. In particular, I claim that freedom in the polis is a result of slavery or it requires 
slavery. It is necessarily the consequence of the imposition of the private over the common 
and this holds true even for those that are depicted as freemen and not slaves. This is to 
say, freedom in the political appears to be an illusion or at least a problematic notion.  
To start with, it is, at least, ironical and contradictory to argue for freedom as a property of 
the few that is necessarily accompanied by the enslavement of the many. It is implausible 
to argue for an account of freedom that from its very definition refers to it as being 
something that restrains or oppresses. It is contradictory for freedom to be seen as 
something that one acquires or, as Aristotle thinks, realizes over the world and the others. 
This is because freedom, in this sense, appears to be the justification of all war and the 
ground of all suppression. 
It is at least inconsistent to argue that freedom requires slavery to be realized. For this 
study, it is absurd to even consider that if there is no slavery there can be no freedom. Even 
so, it would be fair to say that if there is no experience of what it means to not be free, 
there cannot be any experience of freedom. Following the Heraclitean dialectic, it makes 
sense to say that as one cannot experience day if there is no night, one cannot experience 
freedom if there is no slavery. Thus, as day comes from night and the other way around, 
freedom comes from slavery and slavery from freedom.  
It would also be fair to say that indeed one appreciates freedom in its absence. It is one 
thing though to say that one appreciates freedom or that one can talk about freedom in 
opposition with slavery and an entirely different thing to say that freedom necessarily 
entails slavery or requires slavery. If this is the case, then freedom is something that only 
few are meant to experience, since the polis is something that requires slaves. It would be 
fair to say that the emergence of the polis signifies the freedom of the political animal or its 
liberation from need. As Arendt says about the polis it is the site through which those that 
are able can attain well-being or can act in a way that is humane or not merely 
animalistic.
268
 
                                                          
268
 To that end, I think Arendt stays faithful to the Heideggerian project of a regime in which those that are 
able will have the opportunity to rise and not be enslaved by the ‘averageness’ of the others. Arendt dedicates 
her, probably most famous, work, The Human Condition, in arguing about the freedom to act in the political 
realm, by those able to. With her argument, she positions herself mainly against the teleology of Plato and to 
a lesser extent against Aristotle’s politics.    
132 
 
This is in line with the Heraclitean definition of the human being as what is more than a 
mere animal. This in its turn is in line with what has been said about the Socratic argument, 
as it appears in Plato, that the human being strives to liberate itself or its soul from the 
incompleteness and imperfection that it comes across when it appears in the natural world. 
In other words, to say that the polis would arise in the absence of slavery is like saying that 
Aristotle’s justification of slavery as something natural becomes obsolete. From what has 
been argued thus far it is apparent that the polis is an association of freemen and the 
political animal is the ruler by nature because of slavery.    
It would be fair to say then that freedom in the polis or political freedom is something that 
refers mainly to the elimination of obstacles that enables the possibility for a very specific 
being to realize its reasoning. Even so, if this is to be overlooked and if it is to be accepted, 
for now, that indeed freedom requires the sacrifice of the many for the well-being of the 
few, the freedom of the political way of being is still something unclear. The question that 
arises is what is it in being political or in the way of political existence that signifies 
freedom?   
The short answer, in accordance with the foregoing, would be the liberation of the soul or 
the part of it that corresponds to reason and completeness, from the body or the animalistic 
nature that corresponds to the needs of material incompleteness. As the Heraclitean 
definition of the human being, provided previously, discloses; it is proffering immortal 
fame to mortal or material things. Now, immortal fame, or hysterofimia (υστεροφημία) in 
Greek, is an important notion in Ancient Greek literature. It is the fame that is eternal or 
one that does not wither away with being or that transcends death.   
It is one’s legacy, which is the result of actions that are worth of praise, remembrance and 
reproduction. It comes after death and through it the being defies its mortality. As Homer 
says in his epics one of the reasons the Ancient Greeks participated, without hesitation, in 
the campaign against Troy is that the fall of Troy would bring them eternal fame.
269
 It is 
through being in a way that defies death that the true human being is able to free itself from 
its nature or from mortality; it is able to raise itself above the other animals and above the 
world it comes to be with. 
                                                          
269
 Immortality that is attained through eternal fame is a recurring theme in Homer’s Iliad and it is what 
characterizes; it is what distinguishes the heroes from the rest.  
See http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text.jsp?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0133 
133 
 
In line with this understanding, Aristotle develops his notion of eudemonia (ευδαιμονία), 
which is usually translated as well-being or happiness.
270
 However, this translation is 
vague and does not capture the true meaning of eudemonia. It is important, for the 
purposes of the present argumentation, to have a better understanding of the notion. So, 
etymologically the term is a composition of the proverb eu (ευ), which means good or pure, 
and the word daimon (δαίμον), which is a term that refers to motion much like the Greek 
word for god, as stated in chapter three. Indeed, in Ancient Greek literature the term 
daimon is used to refer to immortals or gods.
271
   
Now, the part the human being shares with the gods or that is immortal, as stated 
previously, is its soul. Indeed, Aristotle says that eudemonia is ‘an activity of the soul in 
accordance with the most complete virtue.’272 The most complete virtue is what in Plato 
and Aristotle refers to wisdom or the way of the ontologist, who knows the ways of the 
soul. It would be fair then to say that eudemonia refers to a way of being that resembles 
that of the gods or that is simply something more than mere being; it is defined by the 
purity of motion or action that is akin to that of the immortals rather than animals.  
Most importantly, the way of being of a political animal can be defined as eudemonia only 
after death. It is only in the end and only by others that one can be described as someone 
whose way of being was more than that of a mere animal.
273
 But, does this mean that one 
dedicates and consumes one’s whole existence for something that cannot be experienced? 
To put it differently, if eudemonia or liberation as the end the political animal attains 
through the polis coincides with its own end or death then this is indeed a peculiar 
understanding of freedom. For example, it could be argued that Aristotle’s life was a 
manifestation of his philosophy and that is how and why he attained immortality through 
hysterofimia.  
Now, based on the discussion of chapter three, Aristotle indeed has earned some kind of 
immortality but what has also been argued is that he is no longer an active constituent of 
the cosmos. Aristotle lives through others or Aristotle is now what others want him to be. 
What I am saying, then, is that it seems that looking for immortal fame is missing the 
whole point of being with the world. To clarify, dedicating one’s life and deeds to ensure 
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one outlives its own material nature through fame after death is an unavailing way of being 
because one ends up not experiencing existence.  
This is only logical since, when one experiences everything as being a part of a grand plan, 
one ends up experiencing everything in relation to this final end. To move forward, it 
would not be farfetched to say that the way of being that aims towards immortality through 
fame appears as being utterly defined and structured rather than free. It appears that being 
or living becomes a product of téchne or an art and it is extremely difficult to identify the 
way in which an artifact is something free. The only way that could be the case is by 
seeing it as something that is complete or not incomplete any more. I will return to this 
later in the chapter.   
So, the question that arises, if the above is correct, is: since the freedom Aristotle argues 
for comes after death or with death, how is it possible for polis to be an association of 
freemen? It seems that the freemen that Aristotle refers to are the successors of those who 
with their way of being were able to set themselves free. It is this way of being, which is 
immortalized through and in the polis by those that follow it and carry it on.  
This is probably what explains his claim that some are marked by birth to be rulers and 
others to be slaves. Meanwhile, this is how the polis is prior to the individual in time, 
which is another of his claims discussed previously. In relation to that, the Athenian 
statesman Pericles says in his, famous, funeral oration that Athens and those that made 
Athens what it is do not need the words of the poets – pointing towards Homer and his 
epics that immortalized those that fought in the Trojan war – to acquire their fame, because 
what they left behind does it for them.
274
 
What Pericles says then is that through the polis of Athens its founding fathers have 
become immortal and it is through it that they have attained immortality. Most importantly 
their immortality does not refer merely to the fact that they are remembered or praised by 
their successors. It rather refers to the fact that their way of being is carried on by their 
successors and this is how they are immortal.  
It would be fair to say that their immortality is defined in terms of completeness. It is 
precisely because, with their way of being, they bring forth the highest form of political 
association or the final end of the political animal. This is why they are seen as having 
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attained completeness and thus immortality. Hence, they, as the foundation of the polis, set 
the standard of the way of being in the polis. This is what Pericles emphasizes to the 
audience; that they are free citizens of Athens because of what their ancestors passed down 
to them and that they should be like them to carry on the polis.
275
   
So, when I say that there is no freedom in the polis I mean that there is no one, slave or 
master, whose being or existence is not determined or authorized by the foundations of the 
political association. The freemen of the polis are not free because they are enslaved by the 
way of being they are authorized to immortalize, which paradoxically grants them their 
freedom or their political freedom in the form of citizenship. The citizen in the polis, as 
discussed in chapter one, is the one that has the freedom to participate in politics or in 
ruling and being ruled. The citizen is authorized or is granted citizenship in a hereditary 
way; the son of a citizen and so on.  
Political freedom or freedom in the polis, at least as this appears in the early days of 
political coexistence or of Western political philosophy, is a notion that refers to the 
authority of some to participate in ruling as equals among equals. In other words, they are 
granted by the founding principle of the polis the right to rule and come up with laws that, 
as Aristotle says, ‘ought to be relative to the politeia.’276 Their ruling should be according 
to the way the foundation of the polis determines. As Schürmann says with regards to 
Aristotle’s political philosophy, ‘magistrates “move” the city because they are themselves 
“moved” by the idea that is its end.’277   
Moreover, according to Arendt’s seminal examination of authority, the freedom in the 
polis as in the authority to rule over others:  
Rests neither on common reason nor on the power of the one who commands; what 
they have in common is the hierarchy itself, whose rightness and legitimacy both 
recognize and where both have their predetermined stable place.
278
  
The freedom that they are supposedly enjoying in the polis is a right that is passed on to 
them. But it is fair to say that a right is usually accompanied by an obligation. In this case 
it seems the obligation refers to the responsibility of carrying on the way of being of those 
that established the polis. This becomes apparent when Pericles talks about the obedience 
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of the citizens of Athens to the ideals, principles and laws that make Athens what it is and 
especially when he says that ‘we are free and tolerant in our private lives; but in public 
affairs we keep the law.’279 
It becomes increasingly difficult to identify freedom in the political for anybody. This is 
because freedom appears as something that is exercised or experienced on a private level 
but not publicly. It appears that the citizen of the polis has two lives; in the one he is free 
and in the other not. In the public life he is a subject of or has to follow the way of being of 
those that are immortalized through the creation of the political association. Their 
authority, to be citizens and not slaves, stems from the fact that they are seen as the heirs or 
those that share the same nature with these immortals. As Plato says with regards to the 
political life:  
We should run our public and our private lives, our homes and our cities in 
obedience to what little spark of immortality lies in us, and dignify this 
dispensation of reason with the name of ‘law’.280   
In this passage, Plato refers to the soul as what the wise people that live in the polis share 
with the immortals; be it gods or those that have attained immortality through 
completeness. Meanwhile, as Aristotle says, the soul’s rule over the body is despotical or it 
should be.
281
 
As Arendt says:               
The supreme criterion of fitness for ruling others is, in Plato and in the aristocratic 
tradition of the West, the capacity to rule one's self. Just as the philosopher-king 
commands the city, the soul commands the body and reason commands the 
passions.
282
 
If the reading of the Aristotelian thought proposed in this study is correct, then the soul 
here refers to the founding principle of the political association, which is the way of being 
of those that have brought it forth. If this is the case then in relation to what has been 
discussed here, this Aristotelian claim means that the way of being or reasoning of those 
that attained immortality should rule over those that constitute the political body or the 
citizens in a despotical way. Consequently, enslavement appears again as the way towards 
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freedom. Or the citizens as the freemen appear to be those that are slaves to the reasoning 
of their forefathers.  
If this is correct then it is impossible to see in what sense freedom is a part of the political 
association. It rather appears that authority is mistaken for freedom. Or at least that 
freedom refers to the very specific, with reference to a single being, enablement of 
pursuing a life that is or is depicted as being more than that of a mere animal. This is to 
say, freedom in the polis or political freedom, as this appears in the early days of the 
political and of political philosophy, is a peculiar concept. In particular, it can be seen as 
stemming from slavery or that it requires slavery to be realized. If this is correct then it is 
fair to say that this is a highly problematic definition of freedom as it is almost impossible 
to distinguish it from domination or the imposition of the private over the common. 
However, I will leave this at that as I will complete its contestation later in this chapter.  
5.2. Heidegger’s Freedom for the Political 
The analysis of the previous section demonstrated why the conception of freedom in the 
polis or freedom as something that is attained through the political association of human 
beings is something that is difficult if not impossible to distinguish from domination. This 
is mainly due to the fact that arises from or that it requires slavery. However, could this be 
different if the political were not the site of the political animal but what belongs to all 
human beings in the same way? To put it differently what if there is no political animal but 
the political belongs equally to every human being? Would it be possible then to see the 
polis or the political as the way towards freedom? 
As a first response to this question, the answer is no because the political is by definition a 
way of being that entails slavery. In other words, even if the political is to be seen as 
something that comes to be without the Aristotelian imposition of the by-nature ruler, it is 
still a relationship among a ruler and subject. This section examines the Heideggerian 
conception of the polis as an example of a coming together that is justified by nothing 
other than the way the human being conducts its being in the world.  
As Heidegger is not a political philosopher he suggests an understanding of a political 
association through his ontological anarchy or his call for an authentic way of being. He 
argues that a being can be free by being in a way that is according with its ‘ownmost’ 
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potentiality to be.
283
 In short, based on the analysis of chapter two, this means to be in a 
way that is not defined by the world or the others but by the being itself. Meanwhile, it 
appears that this being according to oneself becomes possible through the polis as the site 
that comes to be through being authentically and the site in which authenticity is possible 
for everyone. 
With regards to that, the main aim of this section is to argue that his conception of the 
polis, as something that comes to be through being authentically, inevitably collapses to an 
Aristotelian type of essentialism. He ends up arguing for the polis or the political as the site 
of, what I define here as, the authentes,
284
 which appears to have no or little difference 
from the Aristotelian political animal. The authentes is an Ancient Greek term that 
signifies someone that is an originator or a perpetrator; a person whose doings can be 
traced back only to him/her, an initiator or an author.
285
 As a result, this section aims to 
show that even Heidegger’s political authenticity or the emergence of the polis as a result 
of being authentically ends up being but a call for an elitist way of being that disregards the 
freedom of the many for the sake of the few or an inadequate conception of freedom.  
To start with, Heidegger refers to the polis as the site ‘in which man comes to dwell in a 
historical-ontological manner.’286 He argues for an understanding of the political as the site 
in and through which the human being is able to disclose its true being rather than be 
defined by something external. His is a conception that precedes the Platonic and 
Aristotelian wise man; it is a polis that is prior to the ontologist or philosopher-king as the 
sole signifier of beings and things. Instead beings and things appear by themselves. So, for 
him the polis is the site within which his human being is able to be in an authentic way or 
the polis ‘appears as the way in which beings as such in general step into 
unconcealment.’287 This means that it names that in and through which human beings are 
able to disclose their authentic being. Meanwhile it is also the site that makes it possible 
for the human being to concentrate on not losing site of its true being.
288
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This means that Heidegger is not against the polis or the political. His anarchy is 
compatible with the political, because it is not necessarily referring to something that is 
other or that escapes it. It does escape, or at least it seems that it does, the Aristotelian 
conception, but he still thinks that the polis is the way the human being is able to be 
authentically or be according with its own potentiality to be. Nevertheless, the political 
association remains for him something that is realized in spite of the world or the forces of 
nature. In particular, he says, the polis is the result of the strife of human reasoning or 
téchne against the overwhelming justice of nature.
289
  
It would be fair to say then that the political association Heidegger argues for is one that 
comes to be not because it is the predetermined final end but because of the freedom of 
being authentically. It is not the result of imposition but what results precisely due to being 
without a founding principle or an arché, in the way this has been defined in this study. If 
this is correct and indeed the polis is the result of ontological anarchy or of the absence of a 
fundamental nature then what is the reason for slavery, ruling and domination? Since 
slavery, ruling and domination are integral parts of the political then it is either that 
everyone starts by being free but in some cases ends up being a slave, or that everyone 
starts with a predetermined way of being that discloses itself in time.  
Based on his depiction of the polis provided in the previous chapter, the polis is the site in 
which there are priests and there are gods and armies. It would be logical to assume then 
that there must be some that are the subjects of all these ruling figures and hierarchical 
structures. This is because one cannot refer to the existence of all these structures that by 
their definition imply ruling without accounting for those that are ruled. It appears that the 
Heideggerian polis is a site that entails hierarchical structures or statuses that carry some 
kind of authority but there are no subjects. Meanwhile, the existence of slaves as an 
integral part of the polis, in any period and in any place of the Ancient Greek world, is 
something is confirmed historically.
290
   
If slavery, ruling and domination are a necessary part of the political, does this mean that to 
be authentically or be in an ontologically free way, according to him, results inevitably in 
                                                          
289
 In the terminology of Heidegger, which is based on the pre-Socratic thought, the polis is the site where the 
strife between téchne, the human art, and díke (δίκη), the justice or order of physis. See Heidegger M. (2000), 
p. 169 and p. 181. The Heideggerian, pre-Socratic téchne is different to the Aristotelian téchne of the 
architect and it refers mostly to the way of the poet, who gathers words in a reasonable manner, in the manner 
of logos, and discloses itself as a form or as a work, a poem, instead of working towards a predetermined 
form. See Heidegger M. (2000), pp. 180-182. 
290
 Bradely K. & Cartledge P. (Eds.) (2011), The Cambridge World History of Slavery Volume 1: The Ancient 
Mediterranean World, (New York: Cambridge University Press).   
140 
 
all these?  Does it mean that if everyone has the opportunity to be authentically some may 
end up being ruled or dominated? It appears so and if this is the case, I argue that the 
freedom he argues for is an elitist account that aims towards the creation of an elitist way 
of being. He does not necessarily aims towards the elitist way of being but this is the 
unavoidable consequence of his thought. This is because if one ends up being ruled by 
being in an authentic way, much like everyone else, then there are authenticities that are 
more authentic than others.  
If everyone starts with nothing and some end up rulers and others end up subjects then 
authentic being is a freedom that is meant for some and not for others. If being 
authentically means to be free and some end up being ruled then freedom, in Heidegger, is 
either something that vanishes in time, for some, or it is meant for the few. It is, in other 
words, reserved or meant to in the first place for what I have defined as the authentes or 
the ones whose authenticity is, in a peculiar way, official or more authentic than that of 
others that end up being ruled. On the other hand, he may not speak of those ruled because 
there is no ruling in the way Aristotle defines it. There are no slaves and there is no 
inequality because what everyone is in the polis is what everyone can be and thus everyone 
is free even if being ruled.  
If what everyone becomes is the result of ontological anarchy or as Schürmann defines the 
result of ‘letting go or letting be’291, then ruling can be seen as justified because it is not 
imposed. It can be seen as a just or fair development as it is not the result of war or an 
unjust way of being that is enforced by some over others. It rather is the result of freedom; 
subsequently it could be claimed that freedom does not cease to exist with this type of 
ruling. If this is the case and freedom refers to merely being authentically no matter what 
that means in practical terms then his authentic being is similar to Aristotle’s political 
animal. This is to say, what I have defined as the authentes is a way to refer to the natural 
ruler with the only difference being that it is not grounded to an essence or a founding 
principle. 
In order for the polis to be seen as the result of freedom and not of imposition it has to be 
the inevitable or inescapable consequence of being human or of being authentically as 
Heidegger says. If this is the case, then I say that either his anarchy is not without a 
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founding principle or his freedom is an inadequate account as it is something that applies 
to the few. But for this to become clear the following example should be considered. 
So, consider a case in which one can simulate the whole of human history a specific 
number of times; one hundred times for example. But instead of predefining what every 
actor in the simulation can do the person that runs the simulation lets them be. In such a 
case one would not be predefining the result of simulation through determining what one 
can do or be. Instead the result of the simulation would disclose what everyone can do or 
be.  
Thus, it would be logical to expect that in this hypothetical scenario the polis should be the 
result of the simulation every single time for the polis to be a result of freedom or the result 
of letting be as Heidegger appears to be arguing. If there is at least one case where the 
simulation would not result in the emergence of the polis then his argument collapses. This 
is because that would mean that the polis is not the result of being authentically but the 
result of imposition. It would be imposition necessarily because there would be no way to 
justify the domination and inequality of the polis.  
If by being authentically there can be at least one case in which the polis is not the result 
then it would be fair to say that the polis is not necessarily the result of freedom or not 
what results from being authentically. Because of this, the inequality and the ruling of the 
polis would also have no ground for legitimization; it could equally be the result of 
imposition or enforcement. Now, if the analysis of this study is correct and if, as claimed in 
chapter three, the same configuration can have the opposite result, then the results of the 
simulations should not be identical. But I will get back to that later in this chapter. 
Nonetheless, if he indeed argues for the polis as being the inevitable result of being 
authentically then his anarchy does not refer to the absence of a founding principle. It 
rather is a principle itself which dictates that by letting everyone be, without 
predetermining their potentiality to be; the result would be again an association of rulers 
and subjects but in a way that is fair or not imposed by an external or overarching definer. 
It could be seen as the result of freedom in the sense of escaping the 
teleological/teleocratic accounts of Plato and Aristotle.  
As Arendt says,     
In the tradition of Platonic thought, this original, linguistically predetermined 
identity of ruling and beginning had the consequence that all beginning was 
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understood as the legitimation for rulership. With it the most elementary and 
authentic understanding of human freedom disappeared from political 
philosophy.
292
 
This is to say, the Heideggerian polis reinstates this freedom but in doing so it appears that 
the conclusions and argumentation of chapter two are confirmed and he argues for 
panarchy rather than anarchy. In this panarchy, in which everyone is a starting point in the 
absence of an all-encompassing one there is no predetermined order and no one is justified 
by nature to rule. However, since there is slavery, ruling and domination, there is an 
ordering that is hierarchical and it must be the result of the authenticity that prevails.    
It must be, because in the setting he proposes, where there is a confusion of principles or 
where everyone is a principle, some inevitably prevail and become the principle of others. 
This is the only way the existence of slavery, ruling and domination is justified in his 
account, in which there is no sovereign or a ruler by nature. In the end, his polis, as stated 
above, is the result of strife or it is from this strife that some become rulers and other 
slaves.  
Now, this is not that different from the Heraclitean claim that “war is the father of all,” 
which has been shown to be similar to the actual way in which rulers becomes rulers in 
Aristotle. Therefore, it would be fair to say that his ontological anarchy and the authentic 
way of being he proposes ends up being an argument for an elitist way of being. This is 
because, if the above analysis is correct, the authenticity of some will always result in them 
being free, while the authenticity of others will vanish and render them slaves. Hence, it 
would be fair to say that his account of freedom, as something that comes through the 
polis, is inadequate, unless, one identifies slavery, ruling and domination as forms of 
freedom or as its results.  
5.3. Heideggerian Anarchic Freedom of Being in Spite of the World 
So, the foregoing analysis demonstrated the inadequacy of the Heideggerian ontological 
freedom as something that is realized in and through the political. In particular it 
demonstrated how it falls back to an Aristotelian type of coming together, in which some 
are necessary ruling over others. It showed that freedom appears again as the privilege of 
the few that is realized in spite of the absence of freedom for the many. Nevertheless, 
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Schürmann, with his reading of Heidegger, argues that the polis is not the site of the 
authentic human but the context in which the human being loses site of its own potentiality 
to be.
293
  With regards to that, he encourages or advises the reader, interested in Heidegger, 
to study his work backwards, starting from his more recent works.
294
  
So, following Schürmann’s advice, this section examines Heidegger’s notion of freedom as 
authenticity again, but this time as something that is realized in the political yet inspite of 
it. In particular, it is not merely Schürmann’s encouragement to do so that this section 
examines Heidegger’s authenticity from a different point of view. The peculiarity in 
Heidegger’s thought, which has been identified in the introductory chapter with the term 
“Heidegger’s turn,” is certainly one of the reasons. But it is mostly due to the importance 
Heidegger’s thought plays in the formulation of the contemporary understandings of 
anarchy and the fact that his thought, similarly with this study, identifies anarchy with 
being without arché.     
To that end, I argue here that the authenticity with which Heidegger identifies freedom is 
or at least ends up being akin to the principle of its own subjection. As Levinas says, in 
Heidegger freedom comes from obedience to “Being”: it is not man who possesses 
freedom; it is freedom that possesses man.’295 To clarify, Levinas uses “Being” to refer to 
the authenticity of being or to the possibility of the human being to be the starting point of 
its existence. In particular, I claim that the authentic way he argues is the result of isolation 
or an obsessive way of being that instead of setting the being free ends up enslaving it. 
To start with, as discussed previously, Heidegger’s ontological anarchy is in fact an 
argument for panarchy rather than anarchy. He argues, contra Aristotle, that there is not an 
all-encompassing origin, but every human being starts with nothing but its own potentiality 
to be. Now, he says that this potentiality to be belongs only to the human being or it is 
entirely its own to disclose, but it loses touch with it from the moment it is thrown or 
appears in the world.
296
  
Consequently, he argues that being in the world is already a way of being that ‘falls prey’ 
to the world that it appears in and this means that it falls away from itself.
297
 This means 
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that the being since it appears in the world ‘falls prey’ to the meanings and significations of 
the world as they are or have been constituted by the others. As a result, it loses 
immediately the connection it has with its own possibility to be authentically. It falls prey 
to ‘everydayness’ and becomes a part of the being of ‘the they.’298  
For him being with others is in itself a perverted way of being. ‘The they’ refers to a 
collectivity in which everyone loses its oneness, which refers to the unity of the being with 
its own way to be.
299
  This means that the authentic oneness of Dasein or of the being that 
appears in the world is replaced by a collective being, which is in itself a lesser, inauthentic 
way or represents, what Heidegger calls, an ‘averegeness.’ The way of being of ‘the they’ 
is a different type of oneness in which everyone is the same and nobody is able to be 
authentic. As Arrendt says, identifying the oneness of collectivity with the modern division 
of labour: ‘this one-ness is the exact opposite of co-operation, it indicates the unity of the 
species with regard to which every single member is the same and exchangeable.’300 
With that in mind, it would be fair to say that being authentically, in Heidegger, means to 
be left alone to disclose one’s potential to be. It would be also accurate to say that the polis 
as the site of the coming together of beings is the site of collectivity that drags everyone 
down to an average level. Up to this point it seems that Heidegger is indeed arguing for an 
anarchic type of freedom, in the sense of being antithetical to the political way of being. He 
argues for the liberation of the human being from the way of being that is imposed upon it 
by the political. However, the question that arises is: how can one be authentically within 
such a setting? 
It seems that the answer to this question is philosophy or questioning one’s existence.301 
This is because by questioning one’s own existence one does not lose touch with what is 
truly owned. For Heidegger, the inception and the death of being are the only moments that 
are entirely its own and that is why he defines being as being towards death.
302
 As a result, 
what he says is that by being aware of its own finitude one does not become forgetful of 
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what one actually is.
303
 Only by questioning one’s own existence one is able to remind 
oneself that is but a mortal being, which is something that is otherwise getting lost in the 
collective way of being.    
As he says, it is through reaching back to its finitude that one is able to be in its own way 
and realize its own potentiality to be.
304
 In plain terms, what Heidegger says is that in face 
of the certainty and unpredictability of death, one is able to liberate oneself from the 
demands of the collective way of being. Liberation here refers to one’s ability to be in its 
own way, which is a way of being that is necessarily realised in spite of the collective way. 
Now, I consider this to be a controversial argument. This is because indeed in the face of 
death one may experience some kind of liberation or clarity. For example, the acceptance 
of death, due to a terminal illness, arguably acts as a filter that enables the person whose 
life is going to end to reconsider the world and re-evaluate what is meaningful and what is 
not. It would be fair to say that in a case like this the being that awaits death is liberated in 
a sense from all those little things that its everyday life burdens it with. If this is correct, 
then Heidegger actually claims that one is free or can be authentically if one is, and acts 
for, the present as if there is no future.  
If this is what he says then he is right. Indeed if one is to be in such a way that takes 
nothing for granted it may result in a way of being that is liberating or free. One has to 
consider though; is this truly an authentic or free way of being or is this so-called freedom 
the result of utmost despair? In other words, is setting one’s eyes fixed to the possibility of 
not being anymore a way of being free, or is it a way of imposing an impossible to resist or 
escape definer upon one’s being that ends up hindering one’s very possibility of living?  
In answer, in this case death turns into the reference point that provides being with a reason 
to be or with its own authentic reason to be. It is the signifier that provides with meaning 
every single action of the being. This is because by arguing that death is what defines 
being, he makes death the reason that brings forth what he identifies as the authentic way 
to be. In the first instance this appears as an odd argument because it imposes something 
that is external to the being as its starting point. 
If the argumentation of the previous chapters is accurate, then death is not a part of being 
and thus it cannot define being in any way. As Epicurus, who is the philosopher commonly 
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seen as the successor of Democritus, says ‘death is nothing to do with us.’305 Since death 
signifies the end of activity or the moment that a living thing stops being an active 
constituent of the cosmos, it follows that death has no part in defining being in an active 
way.   
Consequently, turning death into a reference point for being, or being free, is brutal and 
inhumane. This is because, being in a way that is defined by one’s own possibility to not 
exist anymore is an overwhelming burden upon one’s life that can bring forth the adverse 
results of what Heidegger aims. It may lead to a way of being that is irresponsible or 
inconsiderate or it could make freedom a form of nihilism defined by the absence of 
responsibility.  
For example, it is equally possible that in the process through which one liberates oneself 
from the influence of the others to end up using its own finitude for not being responsible 
for anything; be it its own being or the others. To put it blatantly, “everyone dies in the 
end” appears to be the password that unlocks ones potential to be authentically, according 
with the foregoing. If this is the case, then it is fair to say that freedom becomes an 
obsession. It becomes the constant strife to be in spite of the world. 
Now, in relation to the analysis of the previous section and with regards to Schürmann’s 
advice to read Heidegger backwards, is not this strife similar to the strife referred to above 
between the human being and nature? Even though Schürmann argues that one should read 
Heidegger backwards to understand his thought, it appears that he is wrong or at least not 
entirely right. It seems that Schürmann fails to identify that the common or recurrent theme 
in Heidegger’s thought is that freedom belongs to those that can attain it no matter what. 
This is to say, it does not matter how one approaches Heidegger’s thought because 
authenticity or the freedom to be is something that occurs in the polis.     
Since the polis he describes is not the result of the imposition of the will of some over the 
others then ruling or the elimination of the freedom of some can only be the result of 
obliviousness. This is because his human being does not aim to create the polis, in the 
sense of not willing the imposition of its way of being upon the others. However, if the 
previous analysis is correct, slavery, ruling and domination end up happening no matter 
what.  
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It follows then that this must be the result of his general conception of freedom as 
something that refers to indifference or paying no attention to the other. Or it might be the 
consequence of the isolation and self-absorption of his being with its own freedom that 
results in the disregard of the freedom of others. Slavery, ruling and domination have 
nothing to do with freedom, because freedom belongs only to the being that disregards 
these occurrences. Or seeing authenticity as something that occurs in spite of the polis 
instead of something that occurs through the polis makes no difference because in the end 
it refers to the freedom of the few that prevail.  
To explain this further, if being free means to be in spite of the world and if these 
occurrences are part of the world then freedom means to be in spite of them. This is very 
important for the post-leftist/Stirnerian account of anarchy, as well as for Newman’s post 
anarchist anarchy, which are discussed in the following chapter. But is not being in spite of 
them synonymous with being indifferent to them or is not being indifferent to them a way 
of letting them exist and perpetuate? Moreover, would it be illogical to say that slavery, 
ruling and domination are the results of the obsession with freedom? 
If the analysis of the previous chapter is correct and if the human being can be needy and 
when it is needy it resorts to violence, then it could similarly be claimed that in the quest 
for freedom and in the face of the certainty and unpredictability of death the other is an 
obstacle that needs to be overcome by any means necessary. It would be fair to say that this 
is what Heidegger says when he claims that ‘humanity is violence-doing not in addition to 
and aside from other qualities but solely in the sense that from the ground up and in its 
doing violence, it uses violence against the overwhelming.’306     
In other worlds, the use of violence is but an externalization of the internal strife or of its 
obsession with death or freedom. It is its way of coping with the fact that it is mortal. It is 
probably for the same exact reason that he says that the human being feels not at home 
being in the world.
307
 But, this is also the way it is able to be in an authentic way or the 
way it attains freedom. If I am right and his anarchy is in fact panarchy or a condition of 
confusion, where every human being is a starting point or the founding principle of itself 
then the being that arises out of this confusion is the one that is obsessed with freedom. It 
is the one that is so self-absorbed that is indifferent about the other beings to such an extent 
that is prepared to attain freedom by any means necessary.  
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It would be fair then to say that freedom in Heidegger is the result of what he calls 
uncanniness or the feeling of not being at home being with the world and others. As he 
says, based mostly on Ancient Greek tragic writers, the human being is the uncanniest 
(deinotaton – δεινότατον) of the uncanny (deina – δεινά).308 Authenticity or freedom is, 
then, something that can be measured or expressed in terms of uncanniness. This means 
that those are more obsessed with freedom and hence more detached from the world and 
the others are more likely to be free.  
To sum up the present discussion, it would be accurate to say that it is irrelevant whether 
one reads Heidegger backwards or not, since it appears that freedom expressed as 
authenticity is something that belongs to some more than others. Consequently, it is safe to 
say that his account of freedom is inadequate as well as bizarre, since isolation and 
obsession can hardly be seen as notions associated with freedom. Moreover, it has to be 
restated that the idea of defining freedom with a way of being that is in spite of the world is 
a dangerous way of being, which may end up justifying slavery, ruling and domination by 
disregarding their existence.      
5.4. Being in Anarchy Instead of the Freedom to Be 
It would be accurate to say that the discussion of the previous three sections demonstrated 
that the association of freedom with the political is problematic. This is mainly because it 
is implausible to speak of freedom in association with the political without this, in one way 
or the other, entailing slavery, ruling and domination. This has been shown through 
considering a case in which the political is the way towards freedom, a case in which the 
political is the result of freedom and a case in which freedom is the result of being against 
the political.    
In relation with that, I claim here that the problem with the definition of freedom does not 
start with its association with the political. Freedom is a concept that is only relevant in 
relation with the political or a concept that emerges alongside the political. In relation to 
that, I argue that freedom is redundant in anarchy or that there is no freedom in anarchy as 
in no need for freedom. Instead, there is responsibility, while the need from freedom arises 
with the emergence of the political as the disturbance of the communion of othernesses. In 
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order to develop my thought I draw mainly upon the arguments presented in this study as 
well as upon the Democritean thought.  
So, it would be fair to say that freedom in political philosophy, at least in the accounts 
examined above, is an existential concept. It is particularly concerned with the way the 
human being can better its existence. To that end, it can be claimed that the Aristotelian 
and Platonic tradition argues that overcoming need or what comes with the material 
substance of the human being enables its freedom to be. This freedom refers to being in a 
way that is more than a mere animal and is only possible through the creation of the 
political association. On the other hand, Heidegger arguably proposes that disregarding the 
political way of being is the way to be free or to be in an authentic way that is not 
dominated by others. 
It appears then that the notion of freedom refers to the separation of the human being from 
the world or other beings and things through either overcoming or isolation. For example, 
do we characterize flowers or other animals, such as the eagle, as being free? It could be 
argued that this is something that happens rarely or not at all. This is not necessarily 
because one does not see the eagle or the flower as free or not free for that matter. But it 
would be correct to say that this is because it seems meaningless to employ the term 
freedom to refer to the way of being of these living things. 
It could be argued though, in line with Aristotle, that the reason this occurs is because they 
are incapable of being free, as they are incapable of understanding the way of nature. 
However, if the analysis of this study is correct then all beings and things are according to 
the way of nature, which has been identified with anarchy and spontaneity. Meanwhile, 
there are many instances in Ancient Greek literature where spontaneity is defined in terms 
of freedom. For example, spontaneity is employed by Hesiod to refer to the way something 
happens without external influence; by Homer to refer to voluntary action, by Xenophon to 
refer to the absence of compulsion; and by Plato to refer to freely or willingly.
309
   
In addition, I have provided a preliminary definition of spontaneity, in chapter two, 
drawing upon Democritus as what refers to the freedom of being of one’s own accord. 
Does this mean that these beings are already free and that is why it is pointless to refer to 
them in terms of freedom? On the contrary, based on the thorough analysis of chapter three 
about what anarchy for the cosmos and the being means, the term freedom has been 
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abandoned for good. Instead, I have introduced the notion of ataxia to refer to the 
spontaneity of the cosmos.  
It has been implied, through the discussion that took place up to this point, that there is no 
freedom in anarchy. This is because being in anarchy is being of one’s own accord, which 
means being according with one’s idiosyncrasy or being with the world. This means to be a 
unique active constituent of the perpetual and incomplete communication among beings 
and things, which has need, as what comes with being alive, as its medium. Being in 
anarchy means to actively constitute and be constituted by others as a part of the 
communion of othernesses that the cosmos is. 
Now, if freedom refers in one way or the other to the separation of the human being from 
the world, it follows that it refers to the division of what has been defined as indivisible. It 
signifies the end of the communication of the human being with the world it comes to be 
with. If the above analysis is correct, then this happens through the political; either through 
waging war against nature or through escaping or alienating oneself from the world. If this 
is correct, then freedom refers to what arises as a result of the end of communication or the 
beginning of violence the human being exerts upon the world.  
If the political, as argued previously, is indeed the result of the neediness of what is defined 
as the true human being or the political animal, then freedom is the result of this as well. 
This is because the main aim of the political association is to free men from the needs of 
life or to allow them to become more than mere animals. Meanwhile, this is only possible 
through the enslavement of all living things, towards the attainment of the political 
animal’s final end. Thus, since as has been shown above freedom always entails slavery, 
ruling and domination, it is fair to say that freedom is the product of the neediness of the 
political animal.  
This does not mean that there is no freedom in anarchy simply because there is no slavery. 
It rather needs to be emphasized that freedom as a result of neediness arises in anarchy as a 
futile attempt to replace it with an arché. The futility of this endeavour is evident in the 
fact that the political animal, as has been demonstrated, in order to liberate itself from the 
incompleteness, which comes with being, enslaves others and itself to external 
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principles.
310
 It is because of its neediness or irrationality for that matter that constructs, 
which have no place in the natural world or outside of the polis, come to life.  
This is for example why the polis, as Heidegger describes it, is the site of the gods and the 
priests, and the warlords and the soldiers. What is the priest without the gods and what is 
the warlord without wars and the soldiers? Most importantly, what is their need if there is 
no polis or the neediness of the political animal to distinguish itself from the world and fill 
the void of the natural incompleteness with them? There is arguably no other need for them 
other than the neediness of what has been identified by Aristotle as the ruler by nature to 
ascribe a reason to the cosmos or to fill its void with a reason to be. 
In anarchy or being according with need, rather than neediness, there is no such a need. 
One does not need freedom or a reason to be as one has every reason to be. This means that 
in anarchy one takes complete responsibility over one’s way of being. One embraces the 
incompleteness of being and instead of looking for ways to pass on its responsibility to 
something external, one experiences the world in any way possible. As Levinas says, ‘true 
experience deserves its name only if it transports beyond what constitutes our nature.’311  
This, in the view of this study, means that in anarchy one experiences being with the world 
through need and not through an absolute signifier. For instance, one does not experience 
being a boy through what is defined by the final end of being a man. In anarchy, as 
discussed, the boy is not the potential man but a being in its own accord. Experiencing the 
world as a boy in anarchy does not mean to be in a way that is determined in accordance 
with the final end of the man, but simply according to the needs that come with being a 
boy.  
As Levinas says:  
To be I is, over and beyond any individualization that can be derived from a system 
of references, to have identity as one’s content. The I is not a being that always 
remain the same, but is the being whose existing consists in identifying itself, in 
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recovering its identity throughout all that happens to it. It is the primal identity, the 
primordial work of identification.
312
    
Thus, in anarchy one takes the responsibility of revealing oneself to itself and to the world 
and does not need an authority or a principle to do that instead. It does not need a priest or 
a wise man to ascribe to it a potentiality or a nature. In the absence, then of a reason to be 
one does not end up with nothing or with a meaningless existence. Instead it appears that 
one has every reason to be or one as a living thing or a being in need is never completely 
defined, but always something other or something that has different needs.  
As a result, being cannot be an art or an episteme. Neither nature nor the wise men are the 
manufacturers of beings, men, and women and so on. Being in anarchy or taking 
responsibility, as a human being, means to not experience the world only through téchne or 
as an artefact. This is not because this is the true or the correct way but because in the 
absence of the political there is no slave nor master but only beings and things.  
Nevertheless, one may object to that and argue in a way similar to Arendt, who says that 
Karl Marx equates the work of the silk worm with that of the poet John Milton, that this 
study reduces the human being to a mere animal.
313
 More accurately, by identifying the 
human being as a being according with need or indivisible from the world there is indeed 
no freedom in anarchy, as being is the result of a determined chain of causation. That 
would be a somewhat fair objection, since the issue was not addressed as thoroughly in the 
discussion of chapter three. In addition, I have not yet fully explained what I mean that in 
anarchy there is ataxia rather than freedom. It would not also be a surprise since the 
Aristotelian anthropocentrism, or the conception that other beings are but means to human 
ends, is arguably the prevalent position in Western philosophy.
314
 Even so, examining this 
is beyond the scope of this study. 
So, in response to the possible objection that being in anarchy is indeed eliminating the 
freedom to be, I say that this is not entirely correct. In one sense it is correct since by being 
in anarchy or according to need there is no need for the freedom to be as this has been 
defined here. In another sense though, this is wrong because the causal determinism that 
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one may identify being in anarchy with, is one that makes change possible rather than the 
other way around.     
I have argued in chapter three that ataxia is what characterizes motion or change in 
anarchy. I have introduced the term because it describes indefiniteness and spontaneity 
best. So, I have argued that it refers to the incompleteness of motion or change through 
which beings and things come together to bring forth the cosmos. Moreover, I have 
differentiated this coming together from necessity by saying that rather than referring to a 
probabilistic inevitability, the same configuration can have the opposite result. This is the 
part which has been intentionally not examined thoroughly as it is more appropriate for this 
discussion to take place here. 
So, when I say that in anarchy there is no freedom but there is ataxia, this means that the 
same arrangement or coming together can have the opposite result. Consequently, it can be 
said at this point that the causal determinism that anarchy can be identified with is one that 
allows or better enables change. This does not mean that if a scientist isolates molecules of 
hydrogen and oxygen and then brings them together that the result is sometimes going to 
be something other than water. Instead, this is to say that the world is never an isolated 
environment like the one scientific experiments take place in. 
For example, is not the neediness or irrationality I have identified the political animal with 
a most certain proof that the same thing can have the opposite result? To clarify, if the 
analysis of this study is correct, then the political animal’s neediness is but a result of its 
idiosyncrasy. In other words, it is not something unnatural but something that comes as a 
result of the way this being makes sense of the cosmos. So, rationality or reason is 
arguably the way the human being responds to need, due to its idiosyncrasy or its otherness 
among othernesses. Thus, if what is rational can be irrational then it would be fair to say 
that the same arrangement can have the opposite result.  
Now, irrationality here refers to the human being using its reason in order to overcome or 
escape from its needs rather than respond to them. As Democritus says in a similar way, ‘it 
is irrational not to yield to the necessities in accordance with one’s way of life.’315 This is 
because this is an irresponsible way of being that hurts the very being that acts in this way 
as well as the communion of beings as a whole. Being responsible for oneself or being 
according with need is a way of being that takes responsibility for the whole communion 
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of beings. This has been shown through the example of the bee as well as that of the lion 
and the antelope, in a different way. But in both cases, being according with need or being 
in a responsible way means to not impose the private over the common and vice versa.    
To use the term introduced in the previous chapter, the communion of othernesses appears 
to be a type of homonoia or a unity and singlemindness that is spontaneous rather than 
imposed. For example, an analogy of such a unity can be drawn from team sports. Thus, 
one should think of the communion of beings as a football team, for instance, which 
operates as if it was one single entity.
316
 Or a team in which every player takes 
responsibility and puts all the effort needed from him/her according to his/her abilities. Is 
not a case like this an example in which one is not concerned about the result because 
everyone is acting in a responsible way?  
It must be, because if I am a member of this team I am carefree and thus in a way liberated 
as I trust that I have to carry only my own burden and others will do so in the same way. 
As a result, being responsible for me is in a spontaneous way being responsible for the 
others. What this analogy shows is that the cosmos as a communion of beings and things is 
already a coming together or a type of teamwork. In this coming together one’s 
irresponsibility has an effect on all. When in one way or the other one or more end up 
imposing the private over the common, be it indifference towards the team or considering 
oneself as over and above the team.  
This is not to say that one should put the common over the private. This is not an analogy 
about sacrificing oneself for the common good or the team goal. Instead it is about 
showing that the cosmos is a unity or that the human being is already a part of something 
bigger than itself, which requires from it to be responsible for itself. Based on the 
foregoing, it could be claimed that the human being is not free as long as it sees itself as 
something separate from the cosmos. Instead from the instance that it realizes the fact that 
it is indivisible from the world it comes to be with it realizes that it has no need for 
freedom. In other words, much like the analogy above, when everyone is responsible for 
oneself everyone is responsible for the other. 
This study does not argue for the reduction of the human being or for abandoning reason to 
be in a different way; defined as instinctual or animalistic. What I am saying is that the 
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human being’s irrationality or neediness comes from the employment of reason to 
overcome or escape need instead of responding to it. Hence, it could be said that the causal 
determinism of being in anarchy is not merely a condition where freedom is absent. Instead 
in a setting like the one described here, where being responsible for one’s own existence 
has a direct effect on the cosmos, freedom is a notion that becomes redundant. In fact, even 
if someone has to put it necessarily in terms of freedom, it seems to me that what has been 
described here is more akin to the freedom to be. This is especially if the alternatives are 
the signification from a wise man, isolation and indifference, divine control, fate or 
chance.
317
 
However, if irrationality is according to one’s idiosyncrasy, as I have argued, then it would 
be fair to say that it must be inevitable. In relation with that, the response of this study is 
that, as irrationality is possible because of rationality, the opposite must also be true. If ill 
health can be reversed by changing one’s way of being then the same should hold true for 
irrationality. Since irrationality is a way of being that is not according with need, it would 
be safe to say that using reason to respond to need is the way to do it.  
As argued previously in this study, need is the teacher of being or it is by experiencing 
one’s needs that one reveals oneself to the world. As Democritus argues, ‘nature and 
teaching are closely related; for teaching reforms a person, and reforming remakes its 
nature.’318 There is no one that can teach being better than the needs that comes with its 
idiosyncrasy and hence no one that can rule over it without imposing its own private world 
upon it.  
If being according to reason necessarily entails some intentionality, one should 
intentionally seek to experience one’s own being through need – that is to say, to use 
reason as its own way of responding to the need to experience its own existence and 
through it the world rather than enslave oneself to an external principle. If it is arguably not 
possible to conceive the human being without having ends or acting towards an end, then, 
one should do so in the way the seafarer finds their way in uncharted waters. As the 
Modern Greek poet Constantine P. Cavafy suggests in his ‘Ithaka’ (Ιθάκη), what matters is 
not knowing or reaching the destination but experiencing the way towards it.
319
 
                                                          
317
 Johnson R. M. (2009), p. 11. 
318
 Democritus as cited in Cartledge P. (1998), p. 37. 
319
 Cavafy P. C. (1992), Collected Poems, Keeley E. and Sherrard P. (Trans.), Savidis G. (Ed.), (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 36. 
156 
 
Moreover, this means that in anarchy one does not need the freedom to be in the sense of 
ruling over oneself or being authentic. This is because, to follow the example of Aristotle 
and Heidegger and cite the poets once again, one is able to be original in the sense the 
English poet Philip Larkin defines originality. As he says, originality is being different 
from oneself, not others.
320
 Being according with need or in anarchy is precisely being 
other than oneself by responding to the change of one’s needs or by changing one’s 
idiosyncrasy. This means, one can only be other than oneself by being with the world and 
others and not over them or in spite of them. Thus, in the case of the human beings, using 
reason to change oneself in a responsible way. As Democritus says in a similar manner 
‘more people become good out of training than from nature.’321    
Conclusion  
To summarize, in the pages above I have argued that freedom, as a notion inextricably 
bound to the political, is a notion that is redundant or does not apply in anarchy. In fact, I 
have shown that it is meaningless unless one is a slave, which means unless one’s needs 
are defined by someone or something external. I did so through examining the problematic 
notion of political freedom, the freedom one attains in and through the polis. In particular, 
through this examination it became apparent that there is in fact no freedom in the polis, as 
even the political animal or the ruler by nature enslaves oneself to the ways of its ancestors 
to be authorized by them to rule over others. 
In addition to that, I examined Heidegger’s freedom as being authentically or being in a 
polis in which there is no political animal or no natural ruler. In relation with that, I 
demonstrated that in this polis there are still slavery, ruling and domination. As a result the 
authenticity of this polis ends up privileging some over others or the authenticity of some 
is more authentic than that of others. Moreover, following Schürmann’s advice I looked 
into Heidegger’s authenticity as the freedom to be in spite of the political.  
However, my analysis showed that there is no actual difference in what constitutes 
freedom for Heidegger no matter how one approaches his thought. Freedom as authenticity 
is in fact a way of being in which one is free from caring whether others end up slaves or 
not; an obsession with one’s own life and being that ends up with being indifferent to the 
world and the others. Consequently, I suggested that freedom only makes sense when it is 
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related to slavery. Where there is no slavery there is no freedom or no need for it. Thus, 
freedom comes with the political or with the way of being that comes to be through the 
enslavement of beings and things.  
I consequently claimed that being in anarchy is a way of being where there is no freedom, 
not only because there is no slavery, but because there is genuinely no need for such a 
notion. To prove my point, I provided a further explanation of the concept of ataxia, to 
show that by being according with need or in a responsible way one is able to be original. 
This is to say, one is able to change oneself by using reason to respond to need and reveal 
oneself to the world. So, the following chapter looks into the implications of the definition 
of anarchy as the way of being in relation with the contemporary understandings of 
anarchy in the field of anarchist studies.  
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Chapter 6: Anarchy and Anarchist Thought    
Introduction 
The student of politics who decides to study anarchism comes across a wide range of 
definitions. Anarchism is identified, by different authors, as a philosophy, an ideology, a 
movement as well as a historical tendency and a political culture. This plurality in 
definitions is one of the main reasons that many groups or schools of thought are dubbed 
anarchist, while they share very few or sometimes only one thing in common. 
Nevertheless, the one thing that all types and approaches share is having a concept of 
anarchy. This means that each one has a concept of anarchy, but they do not share a 
common concept of anarchy. It is precisely because this fundamental concept is understood 
in different ways that different approaches to anarchism arise. This is arguably the reason 
of the current debate in the field of anarchist studies.  
The main aim of this section is consequently to employ the definition of anarchy developed 
in this study to argue for an understanding of anarchism as what arises from the need of the 
human being to be in anarchy or to escape the political. In particular, I argue here that 
anarchism should be seen as a revolutionary activism or praxis that arises not against the 
political but in parallel with it; as the, necessarily, collective struggle to re-establish the 
communion of othernesses, which is covered up by the political contextualization. 
To do so, I start by contesting the understanding of anarchism as a political ideology, 
which seems to be the most prominent one as well as the one that is central to the current 
debate.
322
 I argue, then, that it is false to define anarchism through the political, because 
this turns anarchy into a political association. And this is not only paradoxical, based on 
what has been argued in this study, but also is a way through which anarchy is being 
tamed, or by which the possibility of radical change is diminished. In other words, I claim 
that the anarchy of the political ideology of anarchism is not anarchy but an anarchic 
political association akin to the Aristotelian democracy. 
After I establish that it is problematic to define anarchy as an ideology, I examine the two 
contemporary positions that are arguably the ones contesting the ideological nature of 
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anarchism the most; namely post-left anarchism and Newman’s post-anarchism. In fact 
they mostly attack the communal nature of anarchism rather than the fact that anarchism is 
depicted as an ideology. Adopting this definition of anarchism is convenient as it enables 
them to exert their critique and propose their individualistic understandings of anarchy. 
In relation with that, I put forward the case against post-left anarchism because in its 
attempt it deifies the individual and ends up defining anarchy as an individualistic ontology 
or a first philosophy, based on the writings of the individualist philosopher Max Stirner. 
Moreover, I argue against Newman’s post-anarchism, which brings Stirner and Heidegger 
together, as again an individualistic ontology. To be more specific, I claim that his attempt 
to eliminate the communal nature of anarchism ends up with him arguing for a being that is 
irrelevant or that can achieve nothing. This is to say, this chapter rejects the ideological 
understanding of anarchy but defends its communal nature, by demonstrating the 
inconsistencies in post-left anarchism’s and Newman’s post-anarchist definitions of 
anarchy.    
6.1. Anarchism’s Anarchy and Aristotelian Democracy  
Throughout this study I have argued that anarchy refers to the way of being, as in a way of 
being that is beyond the political or that escapes the contextualization of beings and things 
under a founding principle. I have demonstrated why I consider the political to be a 
perversion of anarchy or the futile attempt of the political animal to replace it with an 
arché. With regards to that, I argue here that the contemporary understanding that depicts 
anarchy as the fundamental concept of the political ideology of anarchism is inconsistent. 
If the definition of anarchy I propose here is correct, anarchy is incompatible with the 
understanding of anarchism as a political ideology. I say that what is defined as anarchy, in 
the sense of a political end, is but an anarchic political association that is more akin to 
Aristotle’s description of democracy rather than anarchy. As much as this study sees the 
merits of a democratic political association in comparison with any other political regime, 
this does not make democracy anarchy.  
Now, the only way this can occur is if one adopts the Aristotelian political philosophy or if 
one argues that anarchy is the political association in which everyone is a political animal. 
If this is the case then one is certainly not talking about anarchy as what is without arché 
but for something else that can be defined as an anarchic political association but not 
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anarchy. As Levinas says, anarchy ‘has a meaning prior to the political (or antipolitical) 
currently attributed to it. It would be self-contradictory to set it up as a principle (in the 
sense that anarchists understand it). Anarchy cannot be sovereign like an arché.’323  
I argue, then, similarly with Levinas, against the idealization of anarchy or the positioning 
of anarchy as the core concept of a political ideology. It is also important to say that this is 
a claim which is shared by the proponents of ontological anarchy. Schürmann, for instance, 
says that ontological anarchy has nothing to do with the anarchy of Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon and Mikhail Bakunin, because their anarchy is a telos or a final end and 
ontological anarchy is about the absence of a ground.
324
 The importance of this, though, 
becomes clearer in the following section which discusses Newman’s post-anarchist 
anarchy.  
So, to start with, the Aristotelian understanding of democracy is that of a perverted form of 
political ruling. In fact democracy for Aristotle is a regime that arises as a perversion of 
what he defines as constitutional ruling in his and Plato’s political entropy, as this has been 
defined in chapter four. In particular, democracy is the result of excessive inclusion in 
ruling of people that are not of equal nature. It is a regime that, mainly due to the reforms 
of Cleisthenes, who is the father of democracy, opened participation to politics or ruling to 
numerous tribes of the Ancient Athens that were up to that point segregated.
325
  
Aristotle argues that with Cleisthenes’ reforms, a number of people that were slaves or 
strangers have been enrolled as citizens, which is something contrary to the traditional way 
of participating in ruling.
326
 For him the inclusion of people that are not political animals or 
that cannot participate by nature in ruling and being ruled can only damage the political 
life. This is because, as has been argued throughout this study, it goes against nature or 
against the natural end of the human being as the being that is meant by nature to rule over 
the cosmos. In relation to that, he refers to how democracy, as being anarchic and 
disorderly ruined the Ancient Greek poleis of Thebes and Megara.
327
   
What has this to do with anarchism’s view of anarchy? In order to answer that, anarchism 
has to be properly defined first. This will take place through modern and contemporary 
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works on anarchism. So, whether anarchism is or should be seen as an ideology remains an 
issue of debate in the fields of political theory and of anarchist studies. For example, 
Marshall identifies anarchism as a philosophy that is a part of a tradition that opposes 
domination.
328
 The anarchist academic Paul McLaughlin is more specific and argues that 
anarchism is a moral philosophy that questions the legitimacy of de facto authority.
329
 The 
historian David Miller sees anarchism as an anti-dogmatic school of thought.
330
 
Meanwhile, the anarchist academic Ruth Kinna argues that anarchism is a doctrine that 
aims at the liberation from oppression and exploitation.
331
  
However, the position that is arguably the more prominent one is that anarchism is a 
political ideology that has anarchy as its core concept. For the purposes of this study I will 
refer to this position, which considers anarchism to be a political ideology, as, simply, 
anarchism. To elaborate, according to the seminal work of the political theorist Michael 
Freeden on ideologies; the morphology of an ideology consists of the core, adjacent, and 
peripheral concepts. The core, he says, may be a cluster of concepts and not a single 
concept. In addition, he argues that a number of variants that emphasize different core-
component concepts, or eliminate a core concept and include an odd newcomer, may 
legitimately bear the same ideological tag.
332
  
It would be fair to say then, following Freeden’s useful approach to ideologies, that if 
anarchism is to be seen as an ideology then anarchy would be its core concept. In the end, 
it is from anarchy that anarchism is named after. Nevertheless, I will get back to that later. 
It would also be accurate to say that the political ideology of anarchism refers to what is 
known as communist anarchism. Now, it goes beyond the scope of this study to look into 
the different variants of anarchism and discuss their commonalities and differences.  
The communist/socialist origins of the anarchist ideology are clearly defined and 
emphasized by the anarchist historians Michael Schmidt and Lucien Van der Walt. 
Moreover, Schmidt and Van der Walt are arguably the two thinkers who put forward the 
case for anarchism to be seen as an ideology, in the way defined above, more strongly than 
others. To that end, they quote Bakunin’s early writings, in which he uses the term 
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revolutionary socialism to define anarchism.
333
 In the same way, they identify the anarchist 
ideology ‘as part of the libertarian wing of socialism,’ which originates in the 1860s and it 
was born in the working-class movement and the unions.
334
  
In short, they argue that anarchism is born mainly as a reaction to capitalistic exploitation 
or more accurately as a reaction to the domination of the hierarchical/authoritarian order of 
the emerging capitalist state. The anti-hierarchical and anti-authoritarian elements of 
anarchism are also apparent in the definition Proudhon, the first proclaimed anarchist, 
provides for anarchy. In particular, he says that anarchy, as in what anarchists aim at, is a 
government or administration in which there is ‘the absence of a master, of a sovereign.’335 
Based on what has been discussed in the previous paragraphs it would be fair to say that 
anarchy in the anarchist ideology is portrayed as a political association in which there is 
the absence of a hierarchical/authoritarian order. More accurately, it is the absence of an 
established ruling body from which political authority is diffused to the layers that make up 
the hierarchy. In relation with that, McLaughlin says that anarchism rejects the right of a 
person or body of persons charged with the administration of a polity to issue practical 
directives that the members of the polity have a duty to obey.
336
  
It would be plausible to say that anarchism’s anarchy is indeed akin to Aristotle’s 
democracy as it refers to a political association in which there is no political obligation to 
an established ruling body: a political association in which everybody qualifies to 
participate in ruling and being ruled. That would also be in line with Rancière’s 
observation that democracy is anarchy because it is the political association in which the 
absence of qualifications is what qualifies someone to participate in politics.
337
  
If this is the case and anarchism’s anarchy refers to democracy or to the absence of 
qualifications to participate in politics – such as the natural distinction that Aristotle argues 
for – then it seems reasonable to say that anarchism’s anarchy is an anarchic political 
association rather than anarchy, the way this study has defined it. This means that it is a 
political association that deviates from or appears as being against the fundamental 
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principle of ruling, which has been identified, in this study, with a naturally given ability or 
potentiality to rule.  
Indeed, anarchy as a political association is usually portrayed, similarly with Aristotle’s 
depiction of democracy, as a perverted regime or as a deviation from the political 
orthodoxy. For example, Kinna’s useful mapping of political ideologies, positions anarchy 
in the far left wing of the political spectrum.
338
 This is not to say that Kinna considers 
anarchy as a perversion of the political but the very definition of this spectrum as political 
means that the mapping of the ideological positions stems from their views about ruling. 
Thus, being in the far left firstly means that anarchism is a political ideology or a position. 
Subsequently, anarchy is its final end, if it is correct to say that every political regime has a 
final end.    
Now, the positioning of anarchism to the left end of the political spectrum is a way of 
showing that it deviates from what is the central point of ruling. If the central or main 
reason for ruling or of the political is to have those that are by nature more qualified to rule 
towards a common end, then anarchism is a position that could be described as the left to 
the right or what stands as far as possible from what is politically right. It is arguable that 
the politically right position is represented by those ideologies, which non-coincidentally, 
are positioned in the right wing of the political spectrum. In other words, they are those 
that are conceived of expressing the right, as in the correct or fundamental, understanding 
of politics. 
It would be fair to say that discrimination based on allegedly natural qualifications for 
ruling is what has proven to define the political in its early days and what characterizes the 
right wing ideologies. For example, non-inclusion or considering the members of a race, of 
an ethnic group or of a class as superior or better suited for ruling. This is to say, 
anarchism’s anarchy appears to be indeed a position that stands far away from the 
fundamental political thesis, or that it is akin to the Aristotelian democracy.  
However, this reaffirms the claim I put forward here that it is an anarchic political ideology 
that arises as an antithesis to this central or main political thesis. If this is the case, then 
clearly anarchism’s anarchy is not without a founding principle. This is because, even 
though anarchism’s anarchy opposes the rightness of the fundamental political thesis, it 
does not escape it. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that anarchy considered as a political 
end acquires its significance by the same definer that every other political end does. This 
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means that anarchism appears to be failing to identify the source of political domination. 
Instead of abolishing the very understanding of the human being as a political animal it 
argues for the abolition of the established principles of ruling. It demands equal 
opportunity for everyone to participate in politics on the grounds that there is no one by 
nature meant to rule.  
6.2. Anarchism is Anarchic but not in Anarchy 
If the above analysis is correct then the main political thesis of the anarchist ideology or 
anarchy refers to the enablement of everyone to participate in ruling and being ruled 
without discriminating. It stands for the abolition of the qualifications that make someone a 
political animal. Hence, it makes the case for all human beings to be seen as political 
animals. If this is right, then it would be fair to say that anarchism’s anarchy argues that 
human beings are essentially political beings that are by nature capable of participation in 
ruling and being ruled. As Heidegger argues that no one is a political animal or that the 
human being has no essence, anarchism argues that everyone is a political animal.   
This assumption has negative implications with regards to the anarchist definition of 
anarchy. To clarify, if the analysis of this study is correct, then understanding the human 
being as a political animal is the founding principle of the political or the polis and the 
beginning of domination. This is because, as argued previously, it is through the polis that 
the true human being separates itself from the world it comes to be with or it realizes its 
freedom to be as being over the world. The problem then is that by maintaining the 
political or the polis, as the site of the human being, the anarchist ideology maintains, even 
in an indirect way, the Aristotelian ontology. 
In particular, it would be logical to say that by emphasizing the empowerment of the 
masses that are segregated and refused participation in ruling, it negates the human being 
to a being that is defined by politics and hence ruling. It sustains and reproduces the 
fundamental principle of domination, which wants the human being, as the political 
animal, to be the only being that has a reason to be. It could be argued that this is what 
Proudhon refers to when he says that anarchy is a political association in which ‘the 
sovereignty of the will yields to the sovereignty of reason.’339    
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On the other hand, it could be argued that this means that in anarchy, as a political 
association, reason would prevail over the unreasonable will of some to dominate over 
others. Indeed, this is a fair point and this study has also argued against the neediness of 
the political animal and its irrationality. However, as has been argued previously, the 
irrationality and the neediness that define the political animal are the results of the false 
assumption about the sovereignty of reason. They are the results of the separation of reason 
from the world, as something superior or otherworldly. It is because of the false perception 
that the being that possesses reason is by nature meant to rule over other beings that the 
political comes to be and political domination becomes possible. 
So, how can one argue for something to be sovereign or to be by definition above 
everything else and at the same time argue against hierarchy? How is it possible to hold on 
to the context that requires slaves to operate without bringing forth some kind of 
hierarchy? Based on what is argued in this study this is impossible because if something is 
sovereign or an arché then everything else is taxonomized in accordance with it. I claim, 
then, that anarchism’s anarchy turns inevitably into a hierarchy because by maintaining the 
political it classifies the human being as a political animal. This means that the political 
association it envisages is one in which everyone should be political or concerned about 
politics.  
If I am correct and anarchism requires everyone to be political, then, how is this different 
from Pericles’ statement that whoever does not take an interest in politics should not be a 
citizen of the Ancient Athens?
340
 The fundamental difference here, between the democratic 
Athens and anarchism’s anarchy, is slavery, with anarchism ascribing to everyone the 
ability to be a political animal. Is not though this very definition and the obligations that 
come with it, such as the assumed interest in and potential for participation in politics, 
defining the human being completely? Would it be unfair to say that the arché of the 
political is the arché of anarchism?      
If this is the case, and it certainly seems that it is, then what has been claimed previously 
appears to be correct and the anarchy that the anarchist ideology argues for is not anarchy. 
Anarchy, as has been defined in this study, refers to the absence of such a definer. Instead, 
it seems indeed to be referring to an anarchic political association in which everyone has a 
political obligation to the polis itself and from this obligation the political authority of 
everyone stems. Whoever is not and whoever does not consider oneself a political animal – 
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anyone that possibly does not recognize the obligation to the polis – is unavoidably 
excluded from this anarchic association.  
However, it would be fair to say that an anarchic association would not look to impose 
upon anyone a specific way of being. But is not an association in ruling and being ruled 
unavoidably presupposes and reproduces political animals, or is it not being part of the 
political, a way, even indirectly, of participating in ruling and being ruled? I think it would 
be accurate to say that in an association such as this, one is prior to their birth considered a 
potential political animal and one after its birth is expected to be a political animal. It 
seems then accurate to also say that the anarchic political association, which anarchism 
defines as anarchy, has in fact a founding principle.  
This is problematic not only because anarchism’s anarchy is not without a founding 
principle. It is mainly because it is paradoxical to argue for anarchy or against domination 
and at the same time argue for the preservation of the context through which domination 
comes to be. It must be clarified that if this study had to necessarily associate itself to a 
political ideology that would be anarchism precisely because of its inclusivity. However, 
this does not eliminate the issue that comes with being political. This means that it remains 
unclear or difficult to see from what hierarchy and domination arises, how another 
hierarchy would not arise under anarchism.  
It seems plausible to say that the result of this would be analogous to what is arguably 
taking place currently in the Western world, where the black people of America strive to be 
more like the white, and women demand to be more like men. I am not saying that the 
current feminist movements and those against racial discrimination strive for something 
like this. What I am saying is that this unfortunately appears to be the result precisely 
because their strife does not escape being expressed through the political. In other words, if 
anarchism is to be seen as a political ideology and thus maintain the political, it would be 
similar to those blacks looking to liberate themselves by demanding their share in the 
America that was built upon their labour, or analogous to those women that seek their 
emancipation through adopting the lifestyle of the men, or through becoming active parts 
of the institutions that orchestrated their subjection.         
Arguing for everybody to become a political animal is like arguing for everybody to have 
their share of authority or to have a place within the system that has been excluding them 
since its very beginning. With regards to that, it could be claimed that through maintaining 
or positioning itself in the political spectrum anarchism diminishes itself to merely an 
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alternative way of being political or a subculture. The most common examples of that 
would be its association with punk rock music and fashion or even the commercialization 
of the symbol of anarchy.
341
  
This is not to say that it is illogical for black people to ask for a fair share in today’s 
America or that it does not make sense for women to demand financial independence and 
equal work and educational opportunities with men. Neither that it is implausible to see 
this as a fair development for those that have contributed but never had a say in building 
the Western world. This rather aims to show that anarchism understood as a political 
ideology is, similarly with the black person and the woman, drawing its identity from the 
very thing that made their domination and exclusion possible. If it is fair to say that for a 
banker or a capitalist the inclusion of women in the working force is a positive outcome, 
then the same could hold true with the reduction of anarchy to an alternative political 
stance. 
The negation of anarchy to a political association reaffirms the dominance of the political 
as the way of the human beings and thus makes the possibility of radical change less likely. 
Or it does not eradicate the possibility of hierarchy altogether. For example, even Plato, as 
the main proponent of political ruling based on qualifications, recognizes that through 
providing a political voice to the excluded one maintains peace in the sense of maintaining 
the established order.
342
 Once anarchy through anarchism becomes a part of the political it 
becomes tamed or a part of a totality and no longer a direct threat to it. Meanwhile, it 
appears that the rise of SYRIZA or the coalition of the radical left, as the ruling party in 
Greece since 2012 is a most certain proof of the absorption of anarchy and anarchism by 
the political.
343
  
Anarchy, the way it has been defined in this study, is other than the political or it is a 
coming together in need and not in ruling and being ruled. As Levinas says, it is a 
collectivity in which the individuals that comprise it are not of the common concept.
344
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Thus, they are not defined by the collectivity neither do they define the collectivity. 
Anarchy is not a coming together of anarchists or of political animals for that matter. It is a 
communion of othernesses that has nothing to do with the political but it is an entirely 
different way of being. 
That is why Plato, unlike Aristotle, does not equate it with democracy. It is not, for him, a 
part of the cycle identified as political entropy. Instead, it is something other and, in his 
attempt to downgrade it in order to favour his political philosophy, he defines it as a 
condition in which lesser beings become the rulers. Plato, though, describes anarchy in 
political terms i.e. with regards to authority or ruling. He considers political ruling 
necessary and thus anarchy is a deviation from this or the result of excessive democracy 
but not democracy itself.  
In particular, the main characteristics of Plato’s view on anarchy are that fathers swap 
places with sons; sons do not stand in awe in front of parents; citizens are the same with 
metics
345
 and visitors from abroad; teachers swap places with pupils; the younger take 
control and challenge instead of paying respect to the elder; the elder adjust their behaviour 
in accordance with that of the younger; slaves have as much freedom as their owners; men 
and women are equal; and even the non-human animals strut about with absolute 
freedom.
346
 This depiction of anarchy is surprisingly, for a definition that is clearly trying 
to degrade anarchy, not entirely wrong. This is because anarchy, as a way of being, is 
indeed referring to a communion with no rulers and no founding principles. As Plato says 
‘everyone is at the same level.’347 
However, the evenness of being in anarchy is not something that is measured in terms of 
ruling. It rather refers to the metaphysical evenness or the absence of an absolute way of 
being or an all-encompassing definer; as Levinas puts it, a relationship of individuals or 
singular beings in the absence of a reference point is one that is without the mediation of 
any principle, any ideality.’348 In anarchy, the sheep is not the animal that can be utilized in 
such and such way; the child is not the not-yet-being of an archetype of what it means to 
be; and the woman is not a lesser being to the man in terms of her ability to rule.  
Most importantly though, the human being is not the political animal, the being whose 
fundamental way of being is to form associations based on ruling and being ruled.  Hence, 
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to restate, my objection is not about the form of the anarchist association. It rather has to 
do with its political nature, or it has to do with the fact that anarchy is portrayed as a 
coming together of people that is political in nature. This is because as I have shown in this 
study the political refers to a very specific relationship or coming together that requires 
rulers and subjects.  
Now, if one were to employ the term to refer to something other than this relationship it 
would be a distortion of the concept. It would be something that is not political. To clarify, 
if one were to say that the anarchist ideology does not refer to a relationship of rulers and 
subjects it would mean that it is not a political ideology and thus describing it that why 
would be wrong. If on the other hand one would say that it is then it refers to something 
other than anarchy or to an anarchic political association, which is akin to the Aristotelian 
democracy. Based on the foregoing, this appears to be the case for anarchism’s anarchy.  
It would be accurate to say that anarchism’s anarchy is radical, in the sense of being a 
political position that defies political orthodoxy but not radical enough to be called 
anarchy. To restate, there is no doubt that equal participation of everyone in politics, in the 
way the anarchists argue for, is a much fairer way of being with other human beings. I am 
not arguing against what the anarchist envisage as a fairer political association; if being 
with others has to be political then it should be a democracy or an anarchic association in 
which everyone is able to participate equally in ruling and being ruled. But since the 
political is maintained then the radicalism of anarchism is not uprooting the grounding of 
the human being to the political.   
6.3. Post-Leftist/Stirnerian Anarchy: Non-Ideology as a First 
Philosophy 
The analysis that took place in the previous section demonstrated that anarchism, 
understood as an ideology, is either employing the concept of anarchy in a false way or it is 
wrong to be seen as an ideology in the first place. This is important, as anarchism’s 
ideological nature, expressed in the fact that it idealizes anarchy is a prominent feature of 
the contemporary critique of anarchism. This is the main point of the criticism post-left 
anarchism exerts upon what is called traditional anarchism, which more or less refers to the 
position discussed above.    
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In particular, it is the main argument of the criticism that the anarchist tendency known as 
post-left anarchism exerts upon anarchism. For instance, the post-left anarchist Jason 
McQuinn, in his summary of what post-left anarchism stands for, says that anarchy or post-
left anarchy refers to a non-ideological type of autonomy.
349
 Post-left anarchism is a 
tendency that arguably appears in the work of the self-determined anarchist Bob Black.
350
 
The main aim of Black’s theory is to unhook anarchy and anarchism from the ideological 
approach of what is defined as the left in the political spectrum.  
This is not only because of a particular unsympathetic view towards leftish political claims 
and achievements, but mainly because of a negative perception of every ideological 
approach. As McQuinn says, an ideology is, essentially, the means through which 
domination is possible because through it people lose touch with their true relation with 
themselves. This is because, as he claims, ideologies, founded upon incomplete concepts 
and images, provide the individual with a false basis of interpreting the world.
351
 It is the 
collectivization of the individual under a specific ideological label that post-left anarchism 
emphasizes with its critique.   
To put it differently, post-left anarchist critique focuses on the fact that anarchism shares 
with the political left the same ideological basis, the fact that anarchism is a leftist 
ideology. As a result it is mainly concerned with defining anarchy with post-leftism or with 
non-ideology. The absence of ideology in this case happens to coincide with the political 
ideology of the left as this is what anarchism has traditionally been identified with. This is 
to say, post-left anarchism is in fact post-ideology anarchism and not simply post-left.  
Up to this point, the post-leftist anarchist critique seems to be in line with what this study 
argues for. Indeed, for this study anarchy escapes the political spectrum. It is non-political 
and the portrayal of it as a political concept is the result of it being conceived as a political 
ideal or a political end. However, even if post-left anarchism rightly identifies the 
idealization of anarchy as a false way of approaching anarchy, it appears to be committing 
the same fallacy as Heidegger. In other words, even it can indeed be seen as an attempt to 
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detach anarchy from the Aristotelian ontology, it appears that it proposes another ontology 
or anarchy as a first philosophy.  
I argue that the non-ideological autonomy it argues for is, in essence, a call for the 
protection of the individual from any type of collectivization. Post-left anarchism turns 
anarchy into an ontology in its own right, in which the individual, as in the non-
ideologically autonomous being, is the starting point. This is probably because it draws 
upon individualist philosopher Max Stirner whose thought shares many similarities with 
that of Heidegger.
352
 As a result, the usefulness of the concept of panarchy employed to 
describe Heidegger’s ontological project does not stop there. Panarchy appears to be what 
describes post-left anarchism’s understanding of anarchy best.    
Based on the respective analysis of chapter two, I have demonstrated that what Heidegger 
ends up arguing, through his ontological anarchy, is in fact that anarchy is a first 
philosophy. It is a first philosophy or an arché that is antithetical to that of Aristotle’s; an 
anarchic ontology. It would be fair to say then that post-left anarchism is arguing for the 
same thing simply by taking a different route. To clarify further, Heidegger’s ontological 
project argues for an individualism that wants every being to possess and be possessed by 
its own starting point. In a similar manner, post-left anarchism argues for the individual to 
be the fundamental constituent of anarchy.  
Post-left anarchism fails to provide an adequate definition of anarchy because it disregards 
the fact that being with ideology does not mean necessarily being without a first 
philosophy. It fails to show that what it argues for is indeed an alternative first philosophy 
rather than anarchy. I have argued in the previous sections that anarchism as a political 
ideology does not escape the Aristotelian ontology that wants the human being to be 
essentially a political animal. It could be said, reflecting upon this, that the ideological 
nature of anarchism arises from its ontological foundations.    
It is not only because of its specific ontological foundations but of the fact that it has an 
ontological basis and that it rests upon a first philosophy. I am not saying that anarchism as 
an ideology has a peculiar morphology; one that requires an ontological basis. What I am 
saying instead is that in line with Freeden’s analysis of ideologies, every ideology requires 
a first philosophy upon which it acts. 
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As Freeden says, it is precisely the relationship between thought and action that 
differentiates a philosophy from an ideology.
353
 It would be fair to say that an ideology is 
the praxis of acting upon a first philosophy or upon the concepts that form the basis 
through which one makes sense of the cosmos. Here the term action includes the act of 
interpreting. Again, as Freeden says, interpretation requires thinking and thinking can be 
seen as a form of action or what promotes certain actions.
354
 Ideological thinking can be 
defined as making sense of the world through the interpretation or through the association 
of a cluster of concepts in a specific way.  
Based on the foregoing, it would be accurate to say that what gives rise to different 
political ideologies is the interpretation and association of the same fundamental concepts. 
For example, the interpretation of what it means to be a political animal is what defines 
them; since the concept that human being is a political animal and thus it has to be in a 
political way is necessarily shared between them. So, to complement the above definition, 
an ideology is the praxis of turning a philosophical notion, such as the political animal, into 
the starting point of action or into an ideal that is to be attained or realized. This occurs, 
firstly, through the interpretation and association of the concepts, which enables a 
specific/specified way of making sense of the cosmos, and secondly by physically acting 
on it; by acting according to it and towards it.   
This must be correct, since it appears that in praxis or in reality this is how different 
political positions arise out of which a variety of political actions follow. Consequently, it 
would be accurate to say that being non-ideological does not at the same time mean to be 
without a first philosophy. As a matter of fact, in the case of post-left anarchism, non-
ideological autonomy of the individual seems to be what defines anarchy as a first 
philosophy.   
In particular, as stated above, post-left anarchism draws upon its own reading of Stirner. 
Based on this reading, it argues that anarchism, as a part of the political left, downplays the 
role of the individual.
355
 Anarchy and anarchism for the post-left anarchist is something 
that starts with the individual. It is the constant theorizing and criticizing of the collective 
ideals and understandings through which the individual is liberated and sets itself free to be 
with itself. Anarchy, for post-left anarchists, appears to be the praxis of individualization; it 
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is that through which the individual finds itself truly with itself. It is through the endless 
critique and reflection upon the ideals that attempt or set one in motion that the individual 
finds itself and is with itself. 
If this is the case then how does this conception escape arguing that the individual is the 
starting point or the arché? It would be fair to say, based on this study’s critique of the 
Heideggerian philosophy, that it actually does not escape this drawback. As a matter of 
fact, it appears that this is precisely what it says; every individual is the definer of its own 
individuality. This means that post-left anarchism argues that the human being is 
essentially a being that is self-sufficient or that it is the sole signifier of itself. If this is the 
case, then, indeed post-left anarchy is referring to anarchy as an individualistic first 
philosophy rather than what is without arché. 
Stirner’s philosophical position, as the theoretical basis of post-left anarchism, is that the 
individual is able to construct his/her own private world without any external or 
overarching definers. More accurately, the individual is the sole origin of the way it makes 
sense of the cosmos. In other words, Stirner is making the case for an individual that is 
able to stand above thinking, even its own thinking, and prevent it from becoming a definer 
of the individual. As he says: 
“Absolute thinking” is that which forgets that it is my thinking, that I think, and that 
it exists only through me. But I, as I, swallow it up again what is mine, am its 
master; its only my opinion which I can at any moment change, annihilate, take 
back into myself, and consume.
356
 
So, Stirner argues for anarchy that is rooted in and with the individual. It would be accurate 
to say that his concept of anarchy refers to individualization itself or the constant process 
of maintaining or not losing mastery over oneself to something or someone. This becomes 
clearer with the introduction of his concept of ownness as true freedom or the only actual 
freedom. He says that ownness is actual freedom in the sense that one retains ownership 
over one’s own being and existence.357 To clarify, Stirner argues for a type of autonomy 
that refers to non-alienation in terms of one’s relationship with oneself. This is a 
conception of freedom or a way to be that requires from one to not lose touch with oneself. 
It is to be able to after all, get back to oneself; to gather all the pieces that one owns. 
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This is similar to the Heideggerian oneness, which, as discussed previously, points towards 
panarchy rather than anarchy. This is because, much like Stirner’s ownness, Heidegger’s 
oneness refers to the being, possessing its own origin. This is not problematic only because 
it has proven that it turns anarchy into a starting point, but also because it disregards the 
fact that the individual is a being with the world or already a part of a communion of 
othernesses. In other words, Stirner’s ownness is overlooking the fact that anarchy as the 
way of being is by definition a way of being with others.  
Stirner appears to be making the case for anarchy as the way of being, but he defines 
anarchy in terms of ownership or mastery and control. For example, he claims that nobody 
can have true ownership over someone else’s body, not even in the case of slavery, or he 
says ‘my leg is not “free” from the master’s stick, but it is my leg and it is inseparable.’358 
But Stirner by saying that the master, in a master-slave relationship, does not have true 
ownership of what is a part of the slave’s body, is basically arguing for the repositioning of 
ownership from the master back to the slave. Anarchy, then, seems to be reduced to a 
concept that refers to property or ownership rights over one’s body or existence.  
If this is right, then anarchy in Stirner is a question of ruling rather than its absence. He 
fails to see that what he argues for, with what he argues against, are the same thing from a 
different point of view. This is because the master and the slave of the above example 
appear to be struggling for the same thing, which is ownership over the slave’s body. This 
understanding fails to recognize the fact that one’s body is not something for one to own or 
that one’s existence is indivisible from the world it comes to be with. Therefore, in the 
same way the master never attains true ownership over the slave’s leg, which as 
inseparable from the slave’s body is always a part of it, the slave never is the sole master of 
its body because this is indivisible from the world it comes to be with.  
Now to explain this further, since it also plays a fundamental role in what Newman’s post-
anarchism argues for. As argued in this study, mastery over something or ruling over is 
something that defines arché rather than anarchy. Meanwhile, being a ruler has been 
identified ultimately as the cause or the origin of motion towards a specific/specified end. 
In the above example, then, Stirner argues that there is anarchy as long as the slave remains 
the final cause of motion. To clarify, anarchy is possible as long as it is the slave’s will that 
in a conscious way moves its legs independently of the fact that the master is forcing them. 
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This is as long as the slave has not given in to the master’s will completely and retains the 
ownership or the control over its body.  
It appears that according to Stirner if is possible to talk of anarchy in a case in which the 
slave is for his own reasons contributing towards the attainment of the master’s end. This is 
because in this case it may appear as if the master is the cause of motion but in fact it is the 
slave. It is the refusal to become the subject of the master’s will or to allow one’s own 
body to become an instrument towards the attainment of the master’s end that defines 
anarchy in Stirner. More accurately, it is the fact that the slave retains mastery or 
ownership over his/her body by imposing its will as the final cause of motion over that of 
the master. This is precisely what the above quotation about one’s thinking standing over 
and above external impositions refers to.  
If owning something or ruling over it refers to being the ultimate cause of its motion 
towards an end, then he fails to see that no such ownership is possible for the human being. 
The whole argument about the individual being the sole master of itself is based on a false 
presupposition, which in its turn justifies the idea of individualization as anarchy. This 
means that Stirner does not take into account the fact that in the same way the master never 
attains complete ownership over the slave’s body, the slave is never the owner of its body. 
He fails to see that anarchy as the way of being is something that refers to the fact that 
being cannot be defined in terms of ownership or mastery. 
According with the argumentation of chapter three, being, as in what exists or comes to be, 
is an idiosyncrasy or the unique whole of the synergies that comprise it and thus without 
arché. Furthermore, as has been argued, the synergies that make one’s being are defined by 
boundlessness or they refer to the limitless interplay of one’s being with the world. This 
has been defined in this study as the coming together of othernesses. Meanwhile, need has 
been defined as the link or the way this constant interplay or communication makes itself 
present. So, the nutritional needs are manifestations of the constant interplay of one’s 
idiosyncrasy; there are living beings whose idiosyncrasy in terms of nutritional needs 
identifies them as carnivorous, others as herbivorous and so on. 
This is what he does not seem to take into account, when he says that if the master cuts off 
the slave’s leg the master does not have the slave’s leg anymore but he holds a dead thing, 
because the slave’s leg is inseparable from the slave’s body.359 Is it not the same to say that 
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if one cuts off the human being from the world that it comes to be with, that one holds a 
dead thing? Based on the analysis of the previous chapters regarding the death of being, 
this appears to be the case. Because in order for his account of the human being as the sole 
owner of its own body to be in effect, a complete separation of the human being from the 
world has to take place.  
This however, seems impossible and implausible since no matter how hard I may beat my 
body, similarly to the beating of the master, to attain my ends, the final cause of motion is 
with the world as much as it is with me. To put it blatantly, if instead of the leg I refer to 
any of my internal organs, is it possible to talk about them in terms of ownership or refer to 
me being the source of their motion? If I do so, then this “me” would not refer to my will 
or my thinking but to all these that comprise me as a being. This is to say, I am not the 
owner of my body. But my body is me or my body is indivisible from what makes me a 
being, in a way that is impossible to talk about it in terms of ownership and ruling. 
It appears that what Stirner argues for is implausible, because as long as the leg is the part 
of the slave the master has no true ownership over it, while when the master cuts it off and 
appears to make it his own, the leg is no longer a leg but a dead thing. In the same way, the 
being does not have ownership over itself. It is not plausible to talk about ownership, 
because the source of motion lies with itself as a being with the world or because it is 
indivisible and indistinguishable from the world. True ownership would mean the total 
separation of the being from the world, but, much like Stirner’s example, a total separation 
from the world it comes to be with would render the being a dead thing; since it is 
indivisible from it.  
Therefore, to put it simply, one should think of the being’s relationship with the world as 
being similar to that of the leg with the human being. The leg does not acquire its 
significance from the human being; the being is not the origin of its motion but its motion 
is indivisible and indistinguishable from the motion of the being. Similarly, the motion of 
the being belongs to itself because it is indivisible from the world or a part of the 
communion of othernesses.  
It would be logical to say that Stirner’s argument for anarchy is simply an argument for the 
shifting or transference of ownership or ruling over, defined in terms of the origin of 
motion. It is a proof that he argues for a first philosophy that has the individual as the 
starting point of everything or for, what has been defined in this study as panarchy rather 
than anarchy. Meanwhile, in light of the above analysis, post-left anarchism appears to be a 
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project that aims mainly to criticize the communal or collective character of anarchism as 
an ideology rather than to propose a more accurate understanding anarchy. This is 
fundamental, as the communal nature of anarchism is also the main criticism made by 
Newman’s post-anarchist anarchy, as the following section discusses.360   
6.4. Newman’s Post-Anarchism or the Individual against the 
Communal 
Up to this point I have argued that the anarchist understanding of anarchy as a political 
end, as well as the Stirnerian post-left anarchist view, fail to comply with the definition of 
anarchy developed in this study. In the first case this is mainly due to the ideological nature 
of anarchism, which paradoxically renders anarchy an ideal that is to be attained through 
the political or through political means. Meanwhile in the second case it is because of the 
fact that Stirner and post-left anarchists argue for a first philosophy rather than anarchy or 
for the individual to be the starting point of everything. As stated in the opening paragraph 
of this chapter they both fail to identify anarchy with what escapes or what is other than the 
arché or the established principle.  
The focus of the analysis of this chapter has been anarchism’s ideological approach to 
anarchy. It is this that post-left anarchists criticize through the employment of their reading 
of Stirner, while it is also this that Newman with his post-anarchism, as probably the main 
contemporary critique of anarchism, focuses on. In fact it is in Newman that the thought of 
Heidegger and Stirner come together or that their similarities are expressed as a single 
philosophical position. Nevertheless, as stated earlier, this chapter is ultimately set to 
defend anarchism, thus this section is concerned mostly with establishing the need of 
maintaining the communal nature of anarchism. 
Consequently, in this section I challenge Newman’s ultimate proposal, to move past 
anarchism and towards a post-anarchist approach to anarchy. This is, on the one hand, 
because his conception of anarchy is based on, as well as produces, a plethora of 
contradictions. Meanwhile, on the other hand, much like the post-left anarchist view, it is 
because he falsely attacks the communal nature of anarchism. He fails to recognize that 
anarchy is not about the liberation of the individual; it is not a private issue, but rather a 
communal one or an issue of reclaiming communication with the other or with the world.   
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To start with, it has to be made clear that Newman, similarly to post-left anarchists, attacks 
firstly the ideological nature of anarchism. He brings together the thought of Stirner and 
Heidegger as well as the understanding of the post-structuralist philosopher Michel 
Foucault on power, to define anarchism as a ‘philosophy of power.’361 This 
characterization of anarchism is essentially referring to the fact that anarchism as an 
ideology is unavoidably acting towards the imposition of its ideals or exerting power over 
others. Foucault understands power as a set of actions that defines the actions or the field 
of actions of others and exists only as exercised by some on others, only when it is put into 
action.
362
 This means, in Newman’s view, that the anarchist action, proposed by traditional 
anarchists, towards attaining the anarchic political association is necessarily entailing the 
exercise of power.  
Newman says that the political struggle of the anarchist is a power struggle, or it is the 
anarchist effort to attain its own political ideal in spite of or over others. He claims that 
anarchism attempts a kind of grouping or collectivization of individuals through the 
imposition of the anarchist ideal in a way similar to the other political ideologies. To put in 
terms employed in this study, the anarchist imposes its private understanding of the cosmos 
upon the common. Even if one were to argue that anarchism is mainly trying to liberate 
rather than impose, he says that there is no subject for emancipation.
363
  
To that end, he proposes an understanding of anarchy that goes beyond that of the political 
end that anarchism argues for. Instead, based on Heidegger’s thought and Schürmann’s 
interpretation of anarchy as a principle, he argues for anarchy as a starting point.
364
 In 
particular, he argues for anarchy to be a process that one starts with, in the form of a 
Stirnerian egoist or individual insurrection that is realized in spite of and against the power 
exerted upon the individual. As he says, ‘power exists but it is not my concern; I refuse to 
let it constrain me or have any effect on me; I refuse power’s power over me.’365  
Drawing upon Stirner’s notion of ownness as a process of liberation through 
individualization he argues for anarchy to be understood as a way of restoring the 
individual’s ontological freedom instead of setting freedom as a goal for humanity.366 By 
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putting it like this, his anarchy is indeed presented as a private matter that is not to be 
imposed upon others. However, I argue that his conception of anarchy is out of reach or at 
best a product of chance. This is mainly because it is based upon, what has been proven to 
be in this study, the fallacious presupposition of the being’s autonomy or wholeness as this 
is expressed with Heidegger’s oneness and Stirner’s ownness.     
To clarify, Newman, much like the philosophers he draws upon, fails to see the reciprocal 
relationship between the individual and the communal or the fact that the power his being 
is not to be concerned with as well as the being itself do not exist without each other. I 
have argued in this study, based on the Democritean philosophy, that being is as much as 
non-being; that the private is a manifestation of the common and vice versa. If my analysis 
and argumentation are right, then the individual is a unique manifestation of the common 
and the common is the result of the synergies among private manifestations.  
Furthermore, the political has been identified as the context that disturbs or attempts to 
replace this relationship through establishing a starting point that defines the being 
completely. I have pointed out that the political establishes itself not by disturbing the 
wholeness of being, but by replacing anarchy or by establishing a ground that replaces 
non-being and defines being completely. The political stands in the way or divides and 
distinguishes the individual from the common or the world it comes to be with. It alienates 
the being from the other by preventing or eliminating the otherness of itself. Consequently, 
instead of the individual being a spontaneous manifestation of the common, which has no 
definer, it is a manifestation of the political. 
Now, to say as Newman does, that this power, which is essentially producing individuals, 
does not exist, creates a sequence of contradictions which eventually exhibit the 
implausibility of arguing against the communal character of anarchy. This is to say, in the 
following paragraphs I demonstrate that it is one thing to argue that anarchism should not 
be ideological and a totally different thing to argue against the communal character of 
anarchism. I prove that under the current prevalence of the political, being in anarchy 
needs anarchism. This is not to say I argue all of a sudden that anarchy requires the 
ideology of anarchism, but this becomes clearer in the following paragraphs.   
So, to start with the contradictions of post-anarchism, which demonstrate the impossibility 
of discussing anarchy without the communal, I claim that with the elimination of the 
communal or the collective the very concept of the individual withers away. Based on the 
analysis of the previous chapters, it is through the political as the ground or the founding 
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principle that replaces anarchy that the individual in the form of wholeness emerges in the 
first place. The understanding of the human being as something that possesses its own 
reason to be and thus is an autonomous being arises through and in the political, which 
provides the being with a fundamental reason to be.   
If this is correct and if individualization becomes possible through the existence of a 
ground that distinguishes the individual and provides to it the necessary significance to be 
an autonomous being then in the absence of it there is no individual being. This means one 
of two things; either that the individual is indivisible or indistinguishable from the 
communal, which is what this study argues for, or that there is nothing or no being, which 
is what post-anarchism ends up with. However, if the post-anarchist understanding that 
there is no being is to be accepted, then change as a possibility disappears with it; nothing 
or nothingness is good for nothing.  
As already mentioned Newman argues that anarchy is a process that describes the 
individual’s strife to reclaim or regain the freedom it already has.367 Here, he refers to the 
ontological freedom the being has from the moment it comes to be, which refers to the 
autonomy or self-sufficiency of the individual in terms of significance. In other words, the 
individual in his view is self-luminous; something that produces its own significance out of 
nothing other than itself.
368
  
As I have demonstrated in the previous chapters, this idea of freedom or of self-sufficiency 
is but an illusion since the being from the moment it appears is a synergy or a being with 
the world. Its individuality does not refer to its freedom or to the fact that it exists in spite 
of the world, in spite of power as he says. Instead it refers to the fact that it is a unique 
manifestation of the world. It is the fact that is being constituted and that it constitutes the 
world or the common from which it is indivisible. Thus, if one is to take away the political 
as the ground that imposes significance upon the being and the world or the communal 
with which the being comes to be, what is that out of which the individual emerges in 
Newman?    
It would be fair to say that Newman’s being never emerges or it would be even more 
accurate to say that it is nothing. In fact this is not only this study’s interpretation, it is what 
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he paradoxically admits himself when he refers to it as nothingness.
369
 In an attempt to stay 
faithful to Heidegger’s anarchy, he defines his being as something that is without telos or 
something that is never final, but is an endless becoming or a ‘series of becomings.’370 
There are two questions that arise from this understanding. The first one is: what is it that 
this nothingness endlessly becomes? While the second one and probably the most 
important one is: what is this understanding of being, as not a being, good for? 
To start with the first one, it looks like this individual being, which is paradoxically not a 
being but nothingness, is the personification of Newman’s Stirnerian/Heideggerian 
conception of anarchy. It is the personification of a being that appears in the world through 
the process of being in spite of the world, which is essentially a way of being against the 
world. Newman argues that his being reclaims or retains the freedom it already has through 
what he defines as ‘discipline of indiscipline.’371 This is essentially referring to his being’s 
Stirnerian renouncement of the collective or communal way of being and the power it 
exerts. Meanwhile, it is also in line with what Schürmann identifies as the will to not will 
or the voluntary renouncement of willing. Captured in Heidegger through the phrase ‘I will 
non-willing.’372    
To answer the first question, Newman’s individual is what comes to be through a constant 
process of escaping power or through alienation and isolation from the world. 
Subsequently, he is right in describing it as nothingness. If being, as defined in chapter 
three, is what constitutes and is being constituted in an active fashion, then his individual is 
something that is indeed not a being. It is not a being because it is irrelevant or it has no 
constituting effect on anything. It is something that appears only as an antithesis or against 
power and the world; indifference to power is what defines it and at the same time renders 
it irrelevant.  
This firstly means that the medium through which it is supposed to retain or reclaim its 
freedom becomes its definer. Similarly with the Heideggerian being, as discussed in 
chapter five, it is its refusal to be an active constituent of the world that defines it, or it is 
its refusal to have a final end or a reason to be. A becoming, based on the discussion of 
chapters three, is something that presupposes an end. Arguing for an endless becoming is 
like arguing for an eternal refusal to be defined by something specific or specified. For 
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example, it is like on the one hand, accepting the anarchist critique and rejection of the 
state and its practices but refusing to be an anarchist or defined as such.  
It is one thing to say that I refuse to be defined by the political as well as by the anarchist 
ideological viewpoints, and a completely different thing to say that even though I share 
anarchism’s political struggle I refuse to embrace it by participating actively. This is the 
reason his being ends up being irrelevant or nothingness. To put it differently, the answer 
to the second question is now clear; Newman’s individual alongside the concept of anarchy 
he argues for are good for nothing.  
This is because he chooses refusal and absence over active participation within a context, 
such as the political, where inactivity, again in line with the criticism of Heidegger’s 
thought in chapter five, reinforces the established order rather than enables change. In the 
contemporary world where the political has arguably taken over everything through the 
exertion of strategically centralized and organized domination it is fair to say that private 
or non-organized praxis is akin to inactivity. At the same time, it would be accurate to say 
that inactivity within a context that is founded upon domination can have minimum or no 
impact at all.   
Is Newman actually arguing for inactivity? To be fair, he argues for moving past 
ideological anarchism towards an agonistic anarchism that is defined by the insurrection of 
the individual rather than by organized collective action.
373
 But is it not his call to become 
invisible and refuse who we are, ultimately a call for becoming irrelevant or disappear?
374
 
It would be fair to say, based on the above analysis that this is in fact what he ends up with 
by eliminating the communal, even if it is to be accepted that this may not be his aim.  
This is also apparent in the example of the Ancient Greek cynic philosopher Diogenes he 
uses to demonstrate the way of being he argues for.
375
 Diogenes the Cynic is indeed a good 
example because he refuses to participate in the life of the polis for the most part and his 
way of being is indeed unconventional. He may be indeed disrupting or more accurately 
disturbing, with his presence, the established and normalized flow of life in the polis but he 
does nothing more than this. No matter how interesting his approach to life and acting 
upon his philosophy are, history does not refer to Diogenes as the initiator of change. He is 
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rather an intriguing figure that attracts the interest or the attention in the same way the 
juggler is drawing momentarily the attention of the driver that stops at the traffic lights. 
It would not be farfetched to say that Newman’s post-anarchism is more like a type of 
asceticism rather than agonistic anarchism; it refers to the liberation that the eremite 
achieves through withdrawing from the world and anything that comes with it. Anarchy is 
not something that is possible through moving past anarchism to a post-anarchist era. It 
rather shows in an indirect way the need of anarchism and in particular its communal 
nature. This is what the following section expands upon and supports.  
6.5. Anarchism as a Need or Anarchy Needs Anarchism   
So, based on the foregoing, I argue here that being in anarchy needs anarchism or its 
communal nature. This is on the hand because moving past the communal dimension of 
anarchism, as has been shown from the contestation of Newman’s claims, would mean to 
turn ourselves into nothingness or not active constituents of the world. On the other hand 
this is not because it is impossible to consider oneself as a non-ideologist as Freeden 
says.
376
 I have proven in the first section that seeing anarchism as a political ideology 
diminishes anarchy to merely a part of the political spectrum.  
Even if Freeden is right to some extent, and in a world in which everyone is arguably 
political or a citizen in a political association, one can be seen as obligated in a way to 
support an ideology or have a politicized world view. Anarchism, in order to be in anarchy, 
or what expresses anarchy within the political, cannot be a part of this definition. I argue 
that anarchism should be seen as the manifestation of anarchy, as a way of being, within 
the political context. In particular, it should be seen as activism or as the revolutionary 
praxis that arises out of the need to reestablish communication with otherness or with the 
world. It is not because anarchy needs to be grounded politically or expressed as a political 
end. If what I have argued and discussed in this study is correct, this is precisely what 
anarchy escapes.  
Anarchy does not need anarchists; it is not a political association that comes to be by 
anarchists for the anarchists. In the same way, as the anarchist academic Benjamin Franks 
says in his seminal work on anarchism, anarchism does not need anarchists and it should 
be understood primarily as a mode of revolutionary action rather than a set of theoretical 
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texts.’377 This means that it is not about embracing anarchism as an ideological viewpoint 
or a philosophical understanding of the world, but about accepting it as a collective 
struggle for change. 
More accurately, it is about accepting that anarchy or escaping political contextualization 
is necessarily a collective or a communal struggle and that it cannot be a private matter. 
This means that engagement with anarchism within the current political situation is 
equivalent with the realization of anarchy and not the way towards it. Anarchism should be 
understood as the praxis of being in anarchy within the political or as its manifestation. 
This is because the political is here and it is a part of our being; it is the ground that has 
replaced the communion of othernesses and defines us completely. It has made anarchy, as 
the way of being that does not arise with reference to a definer, impossible. Therefore, it 
would be logical to say that reclaiming non-being or the common, instead of the non-
existent wholeness of being, is what would enable anarchy as a way of being within the 
political. 
Anarchism, then, is to be seen as the struggle for reclaiming ataxia or what is not owned; 
in the sense of otherness or what is not subordinated by and taxonimized in relation with a 
founding principle. As the anarchist academic Nathan Jun observes, anarchism is against 
the domination of representation, which mainly refers to ‘an operation characterized 
chiefly by “speaking for others” or “representing others to themselves” – that is by 
manufacturing images of, or constructing identities for, individuals and groups.’378 
Anarchism is the praxis of being with others in a way that is unavoidably realized within 
the political but is other than the political.  
Anarchism is necessary for anarchy in the political or from the moment that non-being or 
the indefiniteness of being has been replaced by a ground that defines it completely. In the 
absence of the ground that the political imposes upon the being, there is no need for 
anarchism as the being is an active constituent of the world or the communion of 
othernesses it comes to be with. In order to escape the political, anarchism is necessary as 
the coming together of those that have the need to be in a way that is other than the 
political. Anarchism should be seen as the way of being in anarchy within the political.   
                                                          
377
 Franks B. (2006), Rebel Alliances: The Means and Ends of Contemporary British Anarchisms, 
(Edinburgh: AK Press and Dark Star), p. 23. 
378
 Jun N. (2012), Anarchism and Political Modernity, (New York, London: Continuum), p. 128. 
185 
 
Consequently, the understanding of anarchism or the coming together I argue for here is 
not revolutionary in itself; it does not have an aim or an end. It is not realized against or in 
spite of the political. Instead, it can be seen as revolutionary because it is a way of being 
that escapes the political, in the sense of being non-political in itself, while inexorably 
positioned within the political, as the context that encompasses all. Here being non-
political does not mean apolitical; being in anarchy, as this study defines it, is being with 
the world or not being something separate.  
Similarly anarchism, understood as being in anarchy in the political is not a withdrawal 
from or a refusal of the political. If the above analysis is correct, withdrawing or being in 
spite of the world would lead to Newman’s not-being, which is good for nothing. It rather 
is a way of being that respects as in understanding the importance of the role of the 
political in the production of beings and is thus realized in parallel with it.   
Anarchism is to be seen a struggle that is unavoidably realized within the political and that 
is the only reason it could be defined as such. Meanwhile, it is not a struggle against the 
political per se, because that would make anarchy something that derives from the political 
or an antithesis that requires the thesis to be realized against. If it were a political struggle 
then that would make my description of anarchism similar to the understanding of 
anarchism as a political ideology. 
It rather would be correct to say that it is a struggle that is realized in parallel with the 
political. This means that it is a struggle not against the political but as a struggle for 
reclaiming the common world, it entails the shaking off of the contextualization the 
political inflicts upon the individual. Anarchism, then, names this praxis of reclaiming, 
which entails doing away with the domination the political exerts or makes possible 
through the taxonomy it establishes. As the anarchist academic Uri Gordon says:  
The term domination in its anarchist sense serves as a generic concept for the 
various systematic features of society whereby groups and persons are controlled, 
coerced, exploited, humiliated, discriminated against, etc. – the dynamics of which 
anarchists seek to uncover, challenge and erode.
379
    
However, the question that arises is; how can reclaiming non-being or the common not be 
a telos or final end? Because it certainly appears as one and if it is then the anarchy of this 
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study is not anarchy as it has an arché. The answer to this question is that reclaiming non-
being is not an end and neither is it something that one starts with. It is rather a process or 
more accurately a need, that one is with, in the same way one does not choose to be with 
the needs being comes with. If anarchy is a way of being, then it would be fair to say that 
when anarchy is disturbed or replaced the need for anarchy arises in the same way the need 
for food arises in its absence.  
To elaborate, if the coming together of humans is something that arises as a need and if this 
coming together as discussed is not political, in the sense the political has been defined 
here, then it would be fair to say that this need does not wither away with the emergence of 
the political. Instead, based on the analysis of the previous chapter, anarchy is suppressed 
by the laws of the polis that are there to serve the political association and maintain its 
ordering. Meanwhile, if the political is the product of the neediness that characterizes the 
political animal, as chapter four argues, then, it would be accurate to say that it does not 
satisfy the need of being with others. It rather satisfies the neediness of this specific being 
and its obsession to separate itself from the world or free itself from the others through 
enslaving them.  
Consequently, it would be plausible to say that if anarchy underlies the political then 
anarchism, in the way defined here, arises as a need or spontaneously. If this is correct then 
anarchism is the way anarchy manifests itself within the political. It is something that 
arises from being with the world. It is not an ideology or a first philosophy but the way the 
need of being with others, which comes with being with the world, manifests itself under 
the suppression of the political. Anarchism is to be understood as a spontaneous coming 
together of those within which the need for being with others, or the need for anarchy, is 
not covered up or ceased by the political.  
One does not have to be part of a group that identifies as anarchist or being a member of a 
political organization that arises from the anarchist ideology. Instead this means that one is 
an anarchist when one acts within the political as if one is in anarchy. For example, the 
anarchist anthropologist David Graeber argues in an influential paper that one may be an 
anarchist without knowing it.
380
 However, the examples he provides from everyday life in 
the Western world are, probably due to the introductory nature of his paper, very basic and 
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could easily be dismissed as indoctrination rather than being in anarchy or being 
responsible.  
For instance, one of the examples he provides to demonstrate this is with people waiting 
patiently in a line to get on a crowded bus without pushing each other even in the absence 
of punishment for such behaviour. This is a case that can arguably be considered as a case 
of indoctrination or as a habit that does not come from using reason to respond to need. 
This could hold true even if one were to add a person with special needs in the example 
and say that the line breaks in order for the disabled person to get on the bus first. Even if 
there are myriads of similar examples that can be drawn from everyday life they do not 
necessarily mean that one is an anarchist in the sense of being in anarchy, or without an 
arché.  
However, an example that arguably shows that anarchism arises as the need for anarchy in 
the political is arguably the coming together of people in Paris in May 1968. For instance, 
this is captured in the testament of French artist Jean-Jacques Lebel who participated 
actively in the events. So, he says in the book May Made Me that one of the people that 
participated in the uprising that took place in Paris in May 1968 stood up and shared with 
the others that he felt in all of his life that he was crazy because he could not obey the 
authority of others. He says that the said person had internalized the fact that he was crazy. 
But then at a demonstration he saw hundreds of thousands of people sharing what he had 
convinced himself to be nothing more than his own madness.
381
    
This anecdote supports the Democretian claim that if most were ill or mad and only a 
handful were healthy or sane, these would be thought ill and mad, and not the others.
382
 It 
demonstrates that the neediness of the political animal has dominated the world to such an 
extent that acting responsibly or having the need to not be contextualized by an authority 
or an absolute signifier is considered as madness. Similarly, anarchism, the way I identify 
it here, is a coming together that can only be described as a struggle because it is 
necessarily realized under the domination of the political.  
Meanwhile, its revolutionary character comes from the fact that it is spontaneous and not a 
product of chance. Based mainly on the discussion of chapter two and chapter five, being 
spontaneous means to be responsible for one’s own being or be according to need. On the 
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other hand, being political means ultimately to leave things up to chance. As a result, a 
spontaneous way of being, which is realized within a context in which leaving things up to 
chance is the norm appears as revolutionary while in fact, as stated above, it is not.  
It would be fair to say that anarchy needs anarchism, as in its communal nature, because in 
isolation or in the way anarchy is defined by Newman, based on Heidegger and Stirner, 
madness prevails or is reaffirmed as the way of being. Anarchism, then, needs to be seen as 
the praxis or the activism that reestablishes the communication with the other or with the 
world that the political eliminates. Calling oneself an anarchist should not be seen as a 
political identity. Instead it should be considered as the way of revealing that one takes or 
is prepared to take responsibility for being with the world or to use reason to respond to 
need.
383
  
In practical terms this means that one should see the anarchist literature and the struggles 
against authority that have been recorded in human history as the activity or the praxis 
these people reveal to the world that the need for being in anarchy has not been eliminated. 
They should be seen as a testament that the political is not the absolute or the way the 
human beings should be by nature. Their writings, their visions and their actions do not 
represent a guide towards anarchy. They do not form the art of anarchy or a step-by-step 
direction to bring forth the anarchic political association in the way the craftsman produces 
the artifact.  
They are rather the praxis that communicates that slavery, ruling and domination are not 
necessary, or that being in anarchy or not being political is not impossibility but a 
responsible approach to being with the world. They should be seen as a part of the activity 
to reestablish the communion or to not merely be constituted by the absolute significations 
the political imposes. This is to say, arguing, in the way Newman and the post-left 
anarchists do against the communal nature of anarchism, is like arguing for the elimination 
of this very possibility. 
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Conclusion 
To conclude, this chapter has defended the communal nature of anarchism, while rejecting 
the approach that identifies it with the political or as a political ideology. It did so through 
employing the concept of anarchy as a way of being, as this has been developed and 
defined throughout this study. In particular, I have proposed that anarchism should be seen 
as a communal struggle that arises from the need to be in anarchy or to escape the 
contextualization of the political.  
I demonstrated how the more prominent position in anarchist studies, which considers 
anarchism as a political ideology, ends up diminishing anarchy to a part of the political 
totality and thus lessens the probability for radical change. In relation to that, I have argued 
that the political ideology of anarchism depicts anarchy as an anarchic political association 
that is akin to the Aristotelian democracy. It is thus incompatible with the way anarchy has 
been defined here or paradoxical, as it appears to be accepting the Aristotelian ontology or 
the political as the absolute and true way of being, when it should be something other than 
this.  
I have then, turned to the newer tendencies within the field that draw their accounts of 
anarchy upon the ontological projects of Stirner and Heidegger. They argue against the 
ideological definition of anarchism, mainly because of its collective and communal nature. 
I contested their approaches and definition of anarchy as ultimately suggesting that anarchy 
refers to an alternative to the Aristotelian ontology that has the individual as the starting 
point of everything. Hence, based also on the contestation of Heidegger’s thought in 
chapter three, I argued that they end up referring to panarchy rather than anarchy.   
As a result, I have demonstrated that their individualistic approaches either define anarchy 
as a first philosophy or diminish the possibility of change by turning being into an isolated 
and allegedly autonomous entity, which however has no one to turn to. The rejection of the 
communal and the identification of anarchy with the non-ideological autonomous 
individual being eliminate any chance there is for the human to communicate and thus be 
constituted in any other way than the political. Subsequently, I have claimed that this is a 
condition that maintains and reaffirms the irrationality of the political rather than 
challenging it. This is because it would be fair to say that this study has proven that being 
without the other essentially means to be nothing in the sense of not being an active 
constituent of the cosmos.     
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Conclusion 
The Scope of the Study 
Anarchy is a notion that is fundamental in the fields of Political Theory, and International 
Relations Theory. It is a concept that appears for the first time in Ancient Greek texts 
usually in relation to the military and political contexts. However, through Heidegger’s 
work anarchy is introduced and becomes important as an ontological concept. Based 
mainly on his depiction of anarchy as an ontological rather than a political concept the 
school of thought known as post-foundationalism proposes a new understanding of the 
political. In the same way, within the newly emerged field of Anarchist Studies, new 
tendencies such as post-left anarchism and post-anarchism arise.   
These tendencies, following mostly the ideas put forward by the post-foundationalist 
thought rather than traditional anarchism, employ ontological anarchy to challenge and 
replace the fundamental assumptions of anarchism. They propose new understandings of 
anarchy as the concept that defines anarchism and, through this, new ways of seeing 
anarchism. It is within this field, the debate between traditional anarchism and the post-
foundationalist tendencies of anarchism, that this study has located itself.     
The main reason for this is that it has identified both understandings of anarchy, the 
traditional and the post-foundationalist, as mainly negative; as definitions that do not 
adequately capture the meaning of anarchy. Instead they present it as something that arises 
primarily as an antithesis or against an established thesis, be it the political or the 
ontological. I consequently proposed and developed in this study a new definition of 
anarchy; one that depicts anarchy in a positive manner. In fact I have claimed that anarchy 
should be seen as metaphysical because it escapes the political and ontological 
contextualization, a definition that argues for anarchy as a thesis that is even prior to that of 
the said contexts. 
I have argued that anarchy is a notion that refers to the way of being or to the way living 
things are and come to be as active constituents of the cosmos. This, I have defined as a 
communion of othernesses or an endless communication and interplay that is inspired by 
need, as what comes with being with the world or being alive. What this has been shown to 
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mean is that being is in anarchy or already a constituent of a collectivity of beings and 
things that cannot be spoken of in terms of an ultimate signifier or a first philosophy.     
To do so, I approached the issue through bringing together the methodology of three 
prominent figures of philosophy. Specifically, I adopted Heidegger’s understanding that 
anarchy is in fact an-arché or what refers to the absence of an arché, in the way this is 
defined by Aristotle: A ‘first thing from which something is, or comes to be, or is 
known.’384 However, I combined this with Levinas’ approach to anarchy as what escapes 
the dialectic of thesis and antithesis. I did this to come up with a definition of anarchy that 
is a standalone thesis rather than an antithesis to Heidegger’s anarchy is to the Aristotelian 
ontology.  
Meanwhile, I have also followed Aristotle’s example and used his work, this time in the 
way he employs the writings of the thinkers he disagrees with to support his thesis. For 
instance, he uses Democritus as an example to show the implausibility of being without an 
arché. This means that I did not develop my account of anarchy as an antithesis to his first 
philosophy or account of arché. Instead, I employed my critique of his thought in parallel 
or as a way to demonstrate why I am right and not so much why he is wrong, even if 
inevitably I had to prove him wrong.   
Within this framework, I mainly drew upon the thought of Democritus as the Ancient 
Greek thinker that is probably the only one arguing actively for the impossibility of 
capturing the indefiniteness of the cosmos through a single medium. However, to support 
my arguments I also employed the work of Levinas, as a secondary source, as well as that 
of Castoriadis, to a lesser extent, as the thinker that argues against the Aristotelian 
ontology. Moreover, Heidegger’s thought, even though it was mainly disputed by this 
study, was also a useful tool in analysing Aristotle. 
In short, I have argued against most of the Ancient Greek philosophers that turned the 
philosophical inquiry into an ontological one or that imposed an arché upon the cosmos. 
These include mainly Aristotle and Plato as well as the pre-Socratics Parmenides and 
Heraclitus, whose thought however has also informed the claims of this study in a few 
occasions. Other than these, Heidegger has been contested as the philosopher that turns 
anarchy into an ontological project and through him the ideas of the Heideggerians 
Schürmann and Arendt.  
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With regards to post-anarchism in particular, I have narrowed my critique down to 
Newman’s post-anarchism as the one I have identified following Heidegger’s anarchy 
more closely. As a result, the other variant known as post-structuralist anarchism, which is 
a post-anarchism that is however emphasizing mostly on the epistemological rather than 
ontological, has not been included.
385
 Meanwhile, with regards to my critique of the 
political aspect ascribed to anarchy and anarchism, I drew mainly upon the work of 
contemporary anarchist thinkers rather than classical ones. 
Summary and Limitations 
So, in order to argue for anarchy as a way of being, this study dedicated the first two 
chapters to establish the plausibility of such a claim. This is mainly due to the primacy of 
Aristotle’s ontology; as a way of making sense of the cosmos that is arguably more 
relatable to the reader. It is certainly easier to convince someone who makes sense of the 
cosmos through reason that there is a reason for everything rather than the opposite. So, the 
first chapter approached the notion of anarchy in a philological way. The main aim was to 
dissociate anarchy from the meaning of disorder, or of the non-order of the hierarchical 
order, attached to it. It did so, mainly through an analysis of Ancient Greek texts in which 
the notion appears, as well as through a parallel examination of the Aristotelian concept of 
arché. 
The reason for that was on the one hand because this study agrees with Heidegger that the 
Greek language is logos, which means, in his words, that ‘what it presents is what lies 
immediately before us.’386 Through the philological analysis indeed became apparent that 
anarchy is not merely referring to disorder but to something that escapes the order-disorder 
continuum. On the other hand, the term anarchy comes from the Ancient Greek word 
anarchia (αναρχία), which shares the same root with the word arché. Both of them can be 
traced back to the Ancient Greek verb árcho (άρχω), whose main meanings are to govern, 
to rule, to drive or to lead.
387
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Through the analysis of the first chapter, I drew a distinction between what is in anarchy 
and what is anarchic, with the first referring to what is without a founding principle and the 
second to what arises against a founding principle. This preliminary analysis was 
completed by the second chapter, which demonstrated mainly that anarchy is a notion that 
precedes the Aristotelian ontology and appears in Ancient Greek texts as chaos or as the 
metaphysical in general. In particular, I have demonstrated not only that anarchy precedes 
the identification of a founding principle for the cosmos in literature, but that it refers to 
the spontaneity of being that is in fact prior to the imposition of a reason upon the cosmos.  
I showed that the Aristotelian physis or nature is more of a ground for his ontology rather 
than an objective description of the natural world. In a similar way, I argued that 
Heidegger’s ontological anarchy is but an anarchic, or antithetical to the Aristotelian, 
ontological project. I have identified it with the notion of panarchy, as a condition in which 
every human being is an arché rather than anarchy. I did so mainly by drawing upon the 
Democritean fragments and his support for the idea of spontaneous generation or of the 
cosmos being void of a primary cause.  
Having established the plausibility of arguing for anarchy instead of an arché, chapter 
three discussed what this means with relation to the being and the cosmos. I introduced the 
notion of communion of othernesses to describe the anarchy of the cosmos, the notion of 
ataxia, to express the incompleteness and spontaneity of motion in anarchy and the term 
idiosyncrasy to define being as something that is a unique amalgam of synergies. I argued 
that being is always being with the world it comes to be with, or indivisible from it. As a 
result, it is always being as much as non-being and never something complete as Aristotle 
has it. This is because the completeness he argues for is akin to the death of being, because 
it renders it inactive rather than an active constituent of the cosmos.   
Now, since political philosophy and the political in general is something that has been in 
its very early days associated with being or ontology, I have then dedicated chapters four 
and five to examining what being in anarchy means for the political. In chapter four, I did 
this in terms of unity or what brings human beings together. To do so, I introduced the 
notion of need, as the missing or metaphysical link that unifies beings and things, and out 
of which the communion of othernesses arise.  
I argued, however, based mostly on Democritus, that need is not the primary cause of the 
cosmos. Instead it is what comes with being or with being alive; it distinguishes the living 
from the dead and beings from things. In parallel with that, I argued against the 
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Aristotelian depiction of the human being as the political animal. In particular, I 
demonstrated that this description refers primarily to a very specific way of being human, 
which I have dubbed the ontologist. Meanwhile, I showed that this way of being is 
characterized by the neediness to complete the incompleteness of nature or to overcome 
need, which is akin to irrationality. As a result, I have claimed that the political is the site 
of slavery or an imposed unity that is the product of war and chance.  
Following on from this, chapter five approached being and being together with others 
through the notion of freedom. This is because, unlike my identification of the political 
with slavery, the political is portrayed as the way towards human freedom or as what 
makes human liberation from its animalistic nature possible. I demonstrated that there is no 
freedom in the polis, but what is defined as freedom is in fact a futile attempt of the 
political animal to separate itself from the world. Furthermore, I examined Heidegger’s 
authenticity, as a freedom that is realized in spite or against the political, to conclude that it 
refers to a type of indifference towards the world and the others that ends up justifying 
slavery, ruling and domination.   
Subsequently, I argued that the notion of freedom is something that comes with the 
political, or something that emerges with the enslavement of beings. As a result, I claimed 
that freedom is a redundant notion in anarchy. In anarchy there is no need for freedom. 
This is not only because there is no slavery, but also because when one uses reason to 
respond to need rather than overcome it one is by definition in a responsible way and thus 
embraces incompleteness. In other words, one can be original or reveal oneself to the 
world and be responsible for change as one does not impose its private world over the 
common and vice versa.
388
 I consequently argued that the political is a perversion of 
anarchy because it eliminates the possibility of being responsible for one’s own being. It is 
from this that the idea of freedom arises; freedom is only relevant when responsibility is 
not possible, i.e. being a slave.         
Based on the way anarchy has been defined in the previous chapter, I then examined its 
implications with regards to the current debate in the field of Anarchist Studies. I rejected 
the identification of anarchism as political ideology, as something that diminishes the 
possibility of anarchy to be a radical/non-political change. However, I ultimately defended 
the communal nature of anarchism against the arguments put forward by post-left 
anarchists as well as from Newman. This is because they either turn anarchy into an 
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individualistic ontology, in the case of post-left anarchism, or present it as a personal issue 
or one that is realized through being in spite of the world. As a result, I have argued that 
anarchism should be seen as the communal struggle that arises from the need to be 
otherwise than political or defined by it. 
Nevertheless, there are limitations to the way this study approached and argued for 
anarchy. The first one has to do with language. Specifically, the philological approach of 
the first chapter was conducted mainly through the Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott 
Lexicon of Ancient Greek. But for the vast majority of the rest of Ancient Greek literature, 
this study used translated texts. The same holds true for the work of other non-English 
speaking thinkers. This is arguably a limitation as there are sometimes difficulties in 
translating in an exact way specific terms that are employed within a specific context. For 
example, Heidegger’s concept of Dasein which sometimes refers to being, as an entity, to 
beingness or essence and to presence or what appears in the world.
389
      
With regards to the sources used in this study, the absence of many sources about the 
thought of Democritus and even the fact that none of his books has survived is a limitation. 
This in relation with the fact that the sources used here were in English, made it sometimes 
difficult to identify exactly weather a fragment was the actual words of Democritus or what 
the interpreter thought he was saying. To minimize the risk, I have contrasted and 
compared the sources I have used to be as sure as possible. 
Furthermore, I have employed Levinas’ thought and approach to anarchy, but I have not 
engaged in a detailed examination of his claims. This may be seen as a limitation. 
However, the reason for this is that Levinas seems to be rejecting all Ancient Greek 
thought as ontological, when this study identifies anarchy in Democritus works. As a 
result, much like with Heidegger, but to a different degree, his work is employed to serve a 
specific purpose in this study and not to drive it. The difference with Heidegger is that he 
draws upon Ancient Greek thinkers for his ontological anarchy and is thus more relevant. 
Moreover, when it comes to this study’s approach to classical or traditional anarchism, one 
may consider the fact that I have looked only into contemporary sources as a limitation. 
But, as explained, this study is about the concept of anarchy rather than anarchism. 
Defending anarchism or its communal nature is the inevitable result of the understanding 
of anarchy this study develops. In addition, this study’s interest in anarchism comes 
                                                          
389
 See Heidegger M. (2000), pp. 55-78. This page range corresponds to the second chapter of the book in 
which he provides an etymological approach to the concept of being. 
196 
 
through the contemporary debate about anarchy and the way anarchism is presented now. 
Thus, for the purposes of this study it seemed more appropriate to delve contemporary 
anarchists rather than dive into an enormous amount of traditional anarchist texts.     
Secondary Conclusions and Recommendations 
So, from the discussion and argumentation that took place in this study, the following can 
also be said. An anarchist way of being is different from a political as well as an anarchic 
way of being. This means, if my analysis is correct, then being an anarchist is being in 
anarchy but this is necessarily realized within a political context or under the domination of 
the political way of being. In other words, this means to be responsible or to use reason to 
respond to need rather than use reason to function under the authority of the political. On 
the other hand, this is also distinguishable from being in an anarchic way. This is because 
this has proven to refer to a way of being that is merely antithetical to the political or a 
non-feasible alternative.  
Being an anarchist is different than being a political anarchist or someone that departs from 
the central point of politics but remains a part of its totality. In a similar way, being 
anarchic or in an authentic way Heidegger and those draw upon him argue for, is but 
rejecting the authority of the political because one wishes to define its own self or rise 
above the political. This has been proven to be an irresponsible way of being that points 
towards isolation and irrelevancy. This is because, if a relevant analogy can be drawn from 
nature, when wolves hunt they do so in packs and the prey that they usually target are those 
unfortunate enough animals to be left out of the herd or isolated. An anarchist way of being 
that arises from the need to do, rather than to be defined by the political, is by definition a 
communal one.  
Furthermore, the political as a notion is a relic of the Ancient Greek anthropocentric 
ontological thought with which contemporary theories of human coexistence or being 
together with others should part ways with. This is because the political or the polis, 
instead of arising as a response to need, is a product of imposition and violence.
390
 If this 
study is right, then the violence and the war the political animal wages upon nature are 
unnecessary or they are the outcomes of irrational rather than rational behaviour. As a 
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result, the political alongside the notion of the political animal should no longer be 
considered as accurate ways of describing the human being. 
Instead, the human being is already an active constituent of a communion in which there is 
no starting or end point; there is no hierarchy. Beings and things come together out of the 
need for one another rather than by their natural tendency to rule and be ruled or because 
they seek joy. This does not mean that one should not learn the art of politics, even if this 
has proven to be the art of slavery and war.
391
 Instead learning the art of politics is as 
Democritus says a part of being in a responsible way.
392
 This is because in escaping the 
authority of the political one needs to know the ways ruling and enslavement appear and 
become possible.        
In relation with that, it has been argued in this study that Aristotle’s works on politics and 
ethics are inextricably bound to his ontological thinking. In fact political ruling and 
ontology are synonymous in the sense that both define beings and make them appear as a 
part of the human world. It is because of this that the wise man or the philosopher, who is 
supposedly able to apprehend the nature of beings, should rule. The implication of this 
with regards to reading or teaching Aristotle’s politics and ethics is that it is incomplete if 
not impossible to do so without studying or referring to his ontological thought.
393
    
Meanwhile, as has been shown, being in anarchy refers also to the absence of a first 
philosophy. But it is not so much about the absence of a standardized way of making sense 
of the cosmos or it is not about promoting epistemological anarchy. It is rather that if being 
is in anarchy then there cannot be a first philosophy; by definition it is wrong. This is to 
say, also in relation with Heidegger, that philosophy should be seen as an inquiry into 
chaos and anarchy rather than a question of the essence of being. Based on the examination 
of this study, the philosophical inquiry is metaphysical, a question that is not meant to be 
answered in a complete way. Instead, it should be seen as the question that remains open 
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and thus it does not result in closure of meaning, making new knowledge and 
understandings possible.  
Relevance and Further Research 
Now, due to the fact that this study criticizes the foundations of Western philosophy and 
political thought, its findings and arguments can inform various fields. For example, it 
could be utilized to re-examine the foundations of modern Western political philosophy as 
well as the assumptions of anarchy in International Relations theory. In particular, it could 
inform the debate on whether the concept of the state of nature, as this appears in the work 
of the philosopher Thomas Hobbes, refers indeed to anarchy.
394
 In the same way it could 
be employed in the field of International Relations theory, since Hobbes’ concept is central 
to the theory of Realism.
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However, there are two more specific applications that would be more efficient, for the 
purposes of the present discussion, to focus on. The first one refers to the application it can 
have in the field of Anarchist Studies, which was this study’s main objective. So, the 
original definition of anarchy proposed here can be utilized to inform or end the debate 
regarding whether anarchy is a political or ontological concept. As stated, it also supports a 
new way of perceiving anarchism: as a revolutionary or non-political activism.  
However, it can also be employed as a criterion or method for identifying what constitutes 
anarchist thought and action. The fact that it defines anarchy as necessarily a communal 
struggle against political contextualization can be applied in order to distinguish between 
anarchism and those tendencies that identify anarchism with individualism. In particular, it 
can be used instead of the current approaches that define as anarchism every thought 
tendency that rejects the state.  
This approach, more accurately described as a minimal approach, arguably starts with the 
writings of the German judge Paul Eltzbacher and has since become the most commonly 
used method of defining anarchism. Eltzbacher begins by identifying a number of key 
anarchist thinkers to use as representative examples and derives from their writings the 
basic anarchist ideas. This deductive procedure is a normal scientific and logical way of 
using the available data to draw conclusions. But as Schmidt and Van der Welt accuse him 
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of, Eltzbacher instead of choosing anarchist thinkers based on objective criteria, makes his 
choices according to the views that his associates had on anarchism.
396
  
Rather than employing such a vague criterion to define what is anarchist, the applications 
of the definition of anarchy proposed here in all of its aspects would make it possible to 
define anarchist thought in a more accurate way. For example, it would provide a starting 
point for rejecting any type of individualist thought as anarchist. For instance, so-called 
anarcho-capitalism, which Miller identifies with what he dubs anarcho-individualism 
would not, based on my definition, be seen as an anarchism.  
Anarcho-individualism in general and anarcho-capitalism in particular call for a ‘free 
market in which enterprises compete to sell their goods and services.’397 However, such a 
claim, which is mainly an argument for the liberation of the individual to be an active 
participant of a free market not regulated by the state, is certainly not a claim for anarchy. 
It could be positioned closer to what this study has defined as panarchy, in the sense of 
every individual being only for oneself, as it disregards the other in favour of personal 
gain.  
It would be fair to say, based on the discussion of this study, that if one were to adopt the 
individualist approach, which is shared also by the post-left and post-anarchist tendencies, 
the anarchist would be nothing more than a capitalist caricature, or it would strongly 
resemble the literary character of Fernando Pessoa’s The Anarchist Banker. The anarchist 
banker is a person, who understands and supports the validity of the anarchist positions 
but, in the end, puts his egoism and own ambitions above the others and decides that it 
would be self-sacrificing to be responsible for oneself and the other. As a result he chooses 
to be so rich that nothing that happens in the society affects him.
398
  
In general, it is indeed difficult, at times, to distinguish the egoism of the post-anarchist 
being from the overly competitive neoliberal capitalist being that feels that things work out 
for themselves, while it is concerned only with itself. Nevertheless, applying the anarchy of 
this study would be the first step, or more effective if it would be employed in parallel with 
Kinna’s approach, which I like to define as triangulation. This is because she does not only 
employ the common thread of what anarchy means, but also applies this to the various 
schools that are dubbed as anarchist and then she carries an examination of the turning 
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points in history. Such an approach then would arguably reveal the exact circumstances out 
of which the need of anarchism emerges.
399
     
The second application of the concept of anarchy proposed here on which I will focus, is in 
relation with the notion of human rights. In particular, from the discussion that took place 
here a new approach to human rights could emerge. This would be one that does not aim in 
the spreading or establishment of international law but in the abolition of all those 
structures that make human rights possible in the first place. To clarify, human rights are 
arguably something that arises due to the existence of the political or due to slavery, ruling 
and domination. In the absence of this or by being in anarchy I claim that there is no need 
for human rights as having the ability to be according with one’s needs goes without 
saying.  
Such an approach would be arguably less controversial, or more efficient, in the long run, 
than attempting to establish an international law. This is because on the one hand, the 
protection of human rights occurs in many occasions through war in the form of 
humanitarian intervention.
400
 And, on the other hand, human rights and the so-called 
international law are arguably Western ideas and notions.
401
 This is to say, it would 
eliminate the possibility of conceiving them as a way through which the West imposes its 
values in the same way Aristotle and Alexander wanted to Hellenize the peoples of the 
East.  
As Democritus says, an imposed way of being or a law that is followed out of compulsion 
is something that one will rebel against in the first instance.
402
 In general, a global 
anarchist movement, as in a coming together that arises out of the need to be human and 
not a political animal or a citizen, is more than ever relevant nowadays. This is not only 
because it is difficult to see the radical change that Newman sees forming everywhere,
403
 
but mostly because of the damage the political animal has inflicted upon the communion of 
othernesses, through treating beings and things as means towards its end.   
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To sum up, without going to any more detail, the definition of anarchy proposed in this 
study can be utilized for further research and applications mainly within the fields of 
political philosophy/theory as well as that of International Relations Theory. However, it 
could also be applied in the field of environmental ethics, since being in anarchy is being 
with the world or being responsible in a spontaneous way for other beings. Meanwhile, it 
could also be employed to inform the philosophical debate on free-will, since it argues for 
a type of determinism that is inescapable but in which there is no need for freedom.   
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Glossary of Terms 
Actuality: What exists in reality or what appears in the world. In Aristotelian philosophy 
actuality is prior to potentiality or what actually exists precedes and determines the 
potentiality of something to exist.    
Anarchy: A way of being, as defined in this study. This is to say, it signifies the fact that 
being is always incomplete and an active constituent of the cosmos or of the communion of 
othernesses. Thus, it does not refer to a political end or a political association as the 
political ideology of anarchism has it and neither to an ontological project that signifies the 
freedom of the individual from an essential way of being as Heidegger and post-
foundationalism has it.    
Anarchic: What arises as an antithesis to an established thesis of an ultimate definer. In 
other words, it is what requires an arché and thus it is not synonymous with anarchy; it is 
not without arché. For example, anarchism’s anarchy is an anarchic political association or 
an association that requires the political to come to be; it deviates from the political 
orthodoxy but retains the founding principle that gives birth to it. 
Arché: The fundamental concept of the Aristotelian philosophy, used to signify a founding 
principle, primary cause or an ultimate definer that contextualizes everything in a 
hierarchical way. It is that out of which everything else acquires significance and emerges 
as something or as a being or a thing that has a specific/specified potentiality to do or be.    
Ataxia: Adopted by the field of psychology, the notion is employed in this study to refer to 
the incomplete and perpetual motion in anarchy out of which beings and things that form 
the cosmos come to be. It signifies the fact that the being and the cosmos cannot be defined 
completely or rather cannot be defined in terms of an absolute definer. 
Authentes: An Ancient Greek term that was used to signify someone that is a perpetrator 
or an initiator. It is the linguistic root of the term authentic and it has been employed in this 
study to signify the authenticity or freedom to be of the Heideggerian being. In particular, 
it has been used to demonstrate that Heidegger’s being is in the end no different from the 
Aristotelian ruler by nature.    
Being: The fundamental concept of ontology that mainly refers to what exists in the world 
or out of what the cosmos is and comes to be. In Heidegger’s reading of the Ancient Greek 
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philosophers, being is either referring to the entity, the essence of being an entity or what 
appears in the world as an entity. In this study, being has been defined, in opposition with 
the thing, as what is an active constituent of the cosmos; what constitutes and is being 
constituted actively rather than in a passive way.  
Becoming: The process of realization of potentiality of a being towards a 
specific/specified final end or what has not yet been completed; what is not yet a being e.g. 
the boy is a process or an end towards becoming a man. 
Chance: The process or more accurately the result that is contrary to reason, in the sense 
of being an end that was not intended but nevertheless can be traced back to a specific 
reason or a starting point. In this study it has been employed mainly to refer to the result of 
not using reason to respond to need or not being in a responsible way.  
Chaos: The Ancient Greek pre-ontological notion that refers to the anarchy of the cosmos 
or to the fact that the cosmos cannot be spoken of in terms of a sole origin or primary 
cause. 
Collectivity: The notion that refers to being with others. In Heidegger it has a negative 
meaning that is also adopted by Newman to refer to the loss of individuality.  
Communion: The term employed by this study to refer to a metaphysical interplay or 
communication among beings and things. It does not refer to a spiritual union; this study 
does not adopt the religious connotations of the term. It is rather used instead of the term 
community because the later puts geographical restrains or it positions the coming together 
in a specific location. 
Communion of Othernesses: The term employed to refer to the cosmos in anarchy or to 
anarchy itself. In particular, it refers to the constant and incomplete interplay and 
communication of beings and things because of their otherness.  
Dasein: The fundamental concept that refers to being in Heidegger as being in the world or 
appearing in the world. It implies being with others in a non-voluntary way that has 
negative connotations and leads to the loss of one’s freedom to be authentically. In 
addition, it refers to the fact that being in the world is being towards death or that death as 
the ultimate and unavoidable end is what primarily defines being in the world. 
204 
 
Dynamis: The Ancient Greek term that in Aristotle refers to the potentiality a being 
acquires from its primary cause or its arché in order to become a being.  
Entelechy: The term coined by Aristotle to refer to the end of the process of becoming a 
being. It refers to the fact that the motion or change that turns mass or the material 
substratum into a being has a final end that is predetermined and defined by its primary 
cause. Thus, when the process of becoming reaches its final end or is complete the being 
appears in the world for the first time. 
Episteme: The Ancient Greek term that refers to the way the true human being apprehends 
and makes sense of the way of nature. It is used interchangeably with téchne to signify the 
process out of which beings and things appear through contextualization.   
Eudemonia: The Aristotelian term that refers to the way of being that can set human 
beings free or assure they attained immortality through hysterofimia or eternal, after death, 
fame.   
First Philosophy: Another way of referring to ontology or to the fundamental 
philosophical inquiry out of which all other modes of knowledge arise. It is the inquiry into 
the cosmos that requires an arché or that reduces and traces the cosmos to a founding 
principle out of which everything comes to be.  
Hierarchy: A specific/specified ordering in which everything is put under or 
contextualized under a sovereign origin. Or an stratification of beings and things in 
accordance with an arché. The ordering is characterized by completeness and closure, 
while everything that defined by it acquires its significance from the same founding 
principle. It mainly appears in the political, military and religious contexts.  
Homonoia: The Ancient Greek term that refers to the unity among human beings that is 
the result of sharing a common end. In Aristotle this unity is imposed or the common end 
is in fact the end that is imposed by some over others.  
Hysterofimia: The Ancient Greek notion that refers to a type of immortality or fame after 
death that is attained through one’s way of being or through one’s deeds while being alive. 
It appears as the starting point and the final end of the political as well as the aim of the 
true human being in many Ancient Greek thinkers. 
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Ideology: Having a worldview but most importantly, as was employed in this study, it 
refers to the way one interprets and acts upon a first philosophy or a fixed and determined 
way of making sense of the cosmos. In other words, it refers to the variations that arise 
from different interpretations of an otherwise fixed understanding.    
Idiosyncrasy: Being in anarchy. In particular, it is adopted by the field of psychology to 
describe being as something that is never complete in itself but an amalgam of synergies 
among othernesses. Subsequently, it is always something that changes or arranges and 
rearranges itself.     
Imperium: The Latin term utilized by Hannah Arendt and employed by this study to refer 
to the domination a founding principle exerts or to the fact that everything that follows it 
acquires its authority and significance from it.  
In anarchy: Being an active constituent of the cosmos or of the communion of 
othernesses. Thus, instead of referring to what is antithetical to an established thesis or an 
arché, it signifies the total absence of it or an entirely other way of being that cannot be 
spoken of in terms of an arché.  
Logos: The Ancient Greek notion that is translated as reasoning, language and reason as in 
the final end or that for the sake of which what is done is done. In this study, it is mainly 
used to refer to the later. Thus, the animal that has logos in Aristotle is for this study the 
animal that unlike other animals has a reason to be or a final end.  
Like to Like: What Democritus identifies as the way beings and things come together to 
form the cosmos. In this study, this has been used to describe the coming together of 
othernesses or the synergies among them. Thus, the likeness here refers to the uniqueness 
or otherness that makes beings and things come together.    
Mere Cause: A cause of something that is secondary or that arises from the primary cause 
or the arché. The Ancient Greek term used to signify a mere cause is aition. Its 
fundamental difference is that it is not complete in the way the primary cause that moves 
towards a final end is.  
Metaphysical: In this study, synonymous with anarchy or as what escapes the ontological 
thinking that imposes a founding principle upon the cosmos. In particular, it refers to the 
natural world in the absence of a starting point, such as the human téchne or episteme.   
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Need: A fundamental concept in this study as it signifies the missing link or what brings 
beings and things together in a way that is metaphysical or without a starting point. This is 
to say, need is not alternative starting point but what comes with being with the world; it is 
what distinguishes being from not being or what alive from what is dead. 
Non-Being: The incompleteness of nature and of being. It refers to the fact that being is 
never something complete or never a being in the sense of something that appears when 
the process of becoming is complete. Instead being is as much as non-being means that 
being is never something complete in itself but always being with others and the world it 
comes to be with.  
Oneness: The term Heidegger uses to refer to the authenticity or the freedom of the human 
being to be according with its own potentiality to be. It is a concept similar to Stirner’s 
ownness.  
Ontology: In this study, the first philosophy or the way of making sense of the cosmos that 
requires a founding principle. It starts with the reductionism of the pre-Socratics and 
especially with Parmenides and it is completed with Aristotle’s physiology or his physis as 
the primary cause of everything.  
Ontologist: In this study, the Aristotelian political animal or the ruler by nature. In 
particular, it refers to the being or the animal that provides beings with significance and 
make them appear as a part of a context or the political context much like the way the 
craftsman bring things to a presence. It is a different way to refer to the wise man or the 
philosopher that Plato and Aristotle identify as the true human being or the political animal 
that is, among other political animals, better suited to rule.  
Original: Something is original, for this study, not when it is above and over the world, as 
Aristotle arguably has it, not in spite of the world, as Heidegger has it, but when it is 
according with need. This is to say, originality is not a type of freedom from or to, but a 
way of being that is without a founding principle.   
Othernesses: In this study, the uniqueness of the idiosyncrasies that make the coming 
together or the communion of beings and things possible. 
Ownness: The term Max Stirner uses to refer to the his conception of the human being as 
something that owns itself or whose primordial condition is a freedom that comes with the 
mastery it has over itself. 
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Phronesis: The Ancient Greek term that refers to the ability of human beings to 
contemplate or use reason to experience the world. In Aristotle phronesis characterizes 
only the true human beings or those that apprehend the way of nature and thus are able of 
using téchne.  
Physiology: Another way of referring to the Aristotelian ontology. His ontology is a 
physiology because he argues for physis or nature to be the primary cause of everything 
and thus everything is defined and can be spoken of in terms of it. For example, what one 
can do or be is something defined by one’s physis and thus it is in terms of this that one’s 
potentiality to be or do something is expressed according to Aristotle. 
Physis: The Aristotelian conception of nature as the primary cause or the arché of 
everything there is. In this study, this understanding of nature has been shown to be more 
of a convenient way for Aristotle to ground his first philosophy or ontology rather than an 
objective view to the ways of nature.  
Polis: The Ancient Greek term that is usually translated as city-state. In Aristotle it refers 
to the final end of the true human being or of the political animal. It is the site in which and 
through which the political animal is able to be free. However, the polis has been identified 
in this study as the site in which the domination of the political animal is realized and thus 
instead of a site of freedom is the site that comes to be through slavery.    
Political Animal: The term Aristotle coined to describe the true human being or to 
distinguish the humans that are by nature able to rule from those that are by nature meant 
to be slaves. Their ability to rule and what makes them political animals is identified by 
him with their ability to apprehend the way of nature or to possess téchne as the human 
way of producing things that is similar to the way of physis and sometimes completes its 
work. In this study, the political animal has been defined as the mad being or the irrational 
being that driven by its neediness to overcome natural incompleteness it ends up justifying 
the enslavement of other beings towards the attainment of its end.    
Politics: The art that only the political animal is able to employ. It refers to the art of ruling 
and being ruled towards a common end, which is the creation of the polis. In this study, it 
has been identified with ontology or defined as a first philosophy in the sense of being the 
art employed to contextualize everything under a common ultimate definer.  
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Politeia: The Ancient Greek term that refers to the association or ruling and being ruled 
among political animals. It is the political association or another way of referring to the 
polis.  
Politeuma: The way the political association is constructed or to the way ruling and being 
ruled among political animals takes place; aristocracy, democracy and so on.  
Panarchy: The forgotten political term that was firstly coined by Paul Emile De Puydt in 
1860, to refer to the co-existence of all possible ways of government. In this study, it is 
used to refer to Heidegger’s and post-anarchism’s individualism or to their argument that 
every human being is free to be the arché of its own existence.   
Post-Anarchism: The anarchist tendency that criticizes the ontological and communal 
foundations of traditional anarchism or of the political ideology of anarchism based on 
post-foundationalist theories.   
Post-Foundationalism: The thought fusion that brings together the Heidegerrian 
ontological anarchy with the theories of mainly French thinkers such as Michel Foucault, 
among others, to argue against essentialism.   
Post-Left Anarchism: The anarchist tendency that much like post-anarchism criticizes the 
ideological and communal nature of anarchism based mainly on the thought of Max 
Stirner. 
Post-Structuralism: Used interchangeably with post-foundationalism but a distinction can 
be drawn between them is that it does not adopt the Heideggerian phenomenology. It rather 
is concentrated mostly on criticizing the epistemological foundations of essentialism based 
on French thinkers such as Jean-Francois Lyotard among others. 
Post-Structuralist Anarchism: Used interchangeably with post-anarchism but what 
distinguishes them is that it is mainly a critique of the anarchist epistemology rather or an 
epistemological anarchism rather than an ontological one.  
Potentiality: Appears, in Aristotle, with the term dynamis and it refers to the innate or by 
nature ability of beings to become something specific/specified. It is positioned by him as 
posterior to actuality; as it is actuality that determines potentiality. In this study, 
potentiality or the ascription of innate abilities has been identified with the death of being 
or the elimination of the being’s ability to change and be other than oneself.  
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Principle: Much like the mere cause is what follows or emerges from a primary cause or a 
founding principle. It is an axiom, a rule or a canon that serves towards the attainment of 
the final end defined by the founding principle.  
Responsibility: In this study it refers to being in one’s own accord or using reason to 
respond to need. It is a fundamental notion in this study as being in anarchy is essentially 
being responsible for one’s own being and through this being responsible for the others. 
Slave: The entity, in the Aristotelian sense, that has no end in itself or a reason to be. As a 
result, it is meant to be ruled for its own good as being left alone is unable to apprehend 
what is good. In this study, a slave has been defined as the being whose needs are defined 
by someone else through violence or domination. Thus, rather than being a natural, in the 
sense of predefined, way of being as Aristotle has it, it is something that is forced upon 
someone.   
Soul: According to most of Ancient Greek philosophy, the founding principle, the arché or 
the ruling part of the human being, with the material substratum or the body being the 
slave. The soul of the true human beings rules in the way of the arché or in a despotical 
way over the body. In cases where this does not occur then the being is a slave by nature or 
a being that is unable to rule over its own body.  
Spontaneity: In Aristotle, what is contrary to reason, similarly with chance, and is used to 
describe the way of being of lesser animals; others animals or human beings that are 
unable to rule over their own body. In this study, spontaneity has been defined as being 
according with need. It has been employed to signify a way of being that rather than being 
contrary to reason is what escapes the rational-irrational relationship. It describes being in 
anarchy as being responsible for oneself; use reason to respond to need.  
Téchne: The Ancient Greek term that is used by Aristotle to refer to the way the human 
being brings beings and things into presence that is similar with physis and sometimes 
completes its work. It is the know-how that is possible only for the true human being to 
possess and through which the human cosmos appears or through which the human final 
end of the polis is possible. 
Teleocracy: The term Renier Schürmann uses to define the Aristotelian ontological 
thought. It is can be used interchangeably with the term teleology but what distinguishes it 
is the fact that in teleocracy the telos or the final is what prevails and what drives the whole 
process of becoming; the final end is beginning and the end of the process.   
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Telos: The Ancient Greek term that refers to the final end or to what appears at the end of 
the process of becoming. In Aristotle telos is what drives and controls the process. It is a 
final end in the sense of not being a mere end or something that appears during the process 
but it represents the finished or complete product. For example, the boy is an end in the 
process of becoming a man, but it is the man that is the telos or the final end of the process.    
Unconcealment: In Heidegger, the process of disclosing to oneself its true self, which is 
only possible by being authentically or according with one’s own potentiality to be.  
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